Saturday, December 20, 2014

Attention News Media


Attention: R. Jones of ABC NEWS, DETROIT, MICHIGAN:


 Lyons and his companies was started in 1978: From 1978 to 2000 Lyons never had any complaints filed against him personally or his companies.

 

Not Until Ronald and Virginia Storzbach making a fraudulent complaints to steal money from him and his company. The Storzbach's then recruits other past clients and one developer Jerry Jarvis so they could also steal money and work that was performed by George Lyons and his companies.  



"Lyons had his builders and Residential Brokers License and it was illegally revoke in 2001."


Per Attorney General Statements: The action we do take will be based in part on our experience, information and knowledge of and about the person complained against.

 

These past clients steals over $770,000.00 of money and work performed from George Edward Lyons and his company. Lyons Builders Inc. By not paying money back to Lyons for money Lyons personally used to construct their homes.

 

This was accomplished by ex-wife illegally removing Lyons from his marital home. And informing Lyons that she threw everything out of the marital home.  Including evidence against these past clients. This evidence was recovered in 2007. 

 

See audio tapes of ex-wife omitting that her attorney Brian Lavan told her to illegally remove Lyons from the marital home. To protect the $800,000.00 equity in the home.

 

The same Attorney Brian Lavan who work for George Lyons and his company on two cases.  Prior to be employed by ex-wife. The same Attorney Brian Lavan that sold to George Lyons a commercial property at 210 S. East Street, Brighton, Michigan for $250,000.00 on a Land Contract. See TIME DATED AUDIO TAPES.

 



                                                 210 S. East Street, Brighton, Michigan 48104

 

The same Attorney Brian Lavan that illegally remove Lyons from the commercial property by making a false forfeiture with his partner Judge Hegarty of the Brighton, Livingston County.

 

Per audio tapes Brian Lavan omitted that he did in fact committed an illegal act to acquire 210 S. East Street.  Also per the same audio tape Brian Lavan wanted Lyons make a false complaint to The State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial Services against Realtor Richard Baker of the Baker Team. So he didn't have to pay a commission to Richard Baker for the second sell of 210 S. East Street, Brighton, Michigan. That Richard Baker sold the property for cash. So Lavan could purchase a foreclosed property 8550 Grand River, Brighton, Michigan. Please review these audio tapes and Lavan criminal acts. The action of Lavan cost the loss of 210 S. East Street, Brighton, Michigan. And $20,000.00+ worth of bring the property up to code. And money George Lyons and his company invested into the property.

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

                                         8550 Grand River Road, Brighton, Michigan 48114

 


 


Experience: of George Lyons acquire Residential Builders license in 1978. Which was 
wrongfully and criminally removed by the Consumer & Industrial services in 2001. George Edward Lyons Built many residential homes and subdivisions.

 

George Lyons acquire Residential Real Estate license in 1976 to 2001 25 years and Residential Brokers License in 1978 to 2001 for 23 years. Residential Builders License 1978 to 2001 for 23 years. Of which was wrongfully and criminally removed by the Consumer & Industrial services in 2001. George Lyons owned and operated 5 Real Estate offices. 1 office in Ann Arbor, 2 offices in Brighton, 1 in office in Dexter and finally 1 office in Pinckney, Michigan.

 


On both licenses George Lyons recovered evidence that was previously presented to Consumer & Industrial service enforcement division. Proving the illegal acts of

 

Director Al Shefkey

Auditor Nicholas Myers

Director James Montgomery

And others

 

 And other in these state offices. Of CONSUMER AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES /Enforcement Division. Having full Knowledge and evidence prior to any judgment of their Courts of Consumer & Industrial Services that George Lyons and his company did no violations of the false and fraudulent complaints of these past clients. Time Dated audio tapes with these above employees of Consumer & Industrial services. Having this evidence the employee’s proceeded in filing fraudulent ruling and reports to the Consumer & Industrial service court. 

 

The past clients having these fraudulent reports. Use to make fraudulent lawsuits against George Lyons and his company. Please review the Time dated audio tapes.

 

The State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial Services enforcement division. Now called LARA-LICENCING AND REGULATIONS


in 2014. With this evidence George Lyons tried to open a meeting with Consumer & Industrial Service Director of Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division  Al Shefkey who worked for Consumer & Industrial enforcement division. Administrative Assistant Director Al Shefkey and the re-showing of  this evidence. This evidence along with audio tapes which are time dated of Director Al Shefkey of Consumer & Industrial services and Auditor Nickolas Myers and others having full information that George Lyons was totally innocence of any and all complaints that was filed by past clients. Auditor Nickolas Myers states on time dated audio tapes.  That George Lyons and his companies did no violations against these past clients.


These past clients were making COMPLETE fraudulent statements prior to the judge’s rulings. These audio tapes were played to now Director Al Shefkey and other employee’s.

 

While playing the audio tapes George Lyons also audio taped Director Al Shefkey and others listening to these audio tapes and there comments. THAT these representatives of Consumer & Industrial service enforcement division  comments stated these past clients were stealing and trying to destroy George Lyons and his companies. See all of these time dated audio tapes. But they still support the past clients false complaints.  Is it because of Ronald Storzbach’s being a police officer.


These issues and many more should come forth to protect License Residential Real Estate Agents, and License Residential Builders. Even if you overwhelming prove your innocence and you have the people on Time dated audio tapes.

I BELIEVE THEY WERE PROTECTING 2 ATTORNEY’S WHO COMMITTED EXTORTION AND EMBEZZLEMENT AGAINST GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES. ONE OF THESE ATTORNEY’S IS NOW A JUDGE. SEE AUDIO TAPES. 2

 

Judge Hegarty

Judge Delvero

Judge Burress

Judge Stanley Latreille

Judge Reader

Judge Reck

There are more



The Consumer & Industrial Services enforcement division will file false auditor reports. Even when they know the truth prior to any judgments. These issues should come out of the shadows and light expose on many issues of criminal acts against me, and my Residential Real Estate License, and Residential Builders License. Which I received my Residential Real Estate License in 1976 and my Builders in 1978. There was no complaints file against these licenses until the criminal act of these past clients. These past clients would use these fraudulent complaints judgments in the Livingston County courts. Where the Livingston County courts would only listen to the fraudulent judgments of Consumer & Industrial service. By doing this in 1997 these past clients stole $770,000.00 from me and my company. George Lyons income for 1997 was to be $ 1, 250,000.00 (One million Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars. Lost because of these people and past clients and others. That will be expose. Along with the State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial service and the Livingston County courts and others.

 

PAST CLIENTS WHO JOIN TOGETHER TO STEAL MONEY AND WORK FROM GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES. CAUSING GEORGE LYONS IN FACING INDIGENTCY.  TO STOP GEORGE LYONS FROM HAVING MONEY FOR ATTORNEY TO FIGHT THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THESE PAST CLIENTS.

 

RONALD AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH-G.M. ENGINEER AND WORK FOR HAMBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT.  THE PEOPLE THAT STARTED THESE FALSE AND FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS. AND ALL MADE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO THE STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICE.  SEE TIME DATED AUDIO TAPES. STATING THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE MAKING FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO STEAL MONEY FROM GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANY. AND WERE OUT TO DESTROY GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES.

 

RICHARD AND ANN FRIBERG

 

DAVID AND CARRIE FEEBACK

 

CURT AND MARY ANN LALONDE

 

IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH

 

JERALD JAVIS – DEVELOPER OF PARTRIDGE POINTE, BRIGHTON, MICHIGAN

 

CORRUPTED ATTORNEYS: I AM CALLING OUT THESE ATTORNEY’S TO PROVE ME WRONG. AFTER THEY REVIEW THEIR TIME DATED AUDIO TAPES.

 

ATTORNEY BRIAN LAVAN

ATTORNEY GERALD EIDT

JUDITH THOMPSON

ATTORNEY DALE COOPER: COMMITTED EXTORTION AND MAKING FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO THE COURTS.

ATTORNEY RICHARD COLIN NOW JUDGE FOR WASHTENAW COUNTY COURTS. RESIDING IN CHELSEA MICHIGAN. COMMITTED EXTORTION.

ATTORNEY MAX SPICKARD

ATTORNEY CHARLES WIDMAIER

ATTORNEY DOUGLAS CAMERON

PROSCUTION ATTORNEY DAN GERBER



BY EXPOSING THESE PEOPLE. TO THE LICENSE REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND TO LICENSE BUILDERS THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA.

HOPEFULLY THESE ACTIONS OF LYONS WILL PROTECT THEM

BECAUSE THIS COULD HAPPEN TO YOU TO. THIS HAPPEN TO ME. SO PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS.
Now why didn’t I come forth about these issues: Ex-wife thinking and fearing these past clients would steal or martial home equity by making fraudulent lawsuits that was acquire with fraudulent judgments from Consumer & Industrial services.

 

My marital home appraised for $800,000, 00 in 1997.   1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan



in 1998 Ex-wife illegally removes George Lyons from the martial homes through the advice of her attorney. So none of these past clients could attach the equity in the home. And when George Lyons went back to retrieve his evidence and property Ex-wife stated to George Lyons that she throughout everything of George Lyons out of the marital home. She and others tried to destroy any and all evidence and personal property? Including time dated audio tapes.



In 2007. I was informed by C & C dumpster company, Howell, Mi. A company that I used in constructing homes. "The worker stated: George who going to pay for this dumpster you or Patti (ex-wife). I informed the person what I was going thru. He stated George I have the largest dumpster here. And everything in the dumpster has your name on it. He then stated the dumpster and the contents in the dumpster becomes his property. Now George what driveway do you what me to drop the dumpster at.



I recovered all evidence. Including time date audio tapes. Evidence that was presented to Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division employees along with time dated audiotapes.
I am presently going to the news media in the very near future: With the following sandwich board signs. Because If I can’t get fair justice or trial in the Livingston County court system because of their and attorney’s criminal acts. 3

 



I will try my best to protect both State of Michigan License Real Estate agents and Residential Builders. And Expose these issues. To the public.

I have recently lien 4 properties: For $21,000,000.00

1. 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan

2. Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan

3. 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan

4. 4849 Gallagher, Whitmore Lake, Michigan.


These register documents can be reviewed through the Livingston County Register of Deeds. 4

 

SANDWICH BOARD TO BE WORN TO PICKET THE COURTS AND NEWS STATIONS


ATTENTION
NEWS MEDIA
THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURTS SYSTEM IS CORRUPTED


39 EMERGENCY MOTIONS FOR JUDGE’S DISQUALIFICATION
FOR BIASNESS. PLUS ALL JUDGE’S WERE CALLED AS MATERIAL WITNESSES

ALL REFUSED THESE MOTIONS ILLEGALLY.



THERE IS MUCH MORE CORRUPTION…
I HAVE THE EVIDENCE

LOOKING FOR INTERVIEWS
GEORGE LYONS
734-330-1004
http://findingjusticeforpeople.blogspot.com 5

 



CORRUPTED ATTORNEY’S

CORRUPTED PROSCUTOR ATTORNEY’S

CORRUPTED POLICE AGENCY’S

CORRUPTED STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES

CORRUPTED FRIEND OF THE COURTS OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY

THIS IS A GOOD OLD BOY’S CLUB

STARTED WITH A CLIENT WHO WAS WORKING FOR HAMBURG TOWNSHIP POLICE

WHO REFUSED TO HAVE BLACK’S BUILD IN A SUBDIVISION IN BRIGHTON, MICHIGAN

ALL ITEMS ARE ON AUDIO TAPES TIME DATED

I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET A FAIR TRIAL.

I CHALLENGE YOU NEWS MEDIA TRY TO FIND ME IN MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS…

IF THIS CAN HAPPEN TO ME THIS COULD HAPPEN TO YOU… OR ONE OF FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS.

NOW STOP AND EXPOSE THE CORRUPTION

 

THIS 2 PAGE DOCUMENT IS GOING ON A SANDWICH BOARD 6

 

 

 

NOW THESE PEOPLE TRIED TO USE THIS STATEMENTS THAT THE CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES ENFORCEMENT AND USED THIS FALSE STATEMENTS TO DE-FAME ME. By definition of harm somebody's reputation: to attack somebody or somebody's reputation, character, or good name by making slanderous or libelous statements.

 

THE COST OF THE COVER-UP OF THE FALSE STATEMENTS OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES ENFORCEMENT DIVISION ENFORCEMENT DIVISION. JUST ONE THING IS $ 21,000,000.00+ (Twenty One Million plus) BETWEEN 1998 TO 2014 LOST OF INCOME. THERE IS A LOT MORE. THIS IS JUST INCOME BECAUSE THESE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THESE PEOPLE.

 



AGAIN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES ENFORECEMENT DIVISION HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT GEORGE LYONS WAS TOTALLY INOCENCE OF ANY CHARGES PER CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES ENFORCEMENT DIVISION. PRIOR TO ANY JUDGMENTS FROM CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES.



Respectfully submitted

George Lyons

6180 Academy Drive Suite 4

Brighton, Michigan 48116

734-330-1004


[x] I certify that the information in these documents is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
[x]I consent to releasing to the Michigan Attorney General any information or documents relative to the investigation of this complaint. 7

 

 


Prior to the Emergency Motions of the Judge’s being disqualified for biasness

All judges were also were call as material witnesses.


 



RECOVERED EVIDENCE THAT WAS HIDDEN FROM GEORGE LYONS

THERE ARE MORE PICTURES.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Prior to the Emergency Motions of the Judge’s being disqualified for biasness
all judges were also were call as material witnesses. 8 9 10



RECOVERED EVIDENCE THAT WAS HIDDEN FROM GEORGE LYONS BY EX-WIFE AND KARL AND MARIAN KOPP


THERE ARE MORE PICTURES.
11


The following Emergency Motion of Disqualification of Judge’s for Biasness document is a copy that I could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 39 more Emergency Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as Material Witnesses? And more.

 

 

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.

Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.

Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.

None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").

 

 

 

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". H R 420


The following document is a copy that I could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 38 more Emergency Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as Material Witnesses?  And more.

                                                                  STATE OF MICHIGAN
                                        IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
                                      210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)


State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge

GEORGE EDWARD LYONS                                                          HONORABLE  CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226                                                                                         Case no. 06-021758-CZ                                           
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169                                                            Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679                                                                                       Case no. 04-20684-CK
                                 
                                                         
PLAINTIFF

-V-

RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
                                                            DEFENDANTS

Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564

                                                               DEFENDANTS

David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W                                           Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood                                                                                Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169

 

                                                                                                                  NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS                                                                                          2000 Grand River
                                                                                                                  Suite 200
                                                                                                                  Brighton, Michigan 48114




 

Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W                                                    Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane

Aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169

734-878-2278                                                                           Attorney for the Defendant’s Lalonde’s and attorney Charles Widmaier

                                                                                                    Attorney Kenneth V. Zich                                                   

                                                                                                     515 E. Grand River Avenue,
                                                                                                     Howell, Michigan. 48543

Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no.                          04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139

810-231-3286              

                                                                                                      Attorney for the Defendants Kopp’s

                                                                                                      Douglas Cameron
DEFENDANTS                                                                              317 W. MAIN Street
                                                                                                       Brighton, Michigan 48116


IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W                                          Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,

Aka Betty Lyons Lane                                                                                           
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                        Charles Widmaier attorney for the

                                                                                                       Defendant’s Marcich’s
734-878-1874                                                                              822 E. Grand River
                                                                                                       Brighton, M 48116

 

 

FOLLOWING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES.


AND ATTORNEYS FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL ALL CLAIMS, AND ALL CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION AND OTHER INVESTIGATOR’S


NOW COMES PLAINTIFF GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, States that Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow court procedures or guidelines of the MCR. 2.003.

ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;

A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,

B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.

Procedure:

Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:

“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.

As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.

The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.

ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;

1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and

3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

Plaintiff George E. Lyons made this motion and says:

1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:

3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.

4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.

a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);

b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).

1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.

2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.

5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)

ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS

6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116

9.
All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live

58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live

59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live

60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live

61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live

62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live

63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live

all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.

 

FOOTNOTE: THE ABOVE WERE ALSO CALL AS MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 38 EMERGENCEY MOTIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE’S FOR BIASNESS.

64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live

And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.


The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.




 


WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully request:

A. that this motion be granted; and,
B. that this matter be thereafter transferred to the State Court Administrator’s office for reassignment to wherefore another circuit as required by MCR 2.003 et seq.


                                                                           RELIEF

ALTERNATIVE, THIS WAS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,

That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and

That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

Procedure:

Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:

“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:

MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a hearing and decides the motion.

The motion was denied, and then the plaintiff is NOW referring the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion or submit this to the State of Michigan administrator Office for a de novo on the record 32/33.

This motion is being request by the Plaintiff and per MCR 2.003 be followed. And placed before the Chief Judge and “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:

Respectfully submitted this January 31st, 2007




By: __________________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


                                                                               STATE OF MICHIGAN
                                      IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
                               210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)


State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge

GEORGE EDWARD LYONS                                                        HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE Latreille
P.O.BOX 226                                                                               Case no.06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169                                                  Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679                                                                      Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN

DEFENDANTS

Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS

David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W                                                    Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood                                                                                               Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                                              NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS                                                                                                       2000 Grand River
                                                                                                                          Suite 200
                                                                                                                          Brighton, Michigan 48114


Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W                                                Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane                           Attorney for Defendants Attorney Charles Widmaier
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                                          Attorney  Kenneth V. Zichi
734-878-2278                  DEFENDANTS                                                      515 E. Grand River Avenue,
                                                                                                                         Howell, Michigan. 48543


Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W                                      Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER                                                                 Attorney for Defendants
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139                                             Douglas Cameron
810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS                                              317 W. MAIN Street
                                                                                                Brighton, Michigan 48116


IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W                                    Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane              Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                   Charles Widmaier
734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS                                                822 E. Grand River,
                                                                                                  Brighton, Mi.48116




AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S, AND PLACING THESE CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION.



Plaintiff George E. Lyons, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that the following facts are true to the best of his personal knowledge; or are based on information and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true; and if sworn as a witness in this matter he would competently testify and produce other evidence to conclusively prove as follows:

1. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, and on information and belief, has numerous personal contacts and acquaintances among all of Livingston County judges, court clerks, other court employees and personnel.

2. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, these allegations beginning many years ago, became directly, indirectly, regularly and routinely involved and enmeshed with all Livingston County and Washtenaw judges and other court personnel in numerous legal, political, fraternal and social organizations. Structures and activities; all of which on information and belief, has provided and continues to provide numerous opportunities for judicial and extra-judicial ex-parte contacts with Livingston County and Washtenaw judicial officers and other court personnel.

3. Plaintiff believes that the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and
other legal representatives, acting herein, has and will actively use his/ and their long-time positions, influence, access to judges and access to court records: to make ex-parte contacts with members of the Livingston County bench and /or their employees in attempts to create bias in defendant’s favor; to surreptitiously remove materials from court records to which Plaintiff is a party; and to otherwise deprive Plaintiff of his rights to due process in this case in any manner possible.

4. On information and belief, HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and
Other legal representatives, for past clients has already used his status and connections to misinform and intimidate potential attorneys for defendants in this case and thereby effectively deprived Plaintiff of legal representation herein.

5. Plaintiff believes that, from its inception, Defendant’s and other past clients has been given special considerations in the handling and treatment of the instant case by 44th Livingston county Circuit court and personnel, due to bias in favor of Defendant’s and their attorney.



6. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, herein is inextricably involved and enmeshed in numerous judicial and extra-judicial matters which include, in general, all Livingston County judicial and circuit officers and other court personnel.



7. All members of the Livingston Judicial and Circuit County bench would have a natural inclination or tendency, if sitting in judgment, to be biased in favor of Defendant’s and/or against Plaintiff due to the status and judicial connections of Defendant’s counsel and past attorney’s.



8. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, has too many opportunities, and is of a mind, and has already undertaken, to improperly engage in ex-parte communications with Livingston County Judicial and Circuit court judges relative to this case; And the has repeatedly representation of Due to the circumstances and relationship existing between the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, and all judicial and Circuit court officers in Livingston County; Plaintiff believes he cannot get a fair trial or hearing in this county.



9. Plaintiff has presented to this court, and other courts evidence to support the removal of this Case No’s. 06-021758-CZ, STORZBACH'S,FRIBERG'S,LALONDE’S AND FEEBACK’S 04-020652 KOPP’S AND 04-021106-CK Marcich’s to a de nova hearing to the State of Michigan Administration Hearing to be transfer to another circuit court.



10. Defendant George E. Lyons hereby swears under penalty of perjury that all facts stated in the forgoing Affidavit In Support of Emergency Motion for Disqualification and Denying Summary Disposition and court rulings of the Honorable Judge Stanley
Latreille of the Defendants are true to the best of his personal knowledge or stated on information and belief, and as to those facts he believes them to be true.


By: _____________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me
This_______day of ___________. 2007

Notary Public: ____________________________

STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)

State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge

GEORGE EDWARD LYONS                                                      HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226                                                                             Case no.06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169                                                Case no 020652-CF-B
734-657-1679                                                                           Case no.04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY  42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS

Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS

David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W                               Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood                                                                    Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                       NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS                                                                              2000 Grand River
                                                                                                      Suite 200
                                                                                                      Brighton, Michigan 48114

Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W                            Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka

3100 Betty Lyons Lane                                                             Attorney for Defendants Attorney Charles Widmaier
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                      Kenneth V. Zichi
734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS                                                   515 E. Grand River Avenue,
                                                                                                     Howell, Michigan. 48543



Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W                                           Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER                                                                      Attorney for Defendants
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139                                                  Douglas Cameron
810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS                                                   317 W. MAIN Street
                                                                                                     Brighton, Michigan 48116


IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W                                        Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane                 Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                     Charles Widmaier
734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS                                                  822 E. Grand River,
                                                                                                     Brighton, MI 48116



 



BRIEF MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE.

DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITION JUDGMENT AND 7 DAY NOTICE. AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S. AND PLACING ALL CASES ON STAY UNTIL AFTER INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION OR OTHER INVESTGATOR’S FROM THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FOR FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS
.


DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT

these underlying principles of disqualification law are well settled. What the Michigan Supreme Court said almost 125 years ago in Stockton v Township Board is and Peninsular Railway v Howard, it remains valid and binding today:

“It Is among the First objects of civil government, to deprive persons of the power in adjudge finally for themselves, and conclusively assert their own causes; and so fundamental is this rule of justice, so essential to the order, peace, and even stability of government, that however broad the terms of a grant of judicial power may be, this principle remains operative, and gives rise to a tacit exception from the general words of the grant’s…The principle … asserts itself wherever judicial powers are employed by a body appointed by law…the rule is not confined to cases where the person is both judge and party.

 

The principle… applies to the elements and substance of the controversy, and in general, where the case is of such a nature as to make it necessary, in its course or final issue for the Trier to pass upon his own implicated rights or interest, the rule attaches and unseats him. Subtle

The court ought not to be astute to discover refined subtle distinctions to save a case from the operation of the maxim, when the principle it embodies bespeaks the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of the litigants are not the only object of the rule. A sound public policy, which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by law from discredit, imperiously demands its observance. “10

exactly what are the: implicated rights or interests”10 which will disqualify a judge? As was held in Stockton, supra, the can be found in the “elements and substance of the controversy:” what the Supreme Court almost a century later referred to as the “circumstances and relationships” of a case when it decided Glass v State Highway Commission, 23 citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Murchison.

“A fair trial is fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationship must be considered. This court has said, however, that every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge…not to hold the balance site, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law, ’23 Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform it high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 24

The Glass court said, “Such reasoning applies equally to Michigan’s assurance of due process.” Therefore, virtually any “circumstances or relationship existing between a judge and a party litigant which would offer “ possible temptation to an average” person “ not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” between contending litigants denies due process of law and is interest enough to provide grounds for disqualification. ”23”


We expect our judges to be human beings with normal human faults and shortcomings like the rest of us, not angles in robes. We realize there are some situations where it would be extremely difficult for any judge to remain neutral and impartial, the often-quoted opinion in Wayne County Prosecutor v. Doerfler 24

“Justice Cardozo has stated.

“ Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions which make the man, be he litigant or judge. “27

A judges are not expected to bring with him to the bench a blank mind and personality. As he becomes, by necessity, a composition of the general experiences of his life, refined and honed by his legal training and legal experience so that the desired judicial temperament will hopefully emerge. “28

to require a blank mind is unreasonable, but to demand an impartial and clear appraisal of each new case is not. A judge may well be subconsciously prejudiced in one way towards the evidence or the parties in a case before him. It is his duty not to permit these prejudices to override his responsibilities in providing a fair forum for the determination of controversy. This duty should ideally motivate the judge to request reassignment of the case if he is aware of any prejudices which he holds which would interfere with his impartiality “29
Modern disqualification rules, grounded in public policy, exist as much for the good of the court as for the good of any litigant; and every judge has a duty to avoid even the appearance of bias, prejudice or partiality. Freely granting disqualification when justified and necessary to achieve that end. As was said in Warren Schools v. MERC: 2

“The object of this rule…is more than guaranties that a legal dispute will be resolved objectively by unbiased and impartial persons. It is also a shield against any suspicion on the part of the litigants and the public that any subjectivity, bias and partiality contributed to the outcome of the dispute. The though behind such was best expressed by Justice Frankfurther in Baker v Carr 22:

The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance…” 22

The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted a rule stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Withrow:”4 judges and decision-makers should be disqualified without a showing of actual bias where “experience teaches that probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, “4

Throughout the last century. Courts have slowly but surely broadened the measure by which a disqualification “threshold” can be reached, steadily relaxing the standards for it employment. While early decisions tended more toward requiring concrete evidence of bias such as direct financial or personal interest, there was a gradual movement toward requiring only an appearance of bias, now well-established; and, more recently, the trend is allowing a petitioner’s reasonable belief that bias exists to establish the appearance of bias, to wit: In a 1981 decision, Pitoniak v Borman’s, 5 the court held:

“A basic requirement of the constitutional right is due process is a hearing before a fair, unbiased and impartial decision-maker. 1/2/3/4/5 A party who challenges the impartiality of a judge need not show actual prejudice; it is one in which: experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. “4/5/6

then in 1982, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in People v Lowenstein: 14“… (Some disqualification cases)… deal with how much of an allowance our courts will make for a judge’s inherent human failings. No human being (even a judge) is completely prejudice-free. But our judicial system requires judges. Therefore we make allowances. Under normal circumstances, we will assume (absent evidence to the contrary) that the judge is free enough from bias to make a tolerably non-partisan Decision. For example, a judge will occasionally preside over a case involving a defendant who had earlier pleaded guilty to the offense.

 

Because this situation often enough arises and because the appearance of impropriety is not that high, we allow the trial judge to remain in charge of the case absent a showing of actual bias…A C However, we realize that some situations are just too dangerous.

 

Judges normally are not subjected to such special pressures and “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies in human weaknesses, we find that the appearance of justice requires the judge to disqualify himself.

The test is not (just) whether or not actual bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused. “17 In fact, even though a judge personally believes himself to be unprejudiced, unbiased and impartial, he should nevertheless certify disqualification where there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias or prejudice. “18/6/2 (emphasis added)

And circumstances of such a nature as to cause doubt can arise from the mind of a petitioner, as was held in1986 by the Florida Supreme Court, which arrived at the Michigan result by applying the same analysis from a different perspective, making several important points along the way as emphasized below:

“ … The facts alleged in a motion to disqualify need only show that the party making it has a well-grounded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge.

 

Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge may be biased, and not the judge’s own perception of his or her ability to act fairly. … The sufficiency of the allegations depends upon whether he or she has successfully established the actual existence of prejudice.

 

The letter standard would render the motion for disqualification virtually futile and result in the sort of adversary proceeding between judge and petitioner that create bias or the appearance thereof even where none had existed before. “33 (emphasis added)

And further to that:

“Generally, disqualification of a judge from action in a proceeding in which he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent is intended not merely for the benefit of the parties to the suit, who are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, but for the general interests of justice, by preserving the purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions.

 

Moreover, judicial tribunals must not only be, but appear to be impartial, so that where circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion of bias, disqualification may be warranted although there is no proof of actual bias. “36 (emphasis added)

No matter where the evolution of disqualification theory may lead, the eternal catch -22 of disqualification law will always follow: upon any request for disqualification, if there exists even a reasonable suspicion of the presence of bias, prejudice or partiality

any failure to grant the request tends to beg the question, lead to more suspicion and possibly create the evil otherwise truthfully denied and sought is be avoided.
A truly independent non-biased judge considering such a situation should not care about retaining jurisdiction of any particular case; but instead rise above one’s self, respect a petitioner’s well-plead request and promptly proceed to remove all grounds for any suspicion of doubt, by granting

Disqualification.


Procedure:

Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:



“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.


: MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification.

 

 

The Judge complained of then holds a holds a hearing and decides the motion. If the motion is denied, then the party or attorney may refer the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion de novo on the record 32/33.


Respectfully submitted this January 31, 2007






By ______________________________________
George Edward Lyons
P.O.Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679

 

 

 

 

TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES


1. US Const, Am XIV; Mich Const 1963,art 1,set 17;
2. In Re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136; 75 S Ct 623( 1955)
3. Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 579; 93 S Ct 1689 ( 1973)
4. Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351 ( 1975 )
5. Pitoniak v Borman’s, Inc. 104 Mich App 718, 722-723(1981)
6. Withrow v Larkin, 421, US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1455( 1975)
7. Mathews v Eldridge,424, US 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893 ( 1976 )
8. Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 263-271; 90 S Ct 1011 (1970)
9. Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 386 Mich 1 ( 1971)
10. Stockwell v Township Board, 22 Mich 341 ( 1871)
11. Peninsular Railway Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich 18 ( 1870)
12. People v Houston, 179 Mich app 753, 756 ( 1983 )
13. Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35, 37-38 (1982)
14. People v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475, 481-432 (1982)
15. United State v Grinnell, 384 US 563; 86 S C: 1698 (1966)
16. People v Rider, 93 Mich App 383 ( 1979 )
17. Ungar v Sarafite. 376 US 573, 588: 84 S Ct 841 (1964)
18. Merritt v Munster, 575 P2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1978)
19. Strong v Pontiac General. 117 Mich App 143, 148 (1982)
20. Wayne County v Recorder’s Court, 81 Mich App 143, 148 (1982)
21. Warren Schools v MERC. 67 Mich App 58 (1976)
22. Baker v Carr. 369 US 186, 267; 82 S Ct 691. 737 – 738 (1962)
23. Tumey v Ohio 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437 (1927)
24. Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14; 75 S Ct 11 (1955)
25. Glass v State Hwy Const. 370 Mich 482 ( 1963 )
26. Wayne County Prosecutor v Doerfler, 14 Mich App 428( 1968 )
27. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 167.
28. Utilities Com v Pollak, 343 US 451, 466; 72 S Ct 813 ( 1952 )
29. Mirych v State Fair Commission, 376 Mich 384( 1965 )
30. Consumer Power v Iosco Circuit Judge, 210Mich 572 (1920)
31. Hayes-Albion v Kuberski, 108Mich App 642, 657-658 (1981)
32. Gruprynski v Bay Judge, 166 Mich 118, 123-124 (1988)
33. People v Gauntlett, 134 Mich 737, 757-761 (1984)
34. MCR 2.003 et seq.
35. Caleffe v Vitale, 65 ALR 4th 67, 71-72 (1986)
36. See 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges ss. 86; see also ss. C (1) (a. b) of Canon 3 of the Code 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Am Jur 2d Desk book)


 

 

 

 

"Fraud on the Court by an Officer of the Court"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"





1. Who is an "officer of the court"?

        A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully.

State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).

2. What is "fraud on the court"?

        Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated

"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."


        "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

               3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?

        "Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).


        Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

        Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain circumstances.
        In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).


        Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")

("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").


        That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."


        The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
        "Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).


        Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.


        Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.

None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

 


        Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").


 Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".

To amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to improve attorney accountability, and for other purposes.

 

The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.


        If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.


        However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.


        The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he/she has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.


        Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.

Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

 

 

Michigan Court Rules

 

Rule 2.003       Disqualification of Judge

(A)     [Unchanged.]

(B)     Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot

        Impartially hear a case, including but not limited to

        Instances in which:

        (1)      The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for

                 Or against a party or attorney.

        (2)      The judge has personal knowledge of disputed

                 evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

        (3)      The judge has been consulted or employed as an

                 Attorney in the matter in controversy.

        (4)      The judge was a partner of a party, attorney for

                 A party, or a member of a law firm representing a

                 Party within the preceding two years.

        (5)      The judge knows that he or she, individually or

                 As a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or

                 Child wherever residing, or any other member of

                 The judge's family residing in the judge's

                 Household, has an economic interest in the

                 Subject matter in controversy or in a party to

                 The proceeding or has any other more than de

                 Minimis interest that could be substantially

                 Affected by the proceeding;

        (6)      The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person

                 Within the third degree of relationship to either

                 Of them, or the spouse of such a person:

                 (a)     Is a party to the proceeding, or an

                         Officer, director or trustee of a party;

                 (b)     Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding?

                 (c)     Is known by the judge to have a more than

                         De minimis interest that could be

                         Substantially affected by the proceeding;

 

                 (d)     Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be

                     A material witness in the proceeding.

 

                 A judge is not disqualified merely because the

                 Judge’s former law clerk is an attorney of record

                 For a party in an action that is before the judge

                 Or is associated with a law firm representing a

                 Party in an action that is before the judge.

(C)     [Unchanged.]

(D)     Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may

        Be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the

        Parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence

        Of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If,

        Following disclosure of any basis for disqualification

        Other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,

        The parties without participation by the judge, all agree

        That the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge

        Is then willing to participate, the judge may participate

        In the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or

        Placed on the record.

 





 

 

Rule 2.003 Disqualification of Judge PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES

 

(A)               Who May Raise. A party may raise the issue of a judge's disqualification by motion, or the judge may raise it.

 

(B)               Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which:

 

(D)   That the judge has knowledge he/she may be called as a material witness.

(1)                The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.

 

(2) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

 

(3) The judge has been consulted or employed as an attorney in the matter in controversy.

 

(4) The judge was a partner of a party, attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm representing a party within the preceding two years.

 

(5) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.

 

(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

 

(A) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party;

(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) Is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;

(d) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceedings.

 

Footnote: Again Plaintiff/Defendant George Lyons filed 39+ Emergency Motions to Disqualify Livingston County Judge’s for Biasness

 

Which The Livingston County Judges refused to acknowledge.  PLUS THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURT JUDGES REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENT TO THE JUDGE PER LAWSUITS.  In Summary’s that was given to the court prior to any hearings before any judges.

 

Per MICHIGAN COURT RULES:

 

A judge is not disqualified merely because the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of record for a party in an action that is before the judge or is associated with a law firm representing a party in an action that is before the judge.

 

(C) Procedure.

 

(1)                Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial and inconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the moving party discovers the ground for disqualification. If the discovery is made within 14 days of the trial date, the motion must be made forthwith. If a motion is not timely filed, untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion should be granted.

 

(2)                All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit. In any motion under this rule, the moving party must include all grounds for disqualification that are known at the time the motion is filed. An affidavit must accompany the motion.

 

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

 

(a)                In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

(b)               In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.

(4) Motion Granted. When a judge is disqualified, the action must be assigned to another judge of the same court, or, if one is not available, the state court administrator shall assign another judge.

(E)    Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification.

If, following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or placed on the record.

Disqualification of Judges




Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.

In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).

Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").

That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice.”

Our Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.

One of our members not only did not receive justice from a prejudiced judge, but he does not believe that he received justice from the judge, as required by law.

"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances."  Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.

Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves.  By law, they are bound to follow the law.  Does your judge follow the law?

Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which further disqualifies the judge.  Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has disqualified himself/herself.  None of the orders issued any judge who has been disqualified by law are valid, they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

However, as we know, many judges ignore the law, but by doing so, they not only attempt to harm you, the public, but they have made a mockery of the law, and have evidenced a disdain for Justices of higher courts, such as the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.  If judges do not have respect for other judges, why should judges expect the respect of the public?

Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".  The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity.  The judge has no more lawful authority than your next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge).  However since some judges believe that they are the Lord, they may not follow the law.  (Judge Rosen entered his courtroom each day, stood before the court audience, raised his hand, and stated that he was the Lord.  The night before he was to be indicted, he took a gun and blew his brains out.  So much for a judge being the Lord.)

If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, has disqualified him/herself.

However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that your judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.

One of our members has filed several motions for disqualification, only to have the judge ignore the motions. The member will post on this web-site several of the motions filed, to give the public a taste of the law and how judges ignore the Supreme Law of the Land. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and we suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

This member will post some of his motions here for educational purposes, and links to these motions will be found on this page.

We will also inform you on what you can do to assist others in disqualifying judges. Please assist when requested.




The above citations are only the tip of the iceberg in the disqualification of judges.  Citizens would appreciate your informing us of any additional citations, whether Federal or State, that concern the disqualification of a judge.  Help complete this page of information.  

 

 

Criminal Penalties

Section 324.XXXXX Criminal Penalties; fraud

(1) Beginning on [the effective date of the act], a person, who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this part, knowing that the statement, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.

(2) A person who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this part, knowing that the statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is subject to a civil fine of $50,000.00 for each submission. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.

(3) A person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than $2,500.00 or more than $50,000.00 for each violation:

(a) Knowingly releases a hazardous substance or causes a release contrary to applicable federal, state, or local requirements or contrary to any permit or license held by that person, if that person knew or should have known that the release could cause personal injury or property damage.

(b) Intentionally damages or renders inaccurate any monitoring device or permanent marker required to be maintained under this part or a rule promulgated under this part.

(c) Intentionally destroys any record required to be maintained under this part or rule promulgated under this part.

(d) Knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of an environmental covenant existing at a facility when obligated to do so, and that failure results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

(e) Intentionally alters, removes or damages an exposure barrier designed to prevent exposures to hazardous substances, including, but not limited to, a physical barrier or written instrument and that action results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

(f) Intentionally fails to disclose to a purchaser, lessee, easement holder or vendee that real property is a facility subject to due care provisions [at the point of sale, lease, easement grant, or vendee contract] in accordance with section [Disclosure and Notice Requirements] and that failure to disclose results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

 

(4) In addition to a fine imposed under subsection (1) or (3), the court may impose an additional fine of not more than $25,000.00 for each day during which the release or

DEQ Proposal Page 1 of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009

 

 

I.           History of Judicial Disqualification

 

Disqualification standards in the United States have been a work in

progress, gaining in complexity and strength over time. Under English

common law, the only accepted basis for judicial disqualification was

financial interest—disqualification for bias was not recognized. In

1792, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that was the precursor to 28

U.S.C. § 455. This legislation codified the common law by calling for

disqualification of a district judge who was “concerned in interest,” but

added that a judge could also be disqualified if he “has been of counsel

for either party.”10 The statute was expanded in 1821 to require disqualification

when relatives of the judge appeared as parties.11

In 1891, Congress enacted legislation, later codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 47, forbidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that the

judge tried.12 In 1911, the precursor to § 455 was further amended to

require disqualification when the judge was a material witness in the

case.13 That same year, Congress enacted new legislation (later codified

as 28 U.S.C. § 144) entitling a party to secure the disqualification of a

judge by submitting an affidavit that the judge has “a personal bias or

prejudice” against the affiant or for the opposing party. A decade later,

in Berger v. United States,14 the Supreme Court interpreted this statute to

prohibit a judge from ruling on the truth of matters asserted in such an

affidavit, and to require automatic disqualification if the affidavit was

facially sufficient.

In 1927, the Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to

the law of disqualification. In Tumey v. Ohio,15 the Court invalidated,

on due process grounds, an Ohio statute that authorized a judge to

preside over cases in which the judge would receive court costs assessed

against convicted (but not acquitted) defendants.

By the mid-twentieth century, common-law aversion to judicial

bias as grounds for disqualification continued to exert considerable

10. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 178–79 (1792).

11. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (1821).

12. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (1891).

13. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (1911).

14. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).

15. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

6

 

II. Disqualification Under

28 U.S.C. § 455

A. Overview

1. The text of § 455

The primary source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system

is 28 U.S.C. § 455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:

§ 455. Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned.

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in

controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served

during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or

such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;

(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such

capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning

the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular

case in controversy;

(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or

minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject

matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest

that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship

to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee

of a party;

(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially

affected by the outcome of the proceeding;

. (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in

the proceeding

(c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial

interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the

personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in

his household.

 

III. Disqualification Under

28 U.S.C. § 144

A. Overview

Section 144 of Title 28 states in its entirety:

Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and

files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the

matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or

in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further

therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.

The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that

bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before

the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or

good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party

may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a

certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.419

By its terms, § 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to

§ 455, which applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the

United States.” A literal reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force

disqualification automatically, simply by filing an affidavit alleging that

the judge is biased against the affiant or in favor of the affiant’s opponent.

Such an interpretation would render § 144 akin to peremptory

disqualification procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number of

western states—and the legislative history of § 144 lends some support

for this interpretation.420

The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must

step aside upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit; but they have

been exacting in their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit

requires and of the procedural prerequisites to application of the

statute. Thus, motions have been dismissed for untimeliness; because

the movant failed to submit an affidavit or submitted more than one

affidavit; because the attorney rather than a party submitted the affida-

419. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949). Originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of

1911, the statute was recodified as § 144 in 1948 without significant change.

420. 46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Representative Cullop).

84

IV. Disqualification Under

28 U.S.C. § 47

A little-used disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no

judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or

issue tried by him.”476 One reason the statute has barely surfaced in the

case law is that its applicability is limited to cases in which a trial judge

subsequently serves as an appellate judge in the same matter, which

may occur when a district judge is appointed to the circuit court or sits

on the circuit court by designation. A second reason it is so rarely employed

is that on those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqualification,

the same result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a).

As an historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always

so. When members of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the

eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was not uncommon for

them to hear appeals as Supreme Court justices from cases they decided

as circuit court judges.

In Russell v. Lane,477 the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision

of a state appellate court in which the judge had been a member

of the panel. The Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance

of impropriety in violation of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however,

the court cited the relevance of § 47, noting that it “is an express

ground for recusal . . . in modern American law for a judge to sit on

the appeal from his own case.”478

A somewhat more extended discussion of § 47 is found in an opinion

by Judge James Craven, Jr., of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit, explaining his disqualification from a school desegregation

case.479 As a district judge years earlier, he heard and decided a

case involving the same parties. Although the instant case was a separate

lawsuit, it raised the identical “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme

Court’s treatment of the predecessor statute to § 47, Judge Craven

held that the statute must be “strictly construed” to prevent judges

476. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1994).

477. 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989).

478. Id. at 948.

479. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.

 

Violation continues. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of the person under this subsection, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $25,000.00 and not more than $50,000.00 per day of violation. Upon conviction under subsection (3), in addition to a fine, the court in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for not more than 2 years or impose probation upon a person for a violation of this part. With the exception of the issuance of criminal complaints, issuance of warrants, and the holding of an arraignment, the circuit court for the county in which the violation occurred has exclusive jurisdiction.

(5) Upon a finding by the court that the action of a criminal defendant prosecuted under this section poses or posed a substantial endangerment to public health, safety, or welfare, the court shall impose, in addition to the penalties set forth in subsections (3) and (4), a fine of not less than $1,000,000.00; and, in addition to a fine, a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.

(6) To find a defendant criminally liable for substantial endangerment under subsection (5), the court shall determine that the defendant knowingly or recklessly acted in such a manner as to cause a danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that either of the following has occurred:

(a) The defendant had an actual awareness, belief, or understanding that his or her conduct would cause a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury.

(b) The defendant acted in gross disregard of the standard of care that any reasonable person would observe in similar circumstances.

(7) As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.

(8) Knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant under subsection (5) may be attributed to the defendant if the defendant took affirmative steps to shield himself or herself from the relevant information.

(9) The attorney general or county prosecutor may conduct an investigation of an alleged violation of this section and bring an action for a violation of this section.

(10) If the attorney general or county prosecutor has reasonable cause to believe that a person has information or is in possession, custody, or control of any documents or records, however stored or embodied, or tangible object relevant to an investigation for violation of this part, the attorney general or county prosecutor may, before bringing any action, make an ex parte request to a magistrate for issuance of a subpoena requiring that person to appear and be examined under oath or to produce the documents, records, or objects for inspection and copying, or both. Service may be accomplished by any means described in the Michigan court rules. Requests made by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham County.

(11) If a person objects to or otherwise fails to comply with a subpoena served under subsection (10), an action may be brought in district court to enforce the demand. Actions filed by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham County.

MDEQ Proposal Page 2 of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009

Mr. Jones this is only the tip of the ice berg: I have so much evidence that it’s overwhelming. Including brief cases of audio tapes. Last Court date was and the end of 2013.

 

Respectfully submitted

 

George Edward Lyons

6180 Academy Drive

Suite 4

Brighton, Michigan 48116

734-330-1004

October 17, 2014

 

 

 

 





"Fraud on the Court by an Officer of the Court" And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"? 2. What is "fraud on the court"? 3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding? 4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"


1. Who is an "officer of the court"?

A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully.


State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).



2. What is "fraud on the court"?



Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated



"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."



"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."



3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?


"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the 29



Entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).



Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.


4.
What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

 

Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain circumstances. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).

 



Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")



("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").


That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972),
the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."

 

The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice. 30

 



"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).



Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.


Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.


Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.

None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.


 

 

 

 

 

 

 



Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution
. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").

 

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". H R 420

 

The following document is a copy that I could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 38 more Emergency Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as Material Witnesses?  And more.

                                                                  STATE OF MICHIGAN
                                        IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
                                      210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)


State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge

GEORGE EDWARD LYONS                                                          HONORABLE  CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226                                                                                         Case no. 06-021758-CZ                                           
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169                                                            Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679                                                                                       Case no. 04-20684-CK
                                 
                                                         
PLAINTIFF

-V-

RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
                                                            DEFENDANTS

Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564

                                                               DEFENDANTS

David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W                                           Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood                                                                                Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169

 

                                                                                                                  NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS                                                                                          2000 Grand River
                                                                                                                  Suite 200
                                                                                                                  Brighton, Michigan 48114




 

Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W                                                    Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane

Aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169

734-878-2278                                                                           Attorney for the Defendant’s Lalonde’s and

                                                                                                    attorney Charles Widmaier

                                                                                                    Attorney Kenneth V. Zich                                                   

                                                                                                     515 E. Grand River Avenue,
                                                                                                     Howell, Michigan. 48543

Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no.                          04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139

810-231-3286              

                                                                                                      Attorney for the Defendants Kopp’s

                                                                                                      Douglas Cameron
DEFENDANTS                                                                              317 W. MAIN Street
                                                                                                       Brighton, Michigan 48116


IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W                                          Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,

Aka Betty Lyons Lane                                                                                           
Pinckney, Michigan 48169                                                        Charles Widmaier attorney for the

                                                                                                       Defendant’s Marcich’s
734-878-1874                                                                              822 E. Grand River
                                                                                                       Brighton, M 48116

 

 

FOLLOWING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES.


AND ATTORNEYS FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL ALL CLAIMS, AND ALL CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION AND OTHER INVESTIGATOR’S


NOW COMES PLAINTIFF GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, States that Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow court procedures or guidelines of the MCR. 2.003.

ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;

A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,

B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.

Procedure:

Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:

“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.

As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.

The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.

ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;

1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and

3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

Plaintiff George E. Lyons made this motion and says:

1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:

3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.

4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.

a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);

b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).

1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.

2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.

5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)

ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS

6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116

9.
All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live

58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live

59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live

60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live

61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live

62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live

63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live

all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.

 

FOOTNOTE: THE ABOVE WERE ALSO CALL AS MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 38 EMERGENCEY MOTIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE’S FOR BIASNESS.

64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live

And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.


The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.




 


WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully request:

A. that this motion be granted; and,
B. that this matter be thereafter transferred to the State Court Administrator’s office for reassignment to wherefore another circuit as required by MCR 2.003 et seq.


                                                                           RELIEF

ALTERNATIVE, THIS WAS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,

That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and

That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.

Procedure:

Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:

“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:

MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a hearing and decides the motion.

The motion was denied, and then the plaintiff is NOW referring the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion or submit this to the State of Michigan administrator Office for a de novo on the record 32/33.

This motion is being request by the Plaintiff and per MCR 2.003 be followed. And placed before the Chief Judge and “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:

Respectfully submitted this January 31st, 2007




By: __________________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"Fraud on the Court by an Officer of the Court"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"





1. Who is an "officer of the court"?

        A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully.

State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).

2. What is "fraud on the court"?

        Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated

"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."


        "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

               3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?

        "Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).


        Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

        Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain circumstances.
        In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).


        Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")

("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").


        That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."


        The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.


        "Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).


        Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.


        Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.

None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

 


        Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").


 Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".

To amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to improve attorney accountability, and for other purposes.

 

The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law.


        If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.


        However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.


        The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he/she has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.


        Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.

Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

 

Michigan Court Rules

 

Rule 2.003       Disqualification of Judge

(A)     [Unchanged.]

(B)     Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot

        Impartially hear a case, including but not limited to

        Instances in which:

        (1)      The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for

                 Or against a party or attorney.

        (2)      The judge has personal knowledge of disputed

                 evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

        (3)      The judge has been consulted or employed as an

                 Attorney in the matter in controversy.

        (4)      The judge was a partner of a party, attorney for

                 A party, or a member of a law firm representing a

                 Party within the preceding two years.

        (5)      The judge knows that he or she, individually or

                 As a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or

                 Child wherever residing, or any other member of

                 The judge's family residing in the judge's

                 Household, has an economic interest in the

                 Subject matter in controversy or in a party to

                 The proceeding or has any other more than de

                 Minimis interest that could be substantially

                 Affected by the proceeding;

        (6)      The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person

                 Within the third degree of relationship to either

                 Of them, or the spouse of such a person:

                 (a)     Is a party to the proceeding, or an

                         Officer, director or trustee of a party;

                 (b)     Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding?

                 (c)     Is known by the judge to have a more than

                         De minimis interest that could be

                         Substantially affected by the proceeding;

                 (d)     Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be

                     A material witness in the proceeding.

 

                 A judge is not disqualified merely because the

                 Judge’s former law clerk is an attorney of record

                 For a party in an action that is before the judge

                 Or is associated with a law firm representing a

                 Party in an action that is before the judge.

(C)     [Unchanged.]

(D)     Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may

        Be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the

        Parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence

        Of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If,

        Following disclosure of any basis for disqualification

        Other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,

        The parties without participation by the judge, all agree

        That the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge

        Is then willing to participate, the judge may participate

        In the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or

        Placed on the record.

 





Rule 2.003 Disqualification of Judge PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES

 

(A)               Who May Raise. A party may raise the issue of a judge's disqualification by motion, or the judge may raise it.

 

(B)               Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which:

 

(D)                       That the judge has knowledge he/she may be called as a material witness.

 

(1)                The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.

 

(2) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

 

(3) The judge has been consulted or employed as an attorney in the matter in controversy.

 

(4) The judge was a partner of a party, attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm representing a party within the preceding two years.

 

(5) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding.

 

(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

 

(A) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party;

(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;

(c) Is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;

(d) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceedings.

 

Footnote: Again Plaintiff/Defendant George Lyons filed 39+ Emergency Motions to Disqualify Livingston County Judge’s for Biasness

 

Which The Livingston County Judges refused to acknowledge.  PLUS THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURT JUDGES REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENT TO THE JUDGE PER LAWSUITS.  In Summary’s that was given to the court prior to any hearings before any judges.

 

Per MICHIGAN COURT RULES:

 

A judge is not disqualified merely because the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of record for a party in an action that is before the judge or is associated with a law firm representing a party in an action that is before the judge.

 

(C) Procedure.

 

(1)                Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial and inconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the moving party discovers the ground for disqualification. If the discovery is made within 14 days of the trial date, the motion must be made forthwith. If a motion is not timely filed, untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion should be granted.

 

(2)                All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit. In any motion under this rule, the moving party must include all grounds for disqualification that are known at the time the motion is filed. An affidavit must accompany the motion.

 

(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,

 

(a)                In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;

 

 

(b)               In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.

 

(4) Motion Granted. When a judge is disqualified, the action must be assigned to another judge of the same court, or, if one is not available, the state court administrator shall assign another judge.

 

(E)    Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification.

 

If, following disclosure of any basis for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may participate in the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or placed on the record.

 

 

Disqualification of Judges




Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances.

In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).

Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").

That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice.”

Our Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.

One of our members not only did not receive justice from a prejudiced judge, but he does not believe that he received justice from the judge, as required by law.

"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances."  Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.

Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves.  By law, they are bound to follow the law.  Does your judge follow the law?

Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which further disqualifies the judge.  Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has disqualified himself/herself.  None of the orders issued any judge who has been disqualified by law are valid, they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.

However, as we know, many judges ignore the law, but by doing so, they not only attempt to harm you, the public, but they have made a mockery of the law, and have evidenced a disdain for Justices of higher courts, such as the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal.  If judges do not have respect for other judges, why should judges expect the respect of the public?

Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".  The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity.  The judge has no more lawful authority than your next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge).  However since some judges believe that they are the Lord, they may not follow the law.  (Judge Rosen entered his courtroom each day, stood before the court audience, raised his hand, and stated that he was the Lord.  The night before he was to be indicted, he took a gun and blew his brains out.  So much for a judge being the Lord.)

If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, has disqualified him/herself.

However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that your judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.

One of our members has filed several motions for disqualification, only to have the judge ignore the motions. The member will post on this web-site several of the motions filed, to give the public a taste of the law and how judges ignore the Supreme Law of the Land. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and we suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

This member will post some of his motions here for educational purposes, and links to these motions will be found on this page.

We will also inform you on what you can do to assist others in disqualifying judges. Please assist when requested.




The above citations are only the tip of the iceberg in the disqualification of judges.  Citizens would appreciate your informing us of any additional citations, whether Federal or State, that concern the disqualification of a judge.  Help complete this page of information.  

 

Criminal Penalties

Section 324.XXXXX Criminal Penalties; fraud

(1) Beginning on [the effective date of the act], a person, who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this part, knowing that the statement, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.

(2) A person who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this part, knowing that the statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is subject to a civil fine of $50,000.00 for each submission. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.

(3) A person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not less than $2,500.00 or more than $50,000.00 for each violation:

(a) Knowingly releases a hazardous substance or causes a release contrary to applicable federal, state, or local requirements or contrary to any permit or license held by that person, if that person knew or should have known that the release could cause personal injury or property damage.

(b) Intentionally damages or renders inaccurate any monitoring device or permanent marker required to be maintained under this part or a rule promulgated under this part.

(c) Intentionally destroys any record required to be maintained under this part or rule promulgated under this part.

(d) Knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of an environmental covenant existing at a facility when obligated to do so, and that failure results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

(e) Intentionally alters, removes or damages an exposure barrier designed to prevent exposures to hazardous substances, including, but not limited to, a physical barrier or written instrument and that action results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

(f) Intentionally fails to disclose to a purchaser, lessee, easement holder or vendee that real property is a facility subject to due care provisions [at the point of sale, lease, easement grant, or vendee contract] in accordance with section [Disclosure and Notice Requirements] and that failure to disclose results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.

 

(4) In addition to a fine imposed under subsection (1) or (3), the court may impose an additional fine of not more than $25,000.00 for each day during which the release or

DEQ Proposal Page 1 of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009

Violation continues. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first conviction of the person under this subsection, the court shall impose a fine of not less than $25,000.00 and not more than $50,000.00 per day of violation. Upon conviction under subsection (3), in addition to a fine, the court in its discretion, may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for not more than 2 years or impose probation upon a person for a violation of this part. With the exception of the issuance of criminal complaints, issuance of warrants, and the holding of an arraignment, the circuit court for the county in which the violation occurred has exclusive jurisdiction.

(5) Upon a finding by the court that the action of a criminal defendant prosecuted under this section poses or posed a substantial endangerment to public health, safety, or welfare, the court shall impose, in addition to the penalties set forth in subsections (3) and (4), a fine of not less than $1,000,000.00; and, in addition to a fine, a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.

(6) To find a defendant criminally liable for substantial endangerment under subsection (5), the court shall determine that the defendant knowingly or recklessly acted in such a manner as to cause a danger of death or serious bodily injury, and that either of the following has occurred:

(a) The defendant had an actual awareness, belief, or understanding that his or her conduct would cause a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury.

(b) The defendant acted in gross disregard of the standard of care that any reasonable person would observe in similar circumstances.

(7) As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.

(8) Knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant under subsection (5) may be attributed to the defendant if the defendant took affirmative steps to shield himself or herself from the relevant information.

(9) The attorney general or county prosecutor may conduct an investigation of an alleged violation of this section and bring an action for a violation of this section.

(10) If the attorney general or county prosecutor has reasonable cause to believe that a person has information or is in possession, custody, or control of any documents or records, however stored or embodied, or tangible object relevant to an investigation for violation of this part, the attorney general or county prosecutor may, before bringing any action, make an ex parte request to a magistrate for issuance of a subpoena requiring that person to appear and be examined under oath or to produce the documents, records, or objects for inspection and copying, or both. Service may be accomplished by any means described in the Michigan court rules. Requests made by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham County.

(11) If a person objects to or otherwise fails to comply with a subpoena served under subsection (10), an action may be brought in district court to enforce the demand. Actions filed by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham County.

 

MDEQ Proposal Page 2 of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009

Mr. Jones this is only the tip of the ice berg: I have so much evidence that it’s overwhelming. Including brief cases of audio tapes. Last Court date was and the end of 2013.

 

Respectfully submitted

 

George Edward Lyons

6180 Academy Drive

Suite 4

Brighton, Michigan 48116

734-330-1004

October 17, 2014