STATEMENT OF FACTS Defendant is Plaintiff’s ex-wife. (Cited appeals exhibits June 18th 2012 and (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 8) Years after their divorce, Defendant illegally converted property of the Plaintiff to herself. Specifically, Plaintiff had a warranty deed for Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan, in the name of Plaintiff’s company, Lyons and Associates Inc. and Karl and Marian Kopp. Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane was worth over $65,000. Cited appeals exhibits June 18th 2012 page 4). Defendant and her attorney, Thomas Halm (the partner of Defendant’s current attorney, David Prine), contacted the original owners Kenneth and Shirley Morgan and falsely stated that Halm was the attorney for Plaintiff George Lyons and that George Lyons lost the Warranty deed, and Defendant’s attorney Halm then requested a new warranty deed for Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane. Halm was not Plaintiff’s attorney, and Plaintiff was unaware of Halm’s actions. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15: “600.2919a Recovery of damages. The Morgan’s thought that Thomas Halm was Plaintiff attorney. Halm requested them to redraft a new warranty deed to Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, and sent it to Thomas Halm’s office in Howell, Michigan. This illegal act of Halm and Defendant secured for Defendant a wrongful deed to Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. This illegal act removed Karl and Marian Kopp from acquiring their interest in Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane and shorted Plaintiff Lyons by $65,000.00. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15). This act of Halm and Defendant also helped cause Plaintiff’s loss of 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan. This is because the interest of Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane was going to the Kopp’s and was going to be used for payment by Plaintiff on a loan from the Kopp’s for 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan, which Plaintiff then lost because the interference of the Defendant and her Attorney Thomas Halm and others. Page 3 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan appraised in 1997 for $800,000.00. Plaintiff had no mortgage on 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan, and the property was owned free and clear. Defendant further caused the conversion of Plaintiff’s property at 1194 Camelot through facilitating a foreclosure of the property without Plaintiff’s knowledge. This was done, in part, by filing a false police report against Plaintiff which wrongfully removed Plaintiff from the home and prevented Plaintiff from being aware of a foreclosure action against Plaintiff’s property. Cited in Exhibits dated June 18th 2012. ( and cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals Additionally, Defendant altered the deed on another property of Plaintiff, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, by whiting out the reference to Plaintiff and writing in Defendant’s name as a purported officer from Lyons and Associates Inc to Lyons Inc. even though Defendant was not an officer or agent of Lyons and Associates Inc. And receiving illegal funds from the closing of 5640 Shoshoni Pass, By doing this, Defendant then took possession and has been trying to sell Lot 2 Betty Lyons to a third party for her own profit. and ( cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 18 American Bar Association Rule 3.4 prohibits a lawyer from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. Likewise Title 18 of United States Code Sections 1503, 1510, 1512 and 1519). Defendant thereafter attempted to destroy evidence relating to her activities, including documents belonging to Plaintiff. Specifically, Defendant ordered a Dumpster from C & C Dumpster Company from Howell, Michigan. Fortunately, Plaintiff was contacted by C & C Dumpster Company regarding payment of the dumpster since almost everything in the dumpster had the Plaintiff’s name on it. As a result, Plaintiff recovered various items of evidence. Defendant’s actions in attempting to destroy evidence are the basis of Plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence claim against Defendant. (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 16). Plaintiff’s original complaint against Defendant, which was prepared by Plaintiff in pro per, asserted the above facts, and various additional facts against the Defendant. and cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 12-13). Page 4: The core of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant falls under the claim of conversion. Michigan Law MCL 600.2919(a) provides that any person damaged can sue “another person for “stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person’s own use”. In addition, Michigan Common Law also provides for a tort of conversion. Common Law conversion “is any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another person’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” See Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc. 234 Mich. App. 94, 111 (1999). (cited: June 20th Claim of Appeals page 15.) Plaintiff believes that the above facts and law state a valid claim of relief against Defendant. Defendant has offered no counterargument to the above. Instead, Defendant ignores Plaintiff’s explanations and pretends not to understand Plaintiff’s pro per complaint. Defendant brought a motion for summary disposition. The grounds for the motion for summary disposition are basically now moot, as the court ordered dismissal on entirely different grounds that were never raised by the Defendant or briefed by the parties. Defendant’s argument in the motion for summary disposition was that Plaintiff was trying to pursue a criminal matter, not a civil matter, and that the disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant were resolved in the divorce proceedings. and cited: ( June 20th 2012 Claim of Appeals). The court dismissed the case even though Plaintiff presented law showing that Michigan law allows a civil claim for conversion, and pointing out that the actions occurred after the divorce proceedings were over. Plaintiff offered evidence supporting his case. However, Judge Hatty had no interest in the arguments made by Plaintiff or in the briefs. Instead, he dismissed the complaint on two new grounds. First, Judge Hatty dismissed the case on the grounds that Plaintiff had not paid sanctions/fees ordered by a different judge (Judge Latreille) in an unrelated case against another defendant, James Brady. This was not a matter That had been raised by the defendant. Judge Hatty ruled that it did not matter that it was an unrelated case against a different defendant, nor did it matter that Plaintiff was indigent and could not pay the fees, nor did it matter that Plaintiff did not know the order applied to bringing cases against other defendants besides the defendant in the other case. Nor did Judge Hatty give defendant an opportunity to research and respond on the issue, nor did he give defendant an opportunity to try earning or borrowing money to pay the fees before dismissing the case. Judge Hatty also dismissed the case on the grounds that the case was “frivolous on its face,” but the judge did not explain to the Plaintiff why he considered Plaintiff’s action a frivolous lawsuit, nor did he give Plaintiff any opportunity to correct the pleading to show Plaintiff’s valid case against the Defendant. Cited in Claims of Appeals June 20th 2012. Prior to and during Judge Latreille in the case Lyons vs. Brady. Judge Latreille had 5+ Emergency Motions for Disqualification for Biasness. Motions Submit by the Plaintiff George Edward Lyons. Some Judge Latreille refused to hear. The relevant portion of the transcript from the hearing is as follows: “THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Lyons, back in 2008 you were warned by Judge Latreille about frivolous filings. And he ordered specifically on December 11, 2008, in Case 07-2338-CH, Judge Latreille issued an order dismissing your quiet title action against a James Brady and awarding attorney fees and costs to Mr. Brady. And to deter you from filing additional litigation, Judge Latreille required you to pay all costs associated with that case prior to filing any additional litigation in this court. Have you paid that money? MR. LYONS: I am indigent. My income per month is $535.00 per month. THE COURT: All right. So you’ve proceeded in violation of Judge Latreille order that you not file any Litigation until you’ve paid off those others costs? MR. LYONS: I thought that was just against Mr. Brady. THE COURT: No. No. The order was clear, and you’ve just told me on this record that you’ve not paid those other -- the costs as Judge Latreille ordered before you filed any litigation. Page 6 MR. LYONS: I am not sure – THE COURT: Is that a yes? MR. LYONS: That I’m not sure, Your Honor. THE COURT: You just said yes about two minutes ago. MR. LYONS: I’d have to – I’d have to check and see if I did pay those. THE COURT: I’m taking your first answer that you haven’t paid it, and I will go on to tell you that at this time there’s no evidence that we can find in the court record to indicate that you have paid any of those fees or costs associated with that litigation. The action in this case --this case shouldn’t even be here now because you violated Judge Latreille’s order. And you knew what that order was and you hadn’t paid those monies. Why the case got filed it shouldn’t have been. But what you’ve caused here is additional frivolous litigation to be filed. And even though you filed this case in pro per you’re still held to the same standards as other citizens and lawyers. … And I’ve had the opportunity to -- to read your papers and to hear you argue, and it’s clear that the dots aren’t being connected here. You shouldn’t be filing this litigation without complying with the orders of the Court, and you’re causing havoc on other people’s lives where you have no right to be doing that. … THE COURT: Well, after reviewing Defendant’s Motion, the Court does grant Defendant’s motion for summary Disposition pursuant to 2.116(C)(8) and dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice in its entirety. Further, because Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of legal merit and Plaintiff Has been previously been warned by this Court -- actually this Court’s successor -- predecessor in 2008 about filing frivolous actions, the Court will award Defendant sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.114, MCR 2.625 and MCL 600.2591(3)(A)(III). Reviewing the complaint -- well, I don’t have to get into that. It’s clear on its face that it’s devoid of any Legal merit and I’m not going to have to go into further Reasons on this.” Page 7 Therefore, the issues on appeal are (1) whether it was proper for the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s case on an issue not raised by the Defendant, and without notice or opportunity for the Plaintiff to research or respond to the issue, (2) whether the trial court denied Plaintiff his right of access to the courts by dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice for failure to pay fees that Plaintiff, as an indigent, was physically unable to pay; and (3) whether the court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s case with prejudice as “frivolous,” without giving Plaintiff a chance to amend the complaint, where Plaintiff had clearly explained the legal and factual basis for his valid complaint against the Defendant. (Cited in Claim of Appeals June 20th 2012. ) Page 8   ARGUMENT Argument Number I In this action, the trial court never gave Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his case. The trial court did not give Lyons the opportunity to present the evidence or witness testimony before the court. The hearing cannot be considered a meaningful opportunity for Lyons to present the merits of his case against the defendant. Lyons’ case is not frivolous, which could be shown if this Court grants Lyons the chance to present his case in court. Lyons can show the trial court’s dismissal must be reversed, and this Court should remand the case for trial. Argument Number II The US Constitution requires that courts allow access to the courts. Judge Hatty’s summary disposition denied the plaintiff access to the court. Plaintiff is indigent and cannot pay the fees require by the court. It violates the Constitution for Judge Hatty to dismiss plaintiff Lyons case. For not paying fees that plaintiff has no ability to pay. Boddie v. Connecticut,401 U.S. 371 (1971) “Meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental constitutional right derived from the first amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the right protects a litigant's interest in using the judicial process to attain redress of grievances. For pro se litigants, the right guarantees all the means necessary to ensure an adequate hearing on all alleged grievances.” Page 9: Argument Number III Defendant’s motion for Summary Disposition argued that Plaintiff Complaint did not state a valid claim for Relief. However, Plaintiff responded to the court as follows. The claims against Defendant Patricia Ann Lyons are not brought by the Plaintiff as a prosecutor, but are instead brought as an individual properly bringing a civil claim for damage based on the criminal conduct. Michigan Law allows a plaintiff to bring a civil claim under the theory of conversion in situations like this where the defendant has stolen or taken property from the plaintiff. For example, Michigan Law MCL 600.2919(a) provides that any person damaged can sue “another person for “stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person own use”. MCL Section 600.2919a. Section 600.2919a provides: Under “600.2919 Plaintiff Lyons can Recovery of damages, costs, and attorney's fees by person damaged; remedy cumulative. Sec. 2919a. (1) A person damaged as a result of either or both of the following may recover 3 times the amount of actual damages sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees: (a) Another person's stealing or embezzling property or converting property to the other person's own use. For which Defendant Lyons pervious attorney Thomas Halm did in fact embezzled property lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Mi. from Plaintiff Lyons. Attorney Thomas Halm is noted Partner with today’s Defendant’s Lyons attorney David Prine. (b) Another person's buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property when the person buying, receiving, possessing, concealing, or aiding in the concealment of stolen, embezzled, or converted property knew that the property was stolen, embezzled, or converted. Which in fact the Defendant attorney previously represented Defendant Attorney Brian Lavan and Dale Cooper did in fact do on 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan. PAGE 10 (2) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other right or remedy the person may have at law or otherwise.” In addition, Michigan Common Law provides for a similar tort called conversion. Common Law conversion “is any distinct act of domain wrongfully exerted over another person’s personal property in denial of or inconsistent with the rights therein.” See Head v. Phillips Camper Sales & Rental, Inc. 234 Mich. App. 94, 111 (1999). Defendant’s acts complained of are a conversion of Plaintiff’s property because Defendant stole 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan and 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. Which was done by Defendant’s attorney at the time Thomas Halm, Partner with Defendant’s attorney now David Prine by switching warranty deeds and forging papers and in tricking Plaintiff and by Defendant giving 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan away for free, which she had no right to do, all as described in the Complaint. Her acts in stealing and taking property that belonged to Plaintiff clearly constitute conversion under both the statute above and under Michigan Common Law. I have a right to sue her because I was damaged by these crimes by this Defendant and others. Spoliation of evidence is an act that is prohibited by American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 37 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Title 18 United States Code. Sanctions for spoliation are preventative, punitive and remedial in nature. Separate tort actions are also permitted. American Bar Association Rule 3.4 prohibits a lawyer from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. Likewise Title 18 of United States Code Sections 1503, 1510, 1512 and 1519 prohibits a party from destroying or assisting another in destroying evidence, PAGE 11 PAGE 12: And provides for criminal prosecution against the wrongdoer. Under Title 18 United States Code Section 1519, a wrongdoer can be fined in huge amounts and imprisoned up to 20 years. This acts of the American Bar Association Rule 3.4 shows that Defendant attorney Thomas Halm and partner with attorney Dale Prine. That Thomas Halm did in fact assisted in destroying evidence pertaining to a case. By illegally switching warranty deeds on lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. Which Plaintiff Lyons had an interest in. And that interest was lost because of the acts of Defendant’s attorney Thomas Halm and Defendant and which is now supported his partner who is now by Defendant’s attorney David Prine. I. Under MCR 2.403(K)(4) and 2.403(N)(3), the requirement for a plaintiff to post a $5000 bond applies only to cases where all of the underlying claims sound in tort. In the present case, the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiff was required to post a bond at least 14 days before trial under MCR 2.403(N) in order to avoid dismissal of his claims. Why? Because the provision only applies to tort cases. It is undisputed that the requirement of a bond under MCR 2.403(N) and 2.403(K) (4) is limited to “tort cases.” Indeed, the limitation to “tort cases” occurs in the opening text of MCR 2.403(K)(4), which authorizes a case evaluation panel to find a case frivolous “[i]n a tort case ….” The Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the term “tort case” in MCR 2.403 in the case of Wilcoxon v. Wayne Cty Neighborhood Legal Serv., 252 Mich. App. 549, 555 (2002). The Wilcoxon court held that an action is a “tort case” under MCR 2.403(N) and MCR 2.403(K)(4) only if all of the underlying claims sound in tort, and that the bond provision does not apply if a case includes claims that do not sound in tort. The facts of the Wilcoxon case are on point. In Wilcoxon, the plaintiff pursued claims both in contract and in tort against her former employer. Wilcoxon, 252 Mich. App., at 550. In mediation under MCR 2.403, the case evaluation panel unanimously found the plaintiff’s claims to be frivolous. Id. at 551. When the Plaintiff did not post a $5000 bond under MCR 2.403(N) (3), the defendant moved to have the case dismissed. Id. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s action was not a tort case under MCR 2.403(K) (4). Id. at 552. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed the decision. Id. at 552, 555. The Court of Appeals pointed out that even though two of Plaintiff’s claims did sound in tort, other claims sounded in contract. Id. at 552-53. Interpreting MCR 2.403, the court ruled: “There is nothing in the language used in the court rule that indicates that its authors intended the specific subcategory “tort case” to encompass civil actions that include both tort and any other civil claims. As used in the court rule, a tort case is one where all the underlying claims sound in tort. If a case includes both tort and contract claims, or tort and any other type of civil claims, then that case falls within the category civil case or action, but not within the subcategory “tort case.” Id. at 555 (underlining added). Therefore, under MCR 2.403, Lyons was only required to pay past judgment in a totally different case. if his claims sounded solely in tort. PAGE 13: PAGE 14: II. Appellant’s claims against Defendant Brady in prior case seek to establish title to 1194 Camelot based, inter alia, on a prior warranty deed to Lyons for the property. Although Lyons does allege that defendant has committed tortious acts, Lyons’ claims do not sound solely in tort. Therefore, the payment for past judgment on a totally different case and dismissal provisions of MCR 2.403(K) (4) and 2.403(N) (3) do not apply to the present case, and the trial court erred in dismissing Lyons’ claims. Similar to the plaintiff in Wilcoxon, claims against Defendant include claims that are not based on tort, and thus the bond and dismissal provisions of MCR 2.403(N) (3) do not apply to Lyons and cannot support the trial court’s dismissal. Plaintiff has admittedly struggled to represent himself in propia persona in this action. Certainly, the various allegations Lyons made in his complaint against the defendant can be hard to read. Plaintiff apologizes, but asks this Court to understand that Plaintiff was without legal help to assist him in preparing or presenting his claims below. Despite the difficulties in reading Appellant’s original complaint, Appellant submits that it is undeniable that the crux of Lyons’ complaint – namely, that Lyons is the rightful owner of 1194 Camelot, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan. that a deed conveying 1194 Camelot to Lyons was properly recorded, that the defendant Lyons knew of Lyons’ claim to 1194 Camelot when James Brady purchased the home from Karl and Marian Kopp, and thus James Brady is not a bona fide purchaser for value – is sufficiently clear in the complaint. (Cited in Claims of Appeal) Actions like Lyons’, to establish title to land in Michigan, properly arise under MCL 600.2932. MCL 600.2932 provides: “Any person … who claims any right in, [or] title to … land, may bring an action in the circuit courts against any person who claims … any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff. … Actions under this section are equitable.” Although Lyons did not label his claim against James Brady and Karl and Marian Kopp and the Defendant as an action to quiet title under MCL 600.2932, the true nature of Lyons’ claim as an action to quiet title is nevertheless apparent upon reading Lyons’ complaint as a whole. As stated in the case of Adams v. Adams, 276 Mich. App. 704, 711 (2007): “It is well settled that the gravamen of an action is determined by reading the Complaint as a whole, and by looking beyond mere procedural labels to determine the exact nature of the claim.” Thus, this Court must look past the labels in Lyons complaint and determine the exact nature of Lyons’ claims as to defendant Lyons and Karl and Marian Kopp and James Brady. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). Lyons’ complaint demonstrates that his true claim against James Brady is that title to 1194 Camelot properly belongs to Lyons, not James Brady. Thus, the complaint is not simply a tort case as James Brady contends. For example, the Complaint states that “the subject matter of this complaint concerns, in part real property,” identified as 1194 Camelot; indicates that the property “stolen” is 1194 Camelot; states in Defendants have “slandered” Lyons’ title to the property (1194 Camelot); states in that Lyons “has always been owner of 1194 Camelot” and that Defendant has “illegally acquire[d] title on 1194 Camelot; states in that the “slander of title” has impaired the vendibility of the property for Lyons; and, perhaps most importantly, “demands the immediate return with clear title without clouds the Plaintiff[‘s] property 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan 48169” (emphasis added) in the request for relief of the Complaint. PAGE 15: The fact that there are also multiple allegations of fraud in the complaint (in addition to the claims of title ownership) of 1194 Camelot, 5640 Shoshoni Pass, and Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane is irrelevant to the issue at hand, since the statement of payment on a totally different case and dismissal provisions of 2.403 apply only to cases in which all of the claims presented sound in tort – which is not the case here. Furthermore, various cases in Michigan have held that allegations of fraud or other tortious conduct in a complaint do not turn an action into an action for tort (for statute of limitations purposes), where the “gravamen” (that is, the ground or essence) of the complaint is to establish title in real property. A sample case in this regard is Adams v. Adams, 276 Mich. App. 704 (2007). In Adams, the court found that despite the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud against the defendant, the gravamen of the complaint was to quiet title in real property; as such, the true nature of the action was to quiet title. See Adams, 276 Mich. App. at 716. Similarly, in the present case, the gravamen of Lyons’ complaint against Brady is to quiet title to 1194 Camelot. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). Finally, Appellant submits that because the Michigan Court Rules are construed to secure the just determination of actions and avoid harsh consequences for pleading errors that do not prejudice the opposing party, a dismissal of Lyons’ action is not justified due to a failure of Lyons to correctly label one or more claims as being too quiet title. See Rieth v. Keele, 230 Mich. App. 346, at HN4 (1998), citing MCR 1.105. III. Alternatively, even in a tort case, the trial court cannot dismiss a plaintiff’s claims, and impose sanctions, without giving the plaintiff a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. The trial court did not give Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his claims and evidence to the court. As such, this court must reverse the trial court’sorder. PAGE 16: Under Michigan law, even when a plaintiff in a tort case must post a bond under MCR 2.403, the trial court cannot dismiss the plaintiff’s claim for failure to post the bond unless the trial court first performs a de novo review that affords the party “a meaningful opportunity to present their case.” Knoke v. Michlin Chem. Corp., 188 Mich. App. 456, 460 (1991). The trial court failed to provide Lyons this opportunity in the present case. As such, the dismissal must be reversed. (Cited in Claims of Appeal). The case of Knoke v. Michlin Chem. Corp., 188 Mich. App. 456 (1991) is on point. In Knoke, a plaintiff brought tort actions against multiple defendants. Id. at 457. In mediation, the mediators determined that the plaintiff’s action was frivolous, thus requiring the plaintiff to post a $5,000 bond in order to proceed to trial. Id. When the plaintiff failed to post the bond on time, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 458. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 460. In reversing the lower court, the Court of Appeals noted that MCR 2.403(N)(3) necessarily requires de novo review by the court in upholding a mediation panel’s ruling that a plaintiff’s complaint is frivolous; otherwise, the rule would “vest the mediators with judicial powers reserved solely for the courts by the constitution.” Id. at 459-60. This de novo review by the court must provide the litigant “a meaningful opportunity” to present his case. Id. at 460. As the Knoke court stated: “Given the nature and purpose of mediation, we conclude that there should be a de novo review of the mediators’ decision on this issue. … Due process requires that litigants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present their case. Anything short of de novo review of the type of determination here would be an affront to fundamental notions of due process….” Id. PAGE 17: PAGE 18: In this action, the trial court never gave Lyons a meaningful opportunity to present his case. Lyons attempted to argue the frivolousness determination at the motion of Summary Disposition to dismiss hearing, offering to present evidence to the court of the “transfer of deeds” to Lyons in 2005 before the subsequent deed to James Brady a totally different case and Defendant. (see In Brady case Hearing Transcript, at page 5, lines 4-12), but the trial court In both cases instead cut off Lyons, said that from the court’s “review of the file” the action was frivolous, and lectured Lyons relating to past lawsuits and actions in prior years. Hearing Transcript, at pages 5-6 for Brady. The trial court in both cases did not give Lyons the opportunity to present the evidence or witness testimony before the court. The court instead invited testimony solely from the defendant’s counsel, on the issue of attorney fees, and told Lyons to just have a seat in Brady case. The same statement was made by Judge Hatty that Id, at page 6, line 24, to page 7, line 13.of Brady case The December 11, 2008 hearing cannot be considered a meaningful opportunity for Lyons to present the merits of his case against the defendant. Both cases were so much alike it was like the same words were used by both Judges’ . In Brady case Lyons’ case is not frivolous, which could be shown if this Court grants Lyons the chance to present his case in court. Lyons can show the deed transferring title in 1194 Camelot to him; he can also show that the deed was recorded by Marian Kopp on May 31, 2005, which preceded the Kopp’s’ sale of the same property to the defendant. This presents a prima facie case to establish title in 1194 Camelot to Lyons. Furthermore, James Brady’s claim that he is a bona fide purchaser of 1194 Camelot is clearly unsustainable under the law, as it is well settled that “[a] subsequent purchaser of real property in Michigian will prevail over a competing interest holder in the same property only if the purchaser is ignorant of the competing interest and the purchaser is first to record its interest in the property.” Tibble v. Consumers Credit Union, 334 B.R 889 (W.D. Mich. Bankr. Ct. 2005). As James Brady’s interest was recorded after the recording Lyons’ interest, Brady’s interest does not prevail over Lyons’ interest in 1194 Camelot. All wrongfully and criminally protect by Defendant Lyons, and Karl and Marian Kopp and James Brady and Defendant Lyons prior attorney Thomas Halm partner with Defendant attorney now David Prine. For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed, and this Court should remand the case for trial. (as Cited in Claims of Appeal and Exhibits), STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED Appellant George Lyons therefore requests that the trial court’s order dismissing Defendant’s complaint, and imposing attorney’s fees, costs, and other sanctions on Plaintiff, be reversed in its entirety, and that the case be remanded for trial. Appellant further asks this Court to direct that a different trial court judge and court be assigned to Plaintiff’s case, if possible, in order to ensure Plaintiff’s right to a fair trial. In addition Plaintiff requests the removal of Defendant’s attorney David Prine from this case and his company Halm and Prine P.C. for Conflict of Interest and David Prine’s partner’s role as a key witness for wrongfully switching warranty deed on lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Mi. In addition or in the alternative, if this court determines that Plaintiff did not adequately state his claims against defendant in Plaintiff’s original complaint, Appellant asks that this Court order the trial court to allow Plaintiff Lyons to PAGE 19: Amend his complaint to more clearly express his claims against Defendant without any requirement to pay fees that Plaintiff has no ability to pay. Respectfully submitted, _________________________________________________/ George Edward Lyons/Plaintiff/Appellant 6180 Academy Drive, Suite 4 Brighton, Michigan 734-330-1004 October 15th 2012