Court of Appeals

STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS Docket no. 311087

GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, Lower Court/Tribunal 6180 Academy Drive Case no. 11-25871-CZ Apt. 4 Brighton, Michigan 48116 734-330-1004

Plaintiff(s) Appellant(s) SENT TO COURT SEPT. 24TH 2012 V. Revised October 15, 2012 ON TIME 14 DAYS AFTER REQUEST FROM COURT OF APPEALS.

PATRICIA ANN LYONS, 1781 Nemoke Trail, Apt 10 Haslett, MI 48840-8635 Phone number unknown Defendant(s) Appellee(s)

Defendant Attorney: David Prine P40590 Of Halm Christian & Prime PC 2130 W. Grand River Ave. Howell, Michigan 48843 517-548-5310

PROOF OF SERVICE STATE OF MICHIGAN County of Livingston

 I affirm that on October 31, 2012, I George Edward Lyons sent one copy of the Following Documents: Amended Brief per letter from court of appeals dated October 18th 2012 which was deposited at a United State Post Office in Brighton, Michigan 48116 addressed to Defendant’s, Appellee Attorney David Prine 2130 W. Grand River Ave. Howell, Michigan 48843 and mailed a copy of this Appeal brief to the Livingston County Circuit Courts at 204 Highlander Way, Howell, Michigan 48843 Date: October 30th, 2012 _____________________________    

George Lyons 6180 Academy Drive, Apt 4 Brighton, Michigan 48116 734-330-1004

STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Docket no. 311087 GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, Lower Court/Tribunal 6180 Academy Drive Case no. 11-25871-CZ Apt. 4 Brighton, Michigan 48116 734-330-1004 Plaintiff(s) Appellant(s)

V. PATRICIA ANN LYONS, 1781 Nemoke Trail, Apt 10 Haslett, MI 48840-8635 Phone number unknown Defendant(s) Appellee(s) Defendant Attorney: David Prine P40590 Of Halm Christian & Prime PC 2130 W. Grand River Ave. Howell, Michigan 48843 517-548-5310

Appeal from the 44th Judicial Circuit, Livingston County, Case no. 11-25871-CZ Hon. Michael Hatty Dated May 17th 2012

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities …………………………………………………………………iv Statement of Jurisdiction …………………………………………………………….1 Statement of Questions Involved in this Appeal ...………………………………...2 Statement of Facts ……………………………………………………………………3 Argument ……………………………………………………………………………10 Amendment of Brief…………………………………………………………..…….21 I. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s case, with prejudice, on a new argument raised by the judge for the first time at the summary disposition hearing. The basis raised by the judge was a failure by Plaintiff to pay sanctions in another, unrelated litigation. This was not a defense raised by the defendant in its pleadings, and had never been raised by Defendant. Plaintiff, present in pro per, had no notice that this would be an issue at the hearing, and was given no opportunity to try to consult an attorney or prepare a response. By dismissing Plaintiff’s case on an entirely new ground without giving Plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to respond, the Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s case with prejudice denied Plaintiff his due process rights. ……………………………..…...…10-14 2. Plaintiff is indigent and is unable to pay the sanctions imposed from Plaintiff’s unrelated prior litigation. The dismissal of Plaintiff’s case with prejudice for a failure to pay fees that Plaintiff cannot pay denies Plaintiff his constitutional right of access to the courts under the US Constitution. Paragraph II page……………...…….. 10 to 12 3. The trial judge also ruled that Plaintiff’s case was frivolous on its face, but failed to give any basis for his conclusion. However, Plaintiff’s complaint did state a claim on which relief can be granted, and to any extent that Plaintiff’s complaint was deficient in this regard, the court was required to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings to satisfy the court’s requirement. The court erred in refusing to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his pleadings. Paragraph III page………………………..11 to 15 4. Under MCR 2.403(K) (4) and 2.403(N) (3), the requirement for a Plaintiff to pay previous judgment applies only to cases where all of the underlying claims sound in tort. ………………………..12-14 II. Appellant’s claims against defendant seek to establish title to 1194 Camelot, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, and lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan based, inter alia, on a prior warranty deed to Lyons for the property. Although Lyons does allege that defendant has committed tortious acts, Lyons’ claims do not sound solely in tort. Therefore, the statement to pay past judgment on a totally different case and dismissal provisions of MCR 2.403(K) (4) and 2.403(N) (3) do not apply to the present case, and the trial Court erred in dismissing Lyons’ claims. …..............................12-15 III. Alternatively, even in a tort case, the trial court cannot dismiss A plaintiff’s claims, and impose sanctions, without giving the plaintiff A meaningful opportunity to present his claims. The trial court did Not give Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his claims and Evidence to the court. As such, this court must reverse the trial Court’s order. ………………………………………………… ….…16-18 Statement of Relief Requested …………………………………………………...44 Signature page ……………………………………………………………………47 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES MCR 2.403 …………………………………………………………………… passim MCR 1.105 ………………………………………………………………………… 13-15 MCLS 600.2932 ……………………………………………………………………..12-14 Wilcoxon v. Wayne Cty Neighborhood Legal Serv., 252 Mich. App. 549 (2002) …. 12-14 Knoke v. Michlin Chem. Corp., 188 Mich. App. 456 (1991) ………………………..13-15 Richards v. Tibaldi, 272 Mich. App. 522 (2006) ……………………………………1 Adams v. Adams, 276 Mich. App. 704 (2007) ……………………………………15-18 Rieth v. Keele, 230 Mich. App. 346 (1998) ……………………………………….. 16-18 Tibble v. Consumers Credit Union, 334 B.R 889 (W.D. Mich. Bankr. Ct. 2005)…. 1 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION This is an appeal from an order of final judgment, issued by Hon. Judge Michael Hatty of the Livingston County Circuit Court on May 17th 2012. Plaintiff filed this appeal on June 28th 2012. Page 1 STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THIS APPEAL Therefore, the issues on appeal are (1) whether Plaintiff sufficiently stated a case for conversion under Michigan law, (2) whether Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant were covered in the divorce, and (3) whether it was proper to dismiss Plaintiff’s case for an indigent’s failure to pay fees in an unrelated case. 1. Was it proper for the trial court to dismiss Plaintiff George Lyons’ claims with prejudice on a new issue that was not raised by Defendant, and without giving Lyons a meaningful opportunity to review the issue and present a response? The Trial Court’s Answer: Yes Appellant’s Answer: No 2. Was it proper for the trial court to dismiss an indigent plaintiff’s claims with prejudice for failure to pay fees from unrelated litigation that Plaintiff could not pay? The Trial Court’s Answer: Yes Appellant’s Answer: No 3. Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend, based on the “face” of a pro per complaint, where Plaintiff’s response to the motion had presented facts and arguments that clearly showed facts supporting a valid case against Defendant? The Trial Court’s Answer: Yes Appellant’s Answer: No Page 2: STATEMENT OF FACTS (Page 3) Defendant is Plaintiff’s ex-wife. (Cited appeals exhibits June 18th 2012 and (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 8) Years after their divorce, Defendant illegally converted property of the Plaintiff to herself. Specifically, Plaintiff had a warranty deed for Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan, in the name of Plaintiff’s company, Lyons and Associates Inc. and Karl and Marian Kopp. Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane was worth over $65,000. Cited appeals exhibits June 18th 2012 page 4). Defendant and her attorney, Thomas Halm (the partner of Defendant’s current attorney, David Prine), contacted the original owners Kenneth and Shirley Morgan and falsely stated that Halm was the attorney for Plaintiff George Lyons and that George Lyons lost the Warranty deed, and Defendant’s attorney Halm then requested a new warranty deed for Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane. Halm was not Plaintiff’s attorney, and Plaintiff was unaware of Halm’s actions. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15: “600.2919a Recovery of damages. The Morgan’s thought that Thomas Halm was Plaintiff attorney. Halm requested them to redraft a new warranty deed to Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, and sent it to Thomas Halm’s office in Howell, Michigan. This illegal act of Halm and Defendant secured for Defendant a wrongful deed to Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. This illegal act removed Karl and Marian Kopp from acquiring their interest in Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane and shorted Plaintiff Lyons by $65,000.00. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15). This act of Halm and Defendant also helped cause Plaintiff’s loss of 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. This is because the interest of Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane was going to the PAGE 4: Kopp’s and was going to be used for payment by Plaintiff on a loan from the Kopp’s for 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan, which Plaintiff then lost because the interference of the Defendant and her Attorney Thomas Halm and others. 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan appraised in 1997 for $800,000.00. Plaintiff had no mortgage on 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan, and the property was owned free and clear. Defendant further caused the conversion of Plaintiff’s property at 1194 Camelot through facilitating a foreclosure of the property without Plaintiff’s knowledge. This was done, in part, by filing a false police report against Plaintiff which wrongfully removed Plaintiff from the home and prevented Plaintiff from being aware of a foreclosure action against Plaintiff’s property. Cited in Exhibits dated June 18th 2012. (and cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals Additionally, Defendant altered the deed on another property of Plaintiff, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, by whiting out the reference to Plaintiff and writing in Defendant’s name as a purported officer from Lyons and Associates Inc to Lyons Inc. even though Defendant was not an officer or agent of Lyons and Associates Inc. And receiving illegal funds from the closing of 5640 Shoshoni Pass, By doing this, Defendant then took possession and has been trying to sell Lot 2 Betty Lyons to a third party for her own profit. and ( cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 18 American Bar Association Rule 3.4 prohibits a lawyer from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. Likewise Title 18 of United States Code Sections 1503, 1510, 1512 and 1519). Defendant thereafter attempted to destroy evidence relating to her activities, including documents belonging to Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant ordered a Dumpster from C & C Dumpster Company from Howell, Michigan. Fortunately, Plaintiff was contacted by C & C PAGE 5: Dumpster Company regarding payment of the dumpster since almost everything in the dumpster had the Plaintiff’s name on it. As a result, Plaintiff recovered various items of evidence. Defendant’s actions in attempting to destroy evidence are the basis of Plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence claim against Defendant. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 16). Plaintiff’s original complaint against Defendant, which was prepared by Plaintiff in pro per, asserted the above facts, and various additional facts against the Defendant. and cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 12-15). The core of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant falls under the claim of conversion. Michigan Law MCL 600.2919(a) provides that any person damaged can sue “another person for “stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use”. In addition, Michigan Common Law also provides for a tort of conversion. Common Law conversion “is any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another person’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” See Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc. 234 Mich. App. 94, 111 (1999). (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15-16.) Plaintiff believes that the above facts and law state a valid claim of relief against Defendant. Defendant has offered no counterargument to the above. Instead, Defendant ignores Plaintiff’s explanations and pretends not to understand Plaintiff’s pro per complaint. Defendant brought a motion for summary disposition. The grounds for the motion for summary disposition are basically now moot, as the court ordered dismissal on entirely different grounds that were never raised by the Defendant or briefed by the parties. Defendant’s argument in the motion for summary disposition was that Plaintiff was trying to pursue a criminal matter, not a civil matter, and that the disputes between Plaintiff and Page 6. Defendant were resolved in the divorce proceedings. and cited: (June 20th 2012 Claim of Appeals). The court dismissed the case even though Plaintiff presented law showing that Michigan law allows a civil claim for conversion, and pointing out that the actions occurred after the divorce proceedings were over. Plaintiff offered evidence supporting his case. However, Judge Hatty had no interest in the arguments made by Plaintiff or in the briefs. Instead, he dismissed the complaint on two new grounds. First, Judge Hatty dismissed the case on the grounds that Plaintiff had not paid sanctions/fees ordered by a different judge (Judge Latreille) in an unrelated case against another defendant, James Brady. This was not a matter that had been raised by the defendant. Judge Hatty ruled that it did not matter that it was an unrelated case against a different defendant, nor did it matter that Plaintiff was indigent and could not pay the fees, nor did it matter that Plaintiff did not know the order applied to bringing cases against other defendants besides the defendant in the other case. Nor did Judge Hatty give defendant an opportunity to research and respond on the issue, nor did he give defendant an opportunity to try earning or borrowing money to pay the fees before dismissing the case. Judge Hatty also dismissed the case on the grounds that the case was “frivolous on its face,” but the judge did not explain to the Plaintiff why he considered Plaintiff’s action a frivolous lawsuit, nor did he give Plaintiff any opportunity to correct the pleading to show Plaintiff’s valid case against the Defendant. Cited in Claims of Appeals June 20th 2012. Prior to and during Judge Latreille in the case Lyons vs. Brady. Judge Latreille had 12+ Emergency Motions for Disqualification for Biasness. Motions Submit by the Plaintiff George Edward Lyons. Some Judge Latreille refused to hear. The relevant portion of the transcript from the hearing is as follows: PAGE 7: “THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lyons, back in 2008 you were warned by Judge Latreille about frivolous filings. And he ordered specifically on December 11, 2008, in Case 07-2338-CH, Judge Latreille issued an order dismissing your quiet title action against a James Brady and awarding attorney fees and costs to Mr. Brady. And to deter you from filing additional litigation, Judge Latreille required you to pay all costs associated with that case prior to filing any additional litigation in this court. Have you paid that money? MR. LYONS: I am indigent. My income per month is $535.00 per month. THE COURT: All right. So you’ve proceeded in Violation of Judge Latreille order that you not file any Litigation until you’ve paid off those others costs? MR. LYONS: I thought that was just against Mr. Brady. THE COURT: No. No. The order was clear, and you’ve just told me on this record that you’ve not paid those other -- the costs as Judge Latreille ordered before you filed Any litigation. MR. LYONS: I am not sure – THE COURT: Is that a yes? MR. LYONS: That I’m not sure, Your Honor. THE COURT: You just said yes about two minutes ago. MR. LYONS: I’d have to – I’d have to check and see If I did pay those. THE COURT: I’m taking your first answer that you haven’t paid it, and I will go on to tell you that at this time there’s no evidence that we can find in the court record to indicate that you have paid any of those fees or costs associated with that litigation. The action in this case --this case shouldn’t even be here now because you violated Judge Latreille’s order. And you knew what that order was and you hadn’t paid those monies. Why the case got filed it shouldn’t have been. But what you’ve caused here is additional frivolous litigation to be filed. PAGE 8: And even though you filed this case in pro per you’re still held to the same standards as other citizens and lawyers. And I’ve had the opportunity to -- to read your papers and to hear you argue, and it’s clear that the dots aren’t being connected here. You shouldn’t be filing this litigation without complying with the orders of the Court, and you’re causing havoc on other people’s lives where you have no right to be doing that. … THE COURT: Well, after reviewing Defendant’s Motion, the Court does grant Defendant’s motion for summary Disposition pursuant to 2.116(C)(8) and dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice in its entirety. Further, because Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of legal merit and Plaintiff Has been previously been warned by this Court -- actually this Court’s successor -- predecessor in 2008 about filing frivolous actions, the Court will award Defendant sanctions Pursuant to MCR 2.114, MCR 2.625 and MCL 600.2591(3) (A) (III). Reviewing the complaint -- well, I don’t have to get Into that. It’s clear on its face that it’s devoid of any Legal merit and I’m not going to have to go into further Reasons on this.” Therefore, the issues on appeal are (1) whether it was proper for the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s case on an issue not raised by the Defendant, and without notice or opportunity for the Plaintiff to research or respond to the issue, (2) whether the trial court denied Plaintiff his right of access to the courts by dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice for failure to pay fees that Plaintiff, as an indigent, was physically unable to pay; and (3) whether the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s case with prejudice as “frivolous,” without giving Plaintiff a chance to amend the complaint, where Plaintiff had clearly explained the legal and factual basis for his valid complaint against the Defendant. (Cited in Claim of Appeals June 20th 2012. ) Page 9   PAGE 10: ARGUMENT Argument Number I In this action, the trial court never gave Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his case. The trial court did not give Lyons the opportunity to present the evidence or witness testimony before the court. The hearing cannot be considered a meaningful opportunity for Lyons to present the merits of his case against the defendant. Lyons’ case is not frivolous, which could be shown if this Court grants Lyons the chance to present his case in court. Lyons can show the trial court’s dismissal must be reversed, and this Court should remand the case for trial. Argument Number II The US Constitution requires that courts allow access to the courts. Judge Hatty’s summary disposition denied the plaintiff access to the court. Plaintiff is indigent and cannot pay the fees require by the court. It violates the Constitution for Judge Hatty to dismiss plaintiff Lyons case. For not paying fees that plaintiff has no ability to pay. Boddie v. Connecticut,401 U.S. 371 (1971) “Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right derived from the first amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the right protects a litigant's interest in using the judicial process to attain redress of grievances. For pro se litigants, the right guarantees all the means necessary to ensure an adequate hearing on all alleged grievances.” PAGE 11 Argument Number III Defendant’s motion for Summary Disposition argued that Plaintiff Complaint did not state a valid claim for Relief. However, Plaintiff responded to the court as follows. The claims against Defendant Patricia Ann Lyons are not brought by the Plaintiff as a prosecutor, but are instead brought as an individual properly bringing a civil claim for damage based on the criminal conduct. Michigan Law allows a plaintiff to bring a civil claim under the theory of conversion in situations like this where the defendant has stolen or taken property from the plaintiff. For example, Michigan Law MCL 600.2919(a) provides that any person damaged can sue “another person for “stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person own use”. MCL Section 600.2919a. Section 600.2919a provides: Under “600.2919 Plaintiff Lyons can Recovery of damages, costs, and attorney's fees by person damaged; remedy cumulative. Sec. 2919a. (1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees: (a) Another person's stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person's own use. For which Defendant Lyons pervious attorney Thomas Halm did in fact embezzled property lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Mi. from Plaintiff Lyons. Attorney Thomas Halm is noted Partner with today’s Defendant’s Lyons attorney David Prine. (b) Another person's buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted. Which in fact the Defendant attorney previously represented Defendant Attorney Brian Lavan and Dale Cooper did in fact do on 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan. PAGE 10 PAGE 12: (2) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other right or remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.” In addition, Michigan Common Law provides for a similar tort called conversion. Common Law conversion “is any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another person’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” See Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc. 234 Mich. App. 94, 111 (1999). Defendant’s acts complained of are a conversion of Plaintiff’s property because Defendant stole 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan and 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. Which was done by Defendant’s attorney at the time Thomas Halm, Partner with Defendant’s attorney now David Prine by switching warranty deeds and forging papers and in tricking Plaintiff and by Defendant giving 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan away for free, which she had no right to do, all as described in the Complaint. Her acts in stealing and taking property that belonged to Plaintiff clearly constitute conversion under both the statute above and under Michigan Common Law. I have a right to sue her because I was damaged by these crimes by this Defendant and others. Spoliation of evidence is an act that is prohibited by American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 37 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Title 18 United States Code. Sanctions for spoliation are preventative, punitive and remedial in nature. Separate tort actions are also permitted. American Bar Association Rule 3.4 prohibits a lawyer from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. Likewise Title 18 of United States Code Sections 1503, 1510, 1512 and 1519 prohibits a party from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence, PAGE 11 PAGE 13: And provides for criminal prosecution against the wrongdoer. Under Title 18 United States Code Section 1519, a wrongdoer can be fined in huge amounts and imprisoned up to 20 years. This acts of the American Bar Association Rule 3.4 shows that Defendant attorney Thomas Halm and partner with attorney Dale Prine. That Thomas Halm did in fact assisted in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. By illegally switching warranty deeds on lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. Which Plaintiff Lyons had an interest in. And that interest was lost because of the acts of Defendant’s attorney Thomas Halm and Defendant and which is now supported his partner who is now by Defendant’s attorney David Prine. I. Under MCR 2.403(K)(4) and 2.403(N)(3), the requirement for a plaintiff to post a $5000 bond applies only to cases where all of the underlying claims sound in tort. In the present case, the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff was required to post a bond at least 14 days before trial under MCR 2.403(N) in order to avoid dismissal of his claims. Why? Because the provision only applies to tort cases. It is undisputed that the requirement of a bond under MCR 2.403(N) and 2.403(K) (4) is limited to “tort cases.” Indeed, the limitation to “tort cases” occurs in the opening text of MCR 2.403(K)(4), which authorizes a case evaluation panel to find a case frivolous “[i]n a tort case ….” The Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the term “tort case” in MCR 2.403 in the case of Wilcoxon v. Wayne Cty Neighborhood Legal PAGE 14: Serv., 252 Mich. App. 549, 555 (2002). The Wilcoxon court held that an action is a “tort case” under MCR 2.403(N) and MCR 2.403(K)(4) only if all of the underlying claims sound in tort, and that the bond provision does not apply if a case includes claims that do not sound in tort. The facts of the Wilcoxon case are on point. In Wilcoxon, the plaintiff pursued claims both in contract and in tort against her former employer. Wilcoxon, 252 Mich. App., at 550. In mediation under MCR 2.403, the case evaluation panel unanimously found the plaintiff’s claims to be frivolous. Id. at 551. When the Plaintiff did not post a $5000 bond under MCR 2.403(N) (3), the defendant moved to have the case dismissed. Id. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s action was not a tort case under MCR 2.403(K) (4). Id. at 552. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed the decision. Id. at 552, 555. The Court of Appeals pointed out that even though two of Plaintiff’s claims did sound in tort, other claims sounded in contract. Id. at 552-53. Interpreting MCR 2.403, the court ruled: “There is nothing in the language used in the court rule that indicates that its authors intended the specific subcategory “tort case” to encompass civil actions that include both tort and any other civil claims. As used in the court rule, a tort case is one where all the underlying claims sound in tort. If a case includes both tort and contract claims, or tort and any other type of civil claims, then that case falls within the category civil case or action, but not within the subcategory “tort case.” Id. at 555 (underlining added). Therefore, under MCR 2.403, Lyons was only required to pay past judgment in a totally different case. if his claims sounded solely in tort. PAGE 15: II. Appellant’s claims against Defendant Brady in prior case seek to establish title to 1194 Camelot based, inter alia, on a prior warranty deed to Lyons for the property. Although Lyons does allege that defendant has committed tortious acts, Lyons’ claims do not sound solely in tort. Therefore, the payment for past judgment on a totally different case and dismissal provisions of MCR 2.403(K) (4) and 2.403(N) (3) do not apply to the present case, and the trial court erred in dismissing Lyons’ claims. Similar to the plaintiff in Wilcoxon, claims against Defendant include claims that are not based on tort, and thus the bond and dismissal provisions of MCR 2.403(N) (3) do not apply to Lyons and cannot support the trial court’s dismissal. Plaintiff has admittedly struggled to represent himself in propia persona in this action. Certainly, the various allegations Lyons made in his complaint against the defendant can be hard to read. Plaintiff apologizes, but asks this Court to understand that Plaintiff was without legal help to assist him in preparing or presenting his claims below. Despite the difficulties in reading Appellant’s original complaint, Appellant submits that it is undeniable that the crux of Lyons’ complaint – namely, that Lyons is the rightful owner of 1194 Camelot, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. that a deed conveying 1194 Camelot to Lyons was properly recorded, that the defendant Lyons knew of Lyons’ claim to 1194 Camelot when James Brady purchased the home from Karl and Marian Kopp, and thus James Brady is not a bona fide purchaser for value – is sufficiently clear in the complaint. (Cited in Claims of Appeal) Actions like Lyons’, to establish title to land in Michigan, properly arise under MCL 600.2932. MCL 600.2932 provides: “Any person … who claims any right in, [or] title to PAGE 16: … land, may bring an action in the circuit courts against any person who claims … any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff. … Actions under this section are equitable.” Although Lyons did not label his claim against James Brady and Karl and Marian Kopp and the Defendant as an action to quiet title under MCL 600.2932, the true nature of Lyons’ claim as an action to quiet title is nevertheless apparent upon reading Lyons’ complaint as a whole. As stated in the case of Adams v. Adams, 276 Mich. App. 704, 711 (2007): “It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the Complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.” Thus, this Court must look past the labels in Lyons complaint and determine the exact nature of Lyons’ claims as to defendant Lyons and Karl and Marian Kopp and James Brady. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). Lyons’ complaint demonstrates that his true claim against James Brady is that title to 1194 Camelot properly belongs to Lyons, not James Brady. Thus, the complaint is not simply a tort case as James Brady contends. For example, the Complaint states that “the subject matter of this complaint concerns, in part real property,” identified as 1194 Camelot; indicates that the property “stolen” is 1194 Camelot; states in Defendants have “slandered” Lyons’ title to the property (1194 Camelot); states in that Lyons “has always been owner of 1194 Camelot” and that Defendant has “illegally acquire[d] title on 1194 Camelot; states in that the “slander of title” has impaired the vendibility of the property for Lyons; and, perhaps most importantly, “demands the immediate return with clear title without clouds the Plaintiff[‘s] property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan 48169” (emphasis added) in the request for relief of the Complaint. PAGE 17: The fact that there are also multiple allegations of fraud in the complaint (in addition to the claims of title ownership) of 1194 Camelot, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane is irrelevant to the issue at hand, since the statement of payment on a totally different case and dismissal provisions of 2.403 apply only to cases in which all of the claims presented sound in tort – which is not the case here. Furthermore, various cases in Michigan have held that allegations of fraud or other tortious conduct in a complaint do not turn an action into an action for tort (for statute of limitations purposes), where the “gravamen” (that is, the ground or essence) of the complaint is to establish title in real property. A sample case in this regard is Adams v. Adams, 276 Mich. App. 704 (2007). In Adams, the court found that despite the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud against the defendant, the gravamen of the complaint was to quiet title in real property; as such, the true nature of the action was to quiet title. See Adams, 276 Mich. App. at 716. Similarly, in the present case, the gravamen of Lyons’ complaint against Brady is to quiet title to 1194 Camelot. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). Finally, Appellant submits that because the Michigan Court Rules are construed to secure the just determination of actions and avoid harsh consequences for pleading errors that do not prejudice the opposing party, a dismissal of Lyons’ action is not justified due to a failure of Lyons to correctly label one or more claims as being too quiet title. See Rieth v. Keele, 230 Mich. App. 346, at HN4 (1998), citing MCR 1.105. III. Alternatively, even in a tort case, the trial court cannot dismiss a plaintiff’s claims, and impose sanctions, without giving the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. The trial court did not give Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his claims and evidence to the court. As such, this court must reverse the trial court’s order. PAGE 18: Under Michigan law, even when a plaintiff in a tort case must post a bond under MCR 2.403, the trial court cannot dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for failure to post the bond unless the trial court first performs a de novo review that affords the party “a meaningful opportunity to present their case.” Knoke v. Michlin Chem. Corp., 188 Mich. App. 456, 460 (1991). The trial court failed to provide Lyons this opportunity in the present case. As such, the dismissal must be reversed. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). The case of Knoke v. Michlin Chem. Corp., 188 Mich. App. 456 (1991) is on point. In Knoke, a plaintiff brought tort actions against multiple defendants. Id. at 457. In mediation, the mediators determined that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, thus requiring the plaintiff to post a $5,000 bond in order to proceed to trial. Id. When the plaintiff failed to post the bond on time, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 458. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 460. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals noted that MCR 2.403(N)(3) necessarily requires de novo review by the court in upholding a mediation panel’s ruling that a plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous; otherwise, the rule would “vest the mediators with judicial powers reserved solely for the courts by the constitution.” Id. at 459-60. This de novo review by the court must provide the litigant “a meaningful opportunity” to present his case. Id. at 460. As the Knoke court stated: “Given the nature and purpose of mediation, we conclude that there should be a de novo review of the mediators’ decision on this issue. … Due process requires that litigants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present their case. Anything short of de novo review of the type of determination here would be an affront to fundamental notions of due process….” Id. PAGE 19: In this action, the trial court never gave Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his case. Lyons attempted to argue the frivolousness determination at the motion of Summary Disposition to dismiss hearing, offering to present evidence to the court of the “transfer of deeds” to Lyons in 2005 before the subsequent deed to James Brady a totally different case and Defendant. (see In Brady case Hearing Transcript, at page 5, lines 4-12), but the trial court In both cases instead cut off Lyons, said that from the court’s “review of the file” the action was frivolous, and lectured Lyons relating to past lawsuits and actions in prior years. Hearing Transcript, at pages 5-6 for Brady. The trial court in both cases did not give Lyons the opportunity to present the evidence or witness testimony before the court. The court instead invited testimony solely from the defendant’s counsel, on the issue of attorney fees, and told Lyons to just have a seat in Brady case. The same statement was made by Judge Hatty that Id, at page 6, line 24, to page 7, line 13.of Brady case The December 11, 2008 hearing cannot be considered a meaningful opportunity for Lyons to present the merits of his case against the defendant. Both cases were so much alike it was like the same words were used by both Judges’. In Brady case Lyons’ case is not frivolous, which could be shown if this Court grants Lyons the chance to present his case in court. Lyons can show the deed transferring title in 1194 Camelot to him; he can also show that the deed was recorded by Marian Kopp on May 31, 2005, which preceded the Kopp’s’ sale of the same property to the defendant. This presents a prima facie case to establish title in 1194 Camelot to Lyons. Furthermore, James Brady’s claim that he is a bona fide purchaser of 1194 Camelot is clearly unsustainable under the law, as it is well settled that “[a] subsequent purchaser of real property in Michigan will prevail over a competing interest holder in the same PAGE 20: property only if the purchaser is ignorant of the competing interest and the purchaser is first to record its interest in the property.” Tibble v. Consumers Credit Union, 334 B.R 889 (W.D. Mich. Bankr. Ct. 2005). As James Brady’s interest was recorded after the recording Lyons’ interest, Brady’s interest does not prevail over Lyons’ interest in 1194 Camelot. All wrongfully and criminally protect by Defendant Lyons, and Karl and Marian Kopp and James Brady and Defendant Lyons prior attorney Thomas Halm partner with Defendant attorney now David Prine. For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed, and this Court should remand the case for trial. (As Cited in Claims of Appeal and Exhibits), PAGE 21: AMENDMENT OF BRIEF Plaintiff Motions for Disqualification of Judge Stanley Laterille and other Judge’s of the Livingston County Judge’s could in all probability be charge for possible treason per the following. 1. Plaintiff filed over 39+ Emergency Motion for Disqualification of Judge’s including Judge Stanley Laterille for Biasness. 12+Emergency disqualification for biasness on Judge Stanley Laterille alone. 2. The motive of the courts was to protect Lawyers and Judge’s criminal acts that were made against George Lyons and his company. That was exposed in case 99-1823-D01-SM. District Judge Frank Delvero. State of Michigan v. Lyons/Edward/Lyons. Where Plaintiff was wrongfully charge for entering without permission into his marital home. False police report was made by Karl Kopp. The same Karl Kopp who made a fraudulent forfeiture on Plaintiff marital home 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. To steal from the Plaintiff his $800,000.00 home. 3. From this lawsuit-on to The Plaintiff Lyons trying to prove the criminal acts of the court, past clients, and attorneys. And after recovering evidence that was hidden from the Plaintiff by Defendant ex-wife Patricia Ann Lyons Plaintiff filed lawsuits against these people. 4. The Livingston county courts per transcripts and audio tapes of the court proceeding. The Judge’s would fraudulently deny the Plaintiff to even speak in his behalf. 5. All of Plaintiff’s lawsuits were met with statements from the judges with fraudulent statements of the Judges that the Plaintiff made frivolous Lawsuits or judge would fraudulently deny the lawsuit. 6. The judges would place the more fraudulent burden on the Plaintiff. By wrongfully approving false legal sanctions or wrongfully approving Summary Dispositions against the Plaintiff. 7. Even after having full Knowledge thru evidence that was presented to the court in all lawsuits. Proving that the Plaintiff’s lawsuit was not a frivolous lawsuit. PAGE 22: 8. The Judge’s including Judge Laterille, would not give any reason why they granted the fraudulent summary disposition, or denial of the plaintiff lawsuit. Or the reasons for the fraudulent sanctions. 9. The Court of Appeals also would not give the Plaintiff any reasons why they came to their conclusions. 10. The Court having full knowledge that the Plaintiff is indigent. Indigence caused by the Livingston County courts and others. Indigence caused by Defendant Patricia Ann Lyons, Karl and Marian Kopp, and James Brady and others that stole money and property from Plaintiff Lyons. 11. Indigence that was caused by past clients in not paying their bills in the amount of $378,000.00. Indigence by Defendant and kopp’s in stealing Plaintiff marital home worth $800,000.00. Which the Plaintiff had no mortgage. Indigence caused by Defendant changing the name on a warranty deed and putting it in her name of 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan. Which cost Plaintiff $300,000.00. Indigence caused by Curt and Marian Lalonde in file a false police report of N.S.F. charges. Causing George Lyons to face 5 years probation. 12. Indigence caused by the Livingston County court, refusing to give Plaintiff Lyons a Fair Trial. A far trial that Plaintiff recovered evidence that was hidden from the Plaintiff. By Defendant ex-wife and Karl and Marian Kopp. Evidence that consist of checks, full unconditional waivers, audio tapes of business meeting that prove past clients stole from Plaintiff George Lyons in the amount of $770,000.00. 13. Evidence that attorneys having full knowledge their clients were committing criminal acts. Evidence of under Judge Frank Delvero and his employee’s committed criminal acts to stop Plaintiff from having a fair trial to acquire back Plaintiff marital home. Evidence of Judges in making fraudulent rulings to stop Plaintiff from having a fair trial. Evidence proving the criminal acts of attorneys, judges, and past clients, and Defendant and Karl and Marian Kopp. 14. Evidence that the Plaintiff took to the Livingston county prosecutor’s office. And evidence that the Prosecutor’s office reviewed and had full knowledge of this evidence PAGE 23: that proved the innocents of the Plaintiff. But still the prosecutors proceeded to file false allegations and criminal charges against the Plaintiff. 15. Evidence that the Plaintiff went to 19 times to the State Police, Pinckney Police, Hamburg Police and the Sheriff department trying to file police reports against these people and Defendant. Evidence that was given to the Police authorities which the presented to the Livingston County Prosecutors office which was denied by the prosecutor’s office. All meetings with the Policing authorities were audio taped. All policing authorities agreeing that these people were committing criminal acts against the Plaintiff Lyons. But 19 times turned down by Prosecutors office representative. Daniel J. Garber Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney. All meetings with Garber were audio taped. 16. By doing this criminal act the Judge’s of the Livingston County court. Denied Plaintiff his due process of Law, and the plaintiff constitution rights. 17. Continuous harassment by the Livingston County Court Judge’s including Judge Laterille. Placed a blind eye against evidence that was presented to the courts by the Plaintiff Lyons. Prior to their wrongful judgments against the Plaintiff. 18. The Livingston County courts judges including Judge Laterille and Judge Hatty who is carrying on the tradition. Criminally supported these criminal acts against Plaintiff Lyons. A continuous wrongful acts of the Livingston County courts to protect lawyers, judges, and defendants. That committed criminal acts made against Plaintiff Lyons. 19. The Plaintiff is more than willing to expose these criminal acts. To any investigating team from the State of Michigan court of Appeals or any other investigating team. Including copies of audio tapes. EMERGENCY MOTIONS OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES FOR BIASNESS. All of the Livingston county judge’s did issue orders after he/she has been disqualified by law, and George Lyons has been denied of his property, the Livingston County judge’s may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce" of any and all PAGE 24: cases in the Livingston county court system along with the State of Michigan offices of the State of Michigan Consumer & Industry services aka Department of Labor and Economic Growth Judge’s. "Fraud on the Court by an Officer of the Court" And "Disqualification Of Judges, State and Federal" To review one of George Lyons Emergency Motions for Disqualification’s of these Judge’s . (Please Read Article three In the Emergency Motions for Disqualification of all judge’s which was drafted by George Edward Lyons) The Definitions incorporated: These following definitions are to help the people who are not legal minded readers in having a better knowledge in the illegal actions that was probable preformed against George Edward Lyons and his company and family by the Livingston County courts systems and attorneys. 1. Who is an "officer of the court"? 2. What is "fraud on the court"? 3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding? 4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?" ________________________________________ 1. Who is an "officer of the court"? Judges is an officer of the court, as well as is all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980). 2. What is "fraud on the court"? PAGE 25: Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted." "Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final." 3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding? "Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Michigan law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 PAGE 26: (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935). Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect. 4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?" Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances. In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994). Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process."). That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in PAGE 27: any proceeding in which her or him impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice." The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice. "Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recues herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202. Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, and then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. PAGE 28: It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect. Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause."). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: “ No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.... ” The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: “ No State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ” Plaintiff Lyons did not receive due process of Law. Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law. The Livingston county judge’s did issue an order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the George Lyons has been denied of any of his / her property, the Livingston PAGE 29: County judge’s have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The Livingston county judge’s has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. These Livingston county judge’s, are acting in this manner, and has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However these Livingston county judges did not follow the law George Edward Lyons as a non-represented litigant, and the Livingston county courts did not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has not disqualified him/herself. However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances. IMPORTANT: The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he/she acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he or she has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce. ALL CASES OF GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES WERE AUTOMTICALLY DISQUALIFIED BY LAW. ALL CASES HAD NO PAGE 30: JURISDICTION AND WERE RULED BY THE FEDERAL AMERICAN ARBITRATION CLAUSE. In the judge’s acting without jurisdiction all building contracts of George Edward Lyons building company carried the American Federal arbitration clause, All case were governed by this arbitration clause: All Judges’ in Livingston’s county had no jurisdiction to make any rulings against George Edward Lyons. George Lyons made outrageous amount of Motion’s that were made in all cases by George Edward Lyons that the Livingston County Courts had no jurisdiction. All of the Livingston County Courts Judge’s rulings of George Lyons Motions were denied. Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts. ALL OF THE LIVINGSTON JUDGE’S WERE DISQUALIFIED FOR BIASNESS BY PLAINTIFF GEORGE LYONS FOR THE JUDGE’S IN THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY JUDGE’S over 38+ motions for disqualification on the below judge’s. That these judge’s denied Plaintiff George Edward Lyons from his Constitutional rights. These Judges’ did not have jurisdiction in to making any rulings against George Lyons in any of the cases that were filed in Livingston County Court system. All Judge’s in Livingston county courts were called as material witness by Plaintiff George Lyons 44th Circuit Court Judge David Reader and Judge Daniel Burress Judicial Center Building - 204 S. Highlander Way, Suite 5, Howell, MI 48843 Phone 517.548.1120 Fax 517.545.9688 44th Circuit Court Judge Stanley Latreille and Judge Susan Reck Judicial Center Building - 204 S. Highlander Way, Suite 5, Howell, MI 48843 Phone 517.546.3060 Fax 517.552.2512 53rd District Court Chief Judge Michael Hegarty Died Brighton District Court - 224 N. First St., Brighton, MI 48116. Judge Michael Hegarty was partners with Attorney Brian Lavan, who was once George Lyons attorney. George Lyons was also purchasing a commercial property from Attorney Brian Lavan, and Brian Lavan also represented George Lyons and his company against James and Betty Steeber. Attorney Brian Lavan illegally represented George Lyons ex-wife Patricia Ann Lyons in a divorce. In representing Patricia Ann Lyons. Attorney Brian Lavan then filed suit against George Lyons and James and Betty Steeber. There is more on Attorney Lavan on tape recorded by George Lyons in Mr. Lavan requesting George Lyons to file a fraudulent complaint with the State of Michigan Consumer & Industry services against a Realtor in the effort in not paying said Realtor a commission Named Richard Baker of the Baker Team. Brian Lavan also represented Plaintiff Lyons. Pesci vs. Lyons in case: 93-0812-GC Before Judge Thomassen at 100 N. Fifth Ave. Ann Arbor, Michigan. 48107. Date 01/21/93 Proving the Conflict of Interest. When Lavan was employed by PAGE 32: Defendant Patricia Ann Lyons. Judge Laterille and Judge Burress refused to recues Lavan. IMPORTANT: George Lyons made many motion’s to remove Attorney Brian Lavan for CONFLICT OF INTEREST from his ex-wife lawsuit against George Lyons with Judge Daniel Burress and Judge Stanley Laterille. BOTH DENIED GEORGE LYONS MOTION to removal of Attorney Brian Lavan for Conflict of Interest. And committing fraud upon the Livingston county court. Phone 810.229.6615 Fax 810.229.1770 53rd District Court Judge Frank R. Delvero Judicial Center Building - 204 S. Highlander Way, Howell, MI 48843 George Lyons had a home at 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. He borrowed $90,000.00 from a friends Karl and Marian Kopp to finish a building project at 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Mi. The so call friends Karl and Marian Kopp filed a fraudulent forfeiture against George Lyons and his wife at that time 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan appraised for $800,000.00. The Kopp’s, in the Kopp’s false forfeiture the Kopp’s stated that they never received any money for the monthly payments from the Lyons’s This Fraudulent forfeiture was false and misleading by the Kopp’s. Against George Lyons who had no evidence to deny this false allegation of the Kopp’s. Until 2007 the Kopp’s were removing evidence from 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, PAGE 33: Michigan. George Lyons recovered a $24,000.00 check which made to the Kopp’s for payment on Camelot. This $24,000.00 check was cash and approved by the Kopp’s in a there signature on the back of the check. THIS CHECK WAS A CONTRACT BETWEEN THE KOPP’S AND LYONS. WHERE THEY ACCEPTED PAYMENT ON 1194 CAMELOT, PINCKNEY, MI. THE STATEMENT ON THE CHECK STATED FOR PAYMENT ON CAMELOT-MEANS THE KOPP’S DID IN FACT ACCEPT PAYMENT OF $24,000.00 (Twenty-Four thousand dollars) ON 1194 CAMELOT, PINCKNEY, MI. Again In the Kopp’s filing a fraudulent forfeiture against the Lyons the Kopp’s stated they never received any payments on the contract between George and Patricia Lyons and Karl and Marian Kopp. These illegal actions of the Kopp’s prove the Kopp’s did commit against George Lyons extortion and embezzlement upon the Plaintiff Lyons and his ex-wife. The Kopp’s also committed fraud upon the Livingston county courts to illegally acquire 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. This check from George Lyons of $24,000.00 (Twenty-Four thousand dollars) to the Kopp’s cover any all past payments and future payments for 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. This check stated on the back for payment for Camelot. The Kopp’s falsely stated in there false forfeiture “The Lyons made no payments on 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. This statement was false and criminal act committed by the Kopp’s against the Lyons. PAGE 34: In the Kopp’s criminal motive is in trying to Stop George Lyons in his lawsuit again the Kopp’s requested George Lyons to re-enter 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. The Kopp’s then Framed George Lyons for entering without permission. Prior to this Marian Kopp gave George Lyons permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. and start payments to the Kopp’s on the original land contract this conversation was taped recorded by George Lyons. After two weeks living in 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. Karl Kopp made a fraudulent Police report to Pinckney Police, that George Lyons enters 1194 Camelot, Pinckney; Mi. George Lyons was wrongfully arrested and went before Judge Frank R. Delvero. Again who had an Emergency motion of Disqualification of Judge Frank R. Delvero for biasness. In the Plaintiff George Lyons having no money, because of the extortion and embezzlement of the Kopp’s and others. George Lyons was given a Court appointed attorney Mack Spickard, George Lyons played the audio tape giving George Lyons permission to move back into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. George Lyons taped recorded court appointed attorney listening to Marian Kopp’s approval to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi and start making payments. Now all the court appointed Attorney Mack Spickard of George Lyons had to do was take the audio tape into court and state to Judge Delvero Mr. Lyons was given permission to enter 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. Attorney Spickard DID NOT DO THIS. PAGE 35: The Prosecutors of Livingston County made a wrongful motion that George Lyons is to be examining by the Ypsilanti Forensic center for Competence to stand trial. George Lyons was exam by Dr. Judith Thompson of the Forensic center. George Lyons played the same audio tape of Marian Kopp giving George Lyons permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. to Dr. Judith Thompson of the Forensic center and recorded her commitments on the tape. Mrs. Thompson stated the Kopp’s did give permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan George Lyons marital property. Again George Lyons recorded the conversation with Dr. Judith Thompson listening to Marian Kopp tape recording giving George Lyons permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. Dr. Thompson did agree that George Lyons was given permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. By Marian Kopp. And again all Dr. Thompson had to do was tell Judge Delvero Mr. Lyons had permission to enter 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. DR. THOMPSON DID NOT DO THIS. Wrongfully Dr. Thompson filed a letter to Judge Delvero that George Lyons was not component to stand trial. This was a lie on Dr. Thompson part. Both actions of Court appointed attorney Mack Spickard and Dr. Judith Thompson should be charged with committing Fraud upon the court of Judge Frank R. Delvero. PAGE 36: This illegal actions of these two is a common illegal act performed by attorneys in Livingston County Court system. This Stopped George Lyons and his ex-wife from acquiring back his marital property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. Furthermore the Livingston County Prosecutor’s office did have both a copy of the $24,000.00 (Twenty-Four thousand dollars) check that was given to the Kopp’s for payment on 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. A total of $106,000.00 of assets were given to the Kopp’s prior to their false forfeiture against Plaintiff Lyons. Proving that the Kopp’s made a fraudulent forfeiture against George Lyons and his ex-wife Patricia Lyons and also there office also had a copy of the Marian Kopp audio tape approval of George Lyons to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. Footnote: Both Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp both were on the Land Contract on proving that Marian Kopp had full permission and rights to give George Lyons permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. with or without permission of Karl Kopp. Karl Kopp had full Knowledge prior to filing his false police report to Pinckney, Mi. that Marian Kopp gave George Lyons permission to enter into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. There was no rescinding by Marian Kopp in giving George Lyons her permission to enter 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. This is proven through audio tapes of the Kopp’s. The following people and Governmental department should be charged with committing fraud upon the court. Livingston County Prosecutor’s office, Court PAGE 37: appointed attorney Mack Spickard and Ypsilanti Forensic center Dr. Judith Thompson, and Karl and Marian Kopp. 1. Plaintiff George Lyons had to face complete destruction of his company and his life because the wrongful actions of the Defendant James Brady and past Defendant’s and Karl and Marian Kopp. 2. That as results of Karl F. Kopp and Marian J. Kopp in there filing a fabricated false forfeiture against Plaintiff George Lyons property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi.. Along with Karl and Marian Kopp filing a false police report for entering without permission into 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi.. And along with Karl and Marian Kopp slandering the title of Plaintiff property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. 3. That in recording said false forfeiture and acquire illegal title to 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan that Karl and Marian Kopp violated provisions along with Marian Kopp being a licensed real estate agent have violated provisions MCLA 565.108; and MSA 26.1278 which entitling Plaintiff to damages including reasonable attorney fees. 4. That further, Karl and Marian Kopp and Defendant James Brady and their criminally recording of said alleged title and the wrongfully acquirement of title of Plaintiff property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Mi. by Karl and Marian Kopp and the Defendant James Brady through embezzlement. 5. These illegal actions done by Karl and Marian Kopp and Defendant James Brady with such gross indifference and to such reckless disregard PAGE 38: to the Plaintiff George Lyons and ex-wife Patricia Ann Lyons and his companies, as to constitute a willful and wanton act entitling Plaintiff to exemplary damages. 6. That the Plaintiff George Lyons has been damage for aside wrongful actions of the Defendant James Brady and Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp. 7. That, as the results of slander of title aforesaid that plaintiff has incurred damages consisting of the following. a. Impairment of vendibility; b. Ligation expensive; c. Loss or impairment of credit; d. Deformation of Character; e. Major Loss of income; f. Mental stress; g. Exemplary damages; h. Reasonable attorney fees; Plaintiff Lyons filed against Honorable Judge Stanley Laterille had 12+ Emergency Motions for Disqualification for biasness. None of them followed the by Honorable Judge Laterille or any other judge in Livingston County courts. Approx 32 to 39 total Emergency Motion for Disqualification for Biasness with all Livingston County Judge’s. All Judges’s refused to follow Michigan court rules. PAGE 39: 04/02/96 Case 96-023807-DM JUDGE Burress: LYONS VS. LYONS DIVORCE. 12/13/96 REMOVAL OF PLAINTIFF PATRICIA ANN LYONS LEGAL COUNCEL BRIAN LAVAN. 1. 03/14/97 Case 96-023807-DM EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE DANIEL BURRESS AND CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATERILLE. 05/06/10 Case 96-023807-DM EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE CAROL HACKETT GARAGIOLA FOR BIASNESS. 07/09/10 Case 96-023807-DM JUDGE ERRED IN HER RULING DID NOT FOLLOW MCR. 2.003 11/29/10 Case 96-023807-DM EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE CAROL HACKETT GARAGIOLA AND CHIEF JUDGE READER FOR BIASNESS. 10/10/96 Case 96-019464-CK JUDGE BURRESS – IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH MAKES FALSE LAWSUIT TO ACQUIRE ILLEGAL FUNDS FROM GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANY. 1. ON 07/14/97 Case 96-019464-CK GEORGE LYONS FILED AN EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE BURRESS, DENIED. NEVER EVEN HEARD. NEVER FORWARD TO CHIEF JUDGE LATERILLE. PAGE 40: 06/23/99 CASE 99-1823-STATE OF MICHIGAN VS GEORGE LYONS. FOR ENTERING WITH OUT PERMISSION. 4. 11/06/01 CASE 99-1823-EMERGENCY MOTION FOR ALL LIVINGSTON COUNTY JUDGE’S DISQUALIFICATION FOR BIASNESS. AND CALL ALL JUDGE’S AS MATERIAL WITNESS. 03/31/04 Case 04-020652-CF JUDGE DANIEL BURRESS: AND JUDGE READER AND JUDGE STANLEY LATERILLE: LYONS VS. KOPP: LYONS UNCOVERED EVIDENCE ON THE KOPP’S THAT WAS HIDDEN BY PLAINTIFF EX-WIFE PATRICIA ANN LYONS AND THE KOPP’S. WHICH THE KOPP’S FILED THEIR FRAUDULENT FORFITURE ON PLAINTIFF’S LYONS MARITAL HOME. 05/11/O4 Case 04-020652-CF LYONS FILED AN EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE READER FOR BIASNESS. AND EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE AND JUDGE DAVID READER FOR BIASNESS. 5. 06/06/05 Case 04-020652-CF LYONS FILED AN EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE READER FOR BIASNESS. AND EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE AND JUDGE DAVID READER FOR BIASNESS. PAGE 41: 6. 03/22/06 Case 04-020652-CF EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFICATION OF ALL JUDGES IN LIVINGSTON COUNTY. 7. 04/06/04 CASE 04-020684-CK LYONS VS MARCICH–WRONGFULLY DISMISS BY JUDGE LATREILLE. OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE GIVEN TO COURT. 8. 04/12/04 CASES 04-020671 LYONS VS. STORZBACH’S. EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE FOR BIASNESS. 04/16/04 Case 04-020684-CK Judge Laterille Lyons vs. Marcich. Motion to reinstate Marcich case to another court. 9. 11/23/04 Case 04-021106-CK JUDGE LATREILLE: EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE FOR BIASNESS. 10. 01/03/06 Case 06-0211858- LYONS VS. STORZBACH’S FRIBERG’S, LALONDE’S, FEEBACK’S, EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE FOR BIASNESS. 11. 03/06/06 Case 06-021977-LYONS VS. JAMES BRADY JUDGE STANLEY LATERILLE EMERGENCY MOTION OF PAGE 42: DISQUALIFICATION OF CHIEF JUDGE DAVID READER FOR BIASNESS. 12. 12/28/07 CASE 07-023338-CH LYONS VS JAMES BRADY JUDGE STANLEY LATERILLE EMERGENCY MOTION OF DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE FOR BIASNESS. WHICH THE JUDGE LATREILLE. WRONGFULLY DISMISSED AND A $4000 TO BE PAID TO CAMERON-ALSO KOPP’S ATTORNEY. IN ALL CASES: PLAINTIFF LYONS HAD SUBMITTED TO THE COURTS OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE FOR ALL CASES. PROVING THAT NONE OF THE CASES THAT PLAINTIFF LYONS FILED WERE NOT IN FACT FRIVOLOUS LAWSUIT CASES. MOST OF ALL HEARING WERE AUDIO TAPED. 13. THESE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS OF THE JUDGES’. THAT PLAINTIFF MADE FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS WAS THE WAY TO CRIMINALLY STOP PLAINTIFF HAVING A FAIR TRIAL IN THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURTS. AND THE JUDGE’S WAYS FOR OBSTURCTION OF JUSTICE. AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF LYONS. AND NOT GIVING PLAINTIFF LYONS HIS DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW. 14. It is the Plaintiff’s belief that it took college educated attorneys and PAGE 43: judges and others to take criminal advantage of a indigent person who suffer from 5 to 8 seizures per day and the only way they could win is to commit obstruction of justice, deny the Plaintiff his due process of law. And refuse the Plaintiff his Constitution rights. That these lawyers, judges, and others could not use their college educated knowledge to go into court and grant the Plaintiff a fair trial. They have to lie, to protect their Defendants. And put their true reputations on the line. THAT THESE PEOPLE DID NOT FOLLOW: MICHIGAN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.0 SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF RULES AND COMMENTARY (a) These are the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. The form of citation for this rule is MRPC 1.0. (b) Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The which these people did not follow. PAGE 44: RELIEF REQUESTED WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands judgments in such sum of excess of $17,000,000.00 (Seventeen million Dollars). That Plaintiff Lyons lost over the years. and If Defendants are found guilty of the following RECEIVING & CONCEALING STOLEN PROPERTY [MCL 750.535] with knowledge that the property was stolen, under Michigan law defines 3 levels of R&C: $20,000 or more: Felony -- up to 10 years and/or $15,000 fine (or 3x property's value), if Defendant’s are found guilty of the following EMBEZZLEMENT [MCL 750.174]. Since 01/01/1999, Michigan defines 4 levels of Embezzlement: under $200: Misdemeanor -- up to 93 days and/or $500, or 3 times amount embezzled, whichever is greater or per as found to be owning plus interest, cost and attorney fees, and Plaintiff now demands the immediate return with clear title without clouds the Plaintiff property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan 48169. It is Obvious that no cause of action exists for the Defendant James Brady against Plaintiff George Lyons and that the Summary Disposition is illegal action of Defendants Attorney Douglas Cameron to commit fraud upon the court. It is equally obvious that the Plaintiff should be granted Summary Disposition in favor of the Plaintiff George Lyons against the Defendant James Brady. That Attorney Douglas Cameron is charge with sanctions by this panel and court for committing fraud upon the court. That the Plaintiff has any and all past cases in the Livingston County court is re- PAGE 45: opened all with cases that where Plaintiff George Lyons was wrongfully denied Due Process of Law. And denied his constitutional rights. Along with all cases in Livingston County District court, The State of Michigan Consumer & Industry courts, the Ingham County Court, the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court. This Panel can, however, impede Defendant’s Patricia Ann Lyons and James Brady and Karl F. Kopp and Marian J. Kopp efforts to further abuse the judicial system by unanimously finding that Defendant’s Patricia Ann Lyons and James Brady and Karl and Marian Kopp and Brady and Kopp’s Attorney Douglas Cameron actions is frivolous pursuant to MCR 2.403(K)(4) AND MCL 600.4963(2). And Grant the Plaintiff George Lyons the immediate possession of 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan with complete clear title. And this panel and this court bring criminal charges against the Defendant’s Patricia Ann Lyons and James Brady and Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp for their criminal acts. And that any and all Judge’s and attorney’s committing and stopping the Plaintiff George Lyons from having Due Process of Law. The Judge’s be charged and reviewed with the Judicial Tenure Committee and the Attorney Grievance Committee of The State of Michigan. Further both civil and criminal charges will follow. This is the relief which Plaintiff George Edward Lyons, respectfully request. Appellant George Lyons therefore requests that the trial court’s order dismissing Defendant’s Brady, Lyons, and Kopp’s complaint, and PAGE 46: imposing attorney’s fees, costs, and other sanctions on Plaintiff, be reversed in its entirety, and that the case be remanded for trial. Appellant further asks this Court to direct that a different trial court judge and court be assigned to Plaintiff’s case, if possible, in order to ensure Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial. The Plaintiff request a investigation for extortion on the following people Attorney Richard Conlin: Attorney Dale Cooper: In addition Plaintiff requests the removal of Defendant’s attorney David Prine from this case and his company Halm and Prine P.C. for Conflict of Interest and David Prine’s partner’s Thomas Halm role as a key witness for wrongfully switching warranty deed on lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Mi. In addition or in the alternative, if this court determines that Plaintiff did not adequately state his claims against defendant in Plaintiff’s original complaint, Appellant asks that this Court order the trial court to allow Plaintiff Lyons to Amend his complaint to more clearly express his claims against Defendant without any requirement to pay fees that Plaintiff has no ability to pay. PAGE 47: Respectfully submitted, _______________________________¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬¬__________________/ George Edward Lyons/Plaintiff/Appellant 6180 Academy Drive, Apt 4 Brighton, Michigan 734-330-1004 Tuesday, October 30, 2012 Phone 517.548.1000 Fax 517.548.9445 III. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 144 Overview Section 144 of Title 28 states in its entirety: Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.419 By its terms, § 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to § 455, which applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States.” A literal reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force disqualification automatically, simply by filing an affidavit alleging that the judge is biased against the affiant or in favor of the affiant’s opponent. Such an interpretation would render § 144 akin to peremptory disqualification procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number of western states—and the legislative history of § 144 lends some support for this interpretation.420 The federal courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must step aside upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit; but they have been exacting in their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit requires and of the procedural prerequisites to application of the statute. Thus, motions have been dismissed for untimeliness; because the movant failed to submit an affidavit or submitted more than one affidavit; because the attorney rather than a party submitted the affida- IV. Disqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 47 A little-used disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.”476 One reason the statute has barely surfaced in the case law is that its applicability is limited to cases in which a trial judge subsequently serves as an appellate judge in the same matter, which may occur when a district judge is appointed to the circuit court or sits on the circuit court by designation. A second reason it is so rarely employed is that on those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqualification, the same result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a). As an historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always so. When members of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it was not uncommon for them to hear appeals as Supreme Court justices from cases they decided as circuit court judges. In Russell v. Lane,477 the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision of a state appellate court in which the judge had been a member of the panel. The Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance of impropriety in violation of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however, the court cited the relevance of § 47, noting that it “is an express ground for recusal . . . in modern American law for a judge to sit on the appeal from his own case.”478 A somewhat more extended discussion of § 47 is found in an opinion by Judge James Craven, Jr., of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, explaining his disqualification from a school desegregation case.479 As a district judge years earlier, he heard and decided a case involving the same parties. Although the instant case was a separate lawsuit, it raised the identical “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the predecessor statute to § 47, Judge Craven held that the statute must be “strictly construed” to prevent judges 476. 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1994). 477. 890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989). 478. Id. at 948. 479. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1970). THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 204 S Highlander Way Howell, MI 48843-2073 (517) 546-8079 EMERGENCY MOTION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE NOW COMES PLAINTIFF GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, States that Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille or other Judge’s did not follow court procedures or guidelines of the MCR. 2.003. And denied George Lyons from due process of law. ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands; A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq., B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law. D. Honorable Judge Stanley Laterille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed. Procedure: Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows: “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31. As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future. The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995. (3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion, (a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo; (b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo. ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands; 1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq., 2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and 3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law. Plaintiff George E. Lyons made this motion and says: 1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq. 2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because: 3. that his Honor Stanley Laterille is being called as a witness in this case. 4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies. a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2); b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7). 1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit. 2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included. 5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio 822 E. Grand River Avenue Brighton, Michigan (810-229-9340) ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS 6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live 317 E. Grand River confirm audio Brighton, Michigan 48116 9. All Judges’ of Livingston County Material Witness Live Court system District / Circuit confirm audios and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live 58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live 59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live 60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live 61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live 62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live 63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live all employees of Livingston Material witness Live County. FOOTNOTE: THE ABOVE WERE ALSO CALL AS MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 38 EMERGENCEY MOTIONS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE’S FOR BIASNESS. 64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future. The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995. (3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion, (a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo; (b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully request: A. that this motion be granted; and, B. that this matter be thereafter transferred to the State Court Administrator’s office for reassignment to wherefore another circuit as required by MCR 2.003 et seq. RELIEF ALTERNATIVE, THIS WAS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands; That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq., That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law. Procedure: Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows: “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.: MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a hearing and decides the motion. The motion was denied, and then the plaintiff is NOW referring the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion or submit this to the State of Michigan administrator Office for a de novo on the record 32/33. This motion is being request by the Plaintiff and per MCR 2.003 be followed. And placed before the Chief Judge and “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.: Respectfully submitted this January 31st, 2007 By: __________________________________ George E. Lyons, Plaintiff P.O. Box 226 Pinckney, Michigan 48169 734-657-1679 This case on Curt and Mary Ann Lalonde setting George Lyons up for N.S.F. Charges. When I recovered the evidence the Prosecutors office refused to represent me. This emergency motion for Disqualification done in 2007- and 2002, 2003, and 2004, 2005, 2006 Six times Stanley Laterille was disqualified: And others were a total of 39 times the same verbiage. All denied by the Judge’s of Livingston County courts. STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY) 210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816) This case on Curt and Mary Ann Lalonde setting me up for N.S.F. Charges. When I recovered the evidence the Prosecutors office refused to represent me. State of Michigan court administrator For assignment of case to another judge GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE Latreille P.O.BOX 226 Case no.06-021758-CZ PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B 734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK PLAINTIFF -V- RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W 7709 PARTRIDGE HILL, Brighton, Michigan 48116 Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508 UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W 5640 Shoshoni Pass Pinckney, Michigan 48169 540-823-3271 Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564 DEFENDANTS David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ 10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 NEAL D. NIELSEN DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River Suite 200 Brighton, Michigan 48114 Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ 3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Kenneth V. Zichi 734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS 515 E. Grand River Avenue, Howell, Michigan. 48543 Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B 4849 GALLAGHER Attorney for Defendants WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139 Douglas Cameron 810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street Brighton, Michigan 48116 IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK 3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier 734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS 822 E. Grand River, Brighton, Mi.48116 AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE STANLEY LATERILLE AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S, AND PLACING THESE CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION. Plaintiff George E. Lyons, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that the following facts are true to the best of his personal knowledge; or are based on information and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true; and if sworn as a witness in this matter he would competently testify and produce other evidence to conclusively prove as follows: 1. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, and on information and belief, has numerous personal contacts and acquaintances among all of Livingston County judges, court clerks, other court employees and personnel. 2. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, these allegations beginning many years ago, became directly, indirectly, regularly and routinely involved and enmeshed with all Livingston County and Washtenaw judges and other court personnel in numerous legal, political, fraternal and social organizations. Structures and activities; all of which on information and belief, has provided and continues to provide numerous opportunities for judicial and extra-judicial ex-parte contacts with Livingston County and Washtenaw judicial officers and other court personnel. 3. Plaintiff believes that the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, acting herein, has and will actively use his/ and their long-time positions, influence, access to judges and access to court records: to make ex-parte contacts with members of the Livingston County bench and /or their employees in attempts to create bias in defendant’s favor; to surreptitiously remove materials from court records to which Plaintiff is a party; and to otherwise deprive Plaintiff of his rights to due process in this case in any manner possible. 4. On information and belief, HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and Other legal representatives, for past clients has already used his status and connections to misinform and intimidate potential attorneys for defendants in this case and thereby effectively deprived Plaintiff of legal representation herein. 5. Plaintiff believes that, from its inception, Defendant’s and other past clients has been given special considerations in the handling and treatment of the instant case by 44th Livingston county Circuit court and personnel, due to bias in favor of Defendant’s and their attorney. 6. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, herein is inextricably involved and enmeshed in numerous judicial and extra-judicial matters which include, in general, all Livingston County judicial and circuit officers and other court personnel. 7. All members of the Livingston Judicial and Circuit County bench would have a natural inclination or tendency, if sitting in judgment, to be biased in favor of Defendant’s and/or against Plaintiff due to the status and judicial connections of Defendant’s counsel and past attorney’s. 8. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, has too many opportunities, and is of a mind, and has already undertaken, to improperly engage in ex-parte communications with Livingston County Judicial and Circuit court judges relative to this case; And the has repeatedly representation of Due to the circumstances and relationship existing between the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, and all judicial and Circuit court officers in Livingston County; Plaintiff believes he cannot get a fair trial or hearing in this county. 9. Plaintiff has presented to this court, and other courts evidence to support the removal of this Case No’s. 06-021758-CZ, STORZBACH'S,FRIBERG'S,LALONDE’S AND FEEBACK’S 04-020652 KOPP’S AND 04-021106-CK Marcich’s to a de nova hearing to the State of Michigan Administration Hearing to be transfer to another circuit court. 10. Defendant George E. Lyons hereby swears under penalty of perjury that all facts stated in the forgoing Affidavit In Support of Emergency Motion for Disqualification and Denying Summary Disposition and court rulings of the Honorable Judge Stanley Laterille of the Defendant’s are true to the best of his personal knowledge or stated on information and belief, and as to those facts he believes them to be true. By: _____________________________ George E. Lyons, Plaintiff Subscribed and sworn to before me This_______day of ___________. 2007 Notary Public: ____________________________. STATE OF MICHIGAN IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY) 210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816) State of Michigan court administrator For assignment of case to another judge GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE P.O.BOX 226 Case no.06-021758-CZ PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no 020652-CF-B 734-657-1679 Case no.04-20684-CK PLAINTIFF -V- RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W 7709 PARTRIDGE HILL, Brighton, Michigan 48116 Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508 UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W 5640 Shoshoni Pass Pinckney, Michigan 48169 540-823-3271 Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564 DEFENDANTS David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ 10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 NEAL D. NIELSEN DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River Suite 200 Brighton, Michigan 48114 Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ 3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Kenneth V. Zichi 734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS 515 E. Grand River Avenue, Howell, Michigan. 48543 Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B 4849 GALLAGHER Attorney for Defendants WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139 Douglas Cameron 810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street Brighton, Michigan 48116 IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK 3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier 734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS 822 E. Grand River, Brighton, Mi 48116 BRIEF MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE. DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITION JUDGMENT AND 7 DAY NOTICE. AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S. AND PLACING ALL CASES ON STAY UNTIL AFTER INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION OR OTHER INVESTGATOR’S FROM THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FOR FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS. DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT These underlying principles of disqualification law are well settled. What the Michigan Supreme Court said almost 125 years ago in Stockton v Township Board is and Peninsular Railway v Howard, it remains valid and binding today: “It Is among the First objects of civil government, to deprive persons of the power in adjudge finally for themselves, and conclusively assert their own causes; and so fundamental is this rule of justice, so essential to the order, peace, and even stability of government, that however broad the terms of a grant of judicial power may be, this principle remains operative, and gives rise to a tacit exception from the general words of the grant’s…The principle … asserts itself wherever judicial powers are employed by a body appointed by law…the rule is not confined to cases where the person is both judge and party. The principle… applies to the elements and substance of the controversy, and in general, where the case is of such a nature as to make it necessary, in its course or final issue for the Trier to pass upon his own implicated rights or interest, the rule attaches and unseats him. Subtle … The court ought not to be astute to discover refined subtle distinctions to save a case from the operation of the maxim, when the principle it embodies bespeaks the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of the litigants are not the only object of the rule. A sound public policy, which is interested in preserving every tribunal appointed by law from discredit, imperiously demands its observance. “10 Exactly what are the: implicated rights or interests”10 which will disqualify a judge? As was held in Stockton, supra, the can be found in the “elements and substance of the controversy:” what the Supreme Court almost a century later referred to as the “circumstances and relationships” of a case when it decided Glass v State Highway Commission, 23 citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Murchison. “A fair trial is fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationship must be considered. This court has said, however, that every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge…not to hold the balance site, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law, ’23 Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform it high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 24 The Glass court said, “Such reasoning applies equally to Michigan’s assurance of due process.” Therefore, virtually any “circumstances or relationship existing between a judge and a party litigant which would offer “ possible temptation to an average” person “ not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” between contending litigants denies due process of law and is interest enough to provide grounds for disqualification. ”23” We expect our judges to be human beings with normal human faults and shortcomings like the rest of us, not angles in robes. We realize there are some situations where it would be extremely difficult for any judge to remain neutral and impartial, the often-quoted opinion in Wayne County Prosecutor v. Doerfler 24 “Justice Cardozo has stated. “ Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions which make the man, be he litigant or judge. “27 A judges are not expected to bring with him to the bench a blank mind and personality. As he becomes, by necessity, a composition of the general experiences of his life, refined and honed by his legal training and legal experience so that the desired judicial temperament will hopefully emerge. “28 To require a blank mind is unreasonable, but to demand an impartial and clear appraisal of each new case is not. A judge may well be subconsciously prejudiced in one way towards the evidence or the parties in a case before him. It is his duty not to permit these prejudices to override his responsibilities in providing a fair forum for the determination of controversy. This duty should ideally motivate the judge to request reassignment of the case if he is aware of any prejudices which he holds which would interfere with his impartiality “29 Modern disqualification rules, grounded in public policy, exist as much for the good of the court as for the good of any litigant; and every judge has a duty to avoid even the appearance of bias, prejudice or partiality. Freely granting disqualification when justified and necessary to achieve that end. As was said in Warren Schools v. MERC: 2 “The object of this rule…is more than guaranties that a legal dispute will be resolved objectively by unbiased and impartial persons. It is also a shield against any suspicion on the part of the litigants and the public that any subjectivity, bias and partiality contributed to the outcome of the dispute. The though behind such was best expressed by Justice Frankfurther in Baker v Carr 22: The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance…” 22 The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted a rule stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Withrow:”4 judges and decision-makers should be disqualified without a showing of actual bias where “experience teaches that probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, “4 Throughout the last century. Courts have slowly but surely broadened the measure by which a disqualification “threshold” can be reached, steadily relaxing the standards for it employment. While early decisions tended more toward requiring concrete evidence of bias such as direct financial or personal interest, there was a gradual movement toward requiring only an appearance of bias, now well-established; and, more recently, the trend is allowing a petitioner’s reasonable belief that bias exists to establish the appearance of bias, to wit: In a 1981 decision, Pitoniak v Borman’s, 5 the court held: “A basic requirement of the constitutional right is due process is a hearing before a fair, unbiased and impartial decision-maker. 1/2/3/4/5 A party who challenges the impartiality of a judge need not show actual prejudice; it is one in which: experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. “4/5/6 then in 1982, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in People v Lowenstein: 14“… (Some disqualification cases)… deal with how much of an allowance our courts will make for a judge’s inherent human failings. No human being (even a judge) is completely prejudice-free. But our judicial system requires judges. Therefore we make allowances. Under normal circumstances, we will assume (absent evidence to the contrary) that the judge is free enough from bias to make a tolerably non-partisan Decision. For example, a judge will occasionally preside over a case involving a defendant who had earlier pleaded guilty to the offense. Because this situation often enough arises and because the appearance of impropriety is not that high, we allow the trial judge to remain in charge of the case absent a showing of actual bias…A C However, we realize that some situations are just too dangerous. Judges normally are not subjected to such special pressures and “under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies in human weaknesses, we find that the appearance of justice requires the judge to disqualify himself. The test is not (just) whether or not actual bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused. “17 In fact, even though a judge personally believes himself to be unprejudiced, unbiased and impartial, he should nevertheless certify disqualification where there are circumstances of such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias or prejudice. “18/6/2 (emphasis added) And circumstances of such a nature as to cause doubt can arise from the mind of a petitioner, as was held in1986 by the Florida Supreme Court, which arrived at the Michigan result by applying the same analysis from a different perspective, making several important points along the way as emphasized below: “ … The facts alleged in a motion to disqualify need only show that the party making it has a well-grounded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge. Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge may be biased, and not the judge’s own perception of his or her ability to act fairly. … The sufficiency of the allegations depends upon whether he or she has successfully established the actual existence of prejudice. The letter standard would render the motion for disqualification virtually futile and result in the sort of adversary proceeding between judge and petitioner that create bias or the appearance thereof even where none had existed before. “33 (emphasis added) And further to that: “Generally, disqualification of a judge from action in a proceeding in which he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent is intended not merely for the benefit of the parties to the suit, who are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, but for the general interests of justice, by preserving the purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions. Moreover, judicial tribunals must not only be, but appear to be impartial, so that where circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion of bias, disqualification may be warranted although there is no proof of actual bias. “36 (emphasis added) No matter where the evolution of disqualification theory may lead, the eternal catch -22 of disqualification law will always follow: upon any request for disqualification, if there exists even a reasonable suspicion of the presence of bias, prejudice or partiality any failure to grant the request tends to beg the question, lead to more suspicion and possibly create the evil otherwise truthfully denied and sought is be avoided. A truly independent non-biased judge considering such a situation should not care about retaining jurisdiction of any particular case; but instead rise above one’s self, respect a petitioner’s well-plead request and promptly proceed to remove all grounds for any suspicion of doubt, by granting Disqualification. Procedure: Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows: “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31. : MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a holds a hearing and decides the motion. If the motion is denied, then the party or attorney may refer the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion de novo on the record 32/33. Respectfully submitted this January 31, 2007 By ______________________________________ George Edward Lyons P.O.Box 226 Pinckney, Michigan 48169 734-657-1679 TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES 1. US Const, Am XIV; Mich Const 1963,art 1,set 17; 2. In Re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136; 75 S Ct 623( 1955) 3. Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 579; 93 S Ct 1689 ( 1973) 4. Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351 ( 1975 ) 5. Pitoniak v Borman’s, Inc. 104 Mich App 718, 722-723(1981) 6. Withrow v Larkin, 421, US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1455( 1975) 7. Mathews v Eldridge,424, US 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893 ( 1976 ) 8. Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 263-271; 90 S Ct 1011 (1970) 9. Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 386 Mich 1 ( 1971) 10. Stockwell v Township Board, 22 Mich 341 ( 1871) 11. Peninsular Railway Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich 18 ( 1870) 12. People v Houston, 179 Mich app 753, 756 ( 1983 ) 13. Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35, 37-38 (1982) 14. People v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475, 481-432 (1982) 15. United State v Grinnell, 384 US 563; 86 S C: 1698 (1966) 16. People v Rider, 93 Mich App 383 ( 1979 ) 17. Ungar v Sarafite. 376 US 573, 588: 84 S Ct 841 (1964) 18. Merritt v Munster, 575 P2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1978) 19. Strong v Pontiac General. 117 Mich App 143, 148 (1982) 20. Wayne County v Recorder’s Court, 81 Mich App 143, 148 (1982) 21. Warren Schools v MERC. 67 Mich App 58 (1976) 22. Baker v Carr. 369 US 186, 267; 82 S Ct 691. 737 – 738 (1962) 23. Tumey v Ohio 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437 (1927) 24. Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14; 75 S Ct 11 (1955) 25. Glass v State Hwy Const. 370 Mich 482 ( 1963 ) 26. Wayne County Prosecutor v Doerfler, 14 Mich App 428( 1968 ) 27. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 167. 28. Utilities Com v Pollak, 343 US 451, 466; 72 S Ct 813 ( 1952 ) 29. Mirych v State Fair Commission, 376 Mich 384( 1965 ) 30. Consumer Power v Iosco Circuit Judge, 210Mich 572 (1920) 31. Hayes-Albion v Kuberski, 108Mich App 642, 657-658 (1981) 32. Gruprynski v Bay Judge, 166 Mich 118, 123-124 (1988) 33. People v Gauntlett, 134 Mich 737, 757-761 (1984) 34. MCR 2.003 et seq. 35. Caleffe v Vitale, 65 ALR 4th 67, 71-72 (1986) 36. See 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges ss. 86; see also ss. C (1) (a. b) of Canon 3 of the Code 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Am Jur 2d Desk book) GEORGE EDWARD LYONS BLOG: 14 YEARS OF CORRUPTION: http://findingjusticeforpeople.blogspot.com/