Attention: R. Jones of ABC NEWS,
DETROIT, MICHIGAN:
Lyons and his companies was
started in 1978: From 1978 to 2000 Lyons never had any complaints filed
against him personally or his companies.
Not Until Ronald and Virginia Storzbach
making a fraudulent complaints to steal money from him and his company. The
Storzbach's then recruits other past clients and one developer Jerry Jarvis so
they could also steal money and work that was performed by George
Lyons and his companies.
"Lyons had his builders and Residential Brokers License and it was illegally revoke in 2001."
Per Attorney General Statements: The action we do take will be based in part on our experience, information and knowledge of and about the person complained against.
These past clients steals over
$770,000.00 of money and work performed from George Edward Lyons and his
company. Lyons Builders Inc. By not paying money back to Lyons for money Lyons
personally used to construct their homes.
This was accomplished by ex-wife
illegally removing Lyons from his marital home. And informing Lyons that
she threw everything out of the marital home.
Including evidence against these past clients. This evidence was
recovered in 2007.
See audio tapes of ex-wife omitting
that her attorney Brian Lavan told her to illegally remove Lyons from the
marital home. To protect the $800,000.00 equity in the home.

210 S.
East Street, Brighton, Michigan 48104
The
same Attorney Brian Lavan that illegally remove Lyons from the commercial
property by making a false forfeiture with his partner Judge Hegarty of the
Brighton, Livingston County.
Per audio tapes Brian Lavan omitted
that he did in fact committed an illegal act to acquire 210 S. East
Street. Also per the same audio tape Brian Lavan wanted Lyons make a
false complaint to The State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial Services
against Realtor Richard Baker of the Baker Team. So he didn't have to pay
a commission to Richard Baker for the second sell of 210 S. East Street,
Brighton, Michigan. That Richard Baker sold the property for cash. So Lavan
could purchase a foreclosed property 8550 Grand River, Brighton, Michigan.
Please review these audio tapes and Lavan criminal acts. The action of Lavan
cost the loss of 210 S. East Street, Brighton, Michigan. And $20,000.00+ worth
of bring the property up to code. And money George Lyons and his company
invested into the property.





8550 Grand River Road,
Brighton, Michigan 48114

Experience: of George Lyons acquire Residential Builders license in 1978. Which was wrongfully and criminally removed by the Consumer & Industrial services in 2001. George Edward Lyons Built many residential homes and subdivisions.
George
Lyons acquire Residential Real Estate license in 1976 to 2001 25 years and
Residential Brokers License in 1978 to 2001 for 23 years. Residential Builders
License 1978 to 2001 for 23 years. Of which was wrongfully and criminally removed by
the Consumer & Industrial services in 2001. George Lyons owned and operated
5 Real Estate offices. 1 office in Ann Arbor, 2 offices in Brighton, 1 in
office in Dexter and finally 1 office in Pinckney, Michigan.
On both licenses George Lyons recovered evidence that was previously presented to Consumer & Industrial service enforcement division. Proving the illegal acts of
Director
Al Shefkey
Auditor
Nicholas Myers
Director
James Montgomery
And
others
And
other in these state offices. Of CONSUMER AND INDUSTRIAL SERVICES /Enforcement
Division. Having full Knowledge and
evidence prior to any judgment of their Courts of Consumer & Industrial
Services that George Lyons and his company did no violations of the false and
fraudulent complaints of these past clients. Time Dated audio tapes with these
above employees of Consumer & Industrial services. Having this evidence the
employee’s proceeded in filing fraudulent ruling and reports to the Consumer
& Industrial service court.
The
past clients having these fraudulent reports. Use to make fraudulent lawsuits
against George Lyons and his company. Please review the Time dated audio tapes.
The
State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial Services enforcement division. Now
called LARA-LICENCING AND REGULATIONS
in 2014. With this evidence George Lyons tried to open a meeting with Consumer & Industrial Service Director of Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division Al Shefkey who worked for Consumer & Industrial enforcement division. Administrative Assistant Director Al Shefkey and the re-showing of this evidence. This evidence along with audio tapes which are time dated of Director Al Shefkey of Consumer & Industrial services and Auditor Nickolas Myers and others having full information that George Lyons was totally innocence of any and all complaints that was filed by past clients. Auditor Nickolas Myers states on time dated audio tapes. That George Lyons and his companies did no violations against these past clients.
These past clients were making COMPLETE fraudulent statements prior to the judge’s rulings. These audio tapes were played to now Director Al Shefkey and other employee’s.
in 2014. With this evidence George Lyons tried to open a meeting with Consumer & Industrial Service Director of Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division Al Shefkey who worked for Consumer & Industrial enforcement division. Administrative Assistant Director Al Shefkey and the re-showing of this evidence. This evidence along with audio tapes which are time dated of Director Al Shefkey of Consumer & Industrial services and Auditor Nickolas Myers and others having full information that George Lyons was totally innocence of any and all complaints that was filed by past clients. Auditor Nickolas Myers states on time dated audio tapes. That George Lyons and his companies did no violations against these past clients.
These past clients were making COMPLETE fraudulent statements prior to the judge’s rulings. These audio tapes were played to now Director Al Shefkey and other employee’s.
While
playing the audio tapes George Lyons also audio taped Director Al Shefkey and
others listening to these audio tapes and there comments. THAT these
representatives of Consumer & Industrial service enforcement division comments stated these past clients were
stealing and trying to destroy George Lyons and his companies. See all of these
time dated audio tapes. But they still support the past clients false
complaints. Is it because of Ronald
Storzbach’s being a police officer.
These issues and many more should come forth to protect License Residential Real Estate Agents, and License Residential Builders. Even if you overwhelming prove your innocence and you have the people on Time dated audio tapes.
I BELIEVE THEY WERE PROTECTING 2 ATTORNEY’S WHO COMMITTED EXTORTION AND EMBEZZLEMENT AGAINST GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES. ONE OF THESE ATTORNEY’S IS NOW A JUDGE. SEE AUDIO TAPES. 2
These issues and many more should come forth to protect License Residential Real Estate Agents, and License Residential Builders. Even if you overwhelming prove your innocence and you have the people on Time dated audio tapes.
I BELIEVE THEY WERE PROTECTING 2 ATTORNEY’S WHO COMMITTED EXTORTION AND EMBEZZLEMENT AGAINST GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES. ONE OF THESE ATTORNEY’S IS NOW A JUDGE. SEE AUDIO TAPES. 2
Judge Hegarty
Judge Delvero
Judge Burress
Judge Stanley Latreille
Judge Reader
Judge Reck
There are more
The Consumer & Industrial Services enforcement division will file false auditor reports. Even when they know the truth prior to any judgments. These issues should come out of the shadows and light expose on many issues of criminal acts against me, and my Residential Real Estate License, and Residential Builders License. Which I received my Residential Real Estate License in 1976 and my Builders in 1978. There was no complaints file against these licenses until the criminal act of these past clients. These past clients would use these fraudulent complaints judgments in the Livingston County courts. Where the Livingston County courts would only listen to the fraudulent judgments of Consumer & Industrial service. By doing this in 1997 these past clients stole $770,000.00 from me and my company. George Lyons income for 1997 was to be $ 1, 250,000.00 (One million Two Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars. Lost because of these people and past clients and others. That will be expose. Along with the State of Michigan Consumer & Industrial service and the Livingston County courts and others.
PAST
CLIENTS WHO JOIN TOGETHER TO STEAL MONEY AND WORK FROM GEORGE LYONS AND HIS
COMPANIES. CAUSING GEORGE LYONS IN FACING INDIGENTCY. TO STOP GEORGE LYONS FROM HAVING MONEY FOR
ATTORNEY TO FIGHT THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THESE PAST CLIENTS.
RONALD
AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH-G.M. ENGINEER AND WORK FOR HAMBURG POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE PEOPLE THAT STARTED THESE FALSE AND
FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS. AND ALL MADE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO THE STATE OF
MICHIGAN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICE.
SEE TIME DATED AUDIO TAPES. STATING THAT THESE PEOPLE WERE MAKING
FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO STEAL MONEY FROM GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANY. AND
WERE OUT TO DESTROY GEORGE LYONS AND HIS COMPANIES.
RICHARD
AND ANN FRIBERG
DAVID
AND CARRIE FEEBACK
CURT
AND MARY ANN LALONDE
IVO
AND HEATHER MARCICH
JERALD
JAVIS – DEVELOPER OF PARTRIDGE POINTE, BRIGHTON, MICHIGAN
CORRUPTED
ATTORNEYS: I AM CALLING OUT THESE ATTORNEY’S TO PROVE ME WRONG. AFTER THEY
REVIEW THEIR TIME DATED AUDIO TAPES.
ATTORNEY
BRIAN LAVAN
ATTORNEY
GERALD EIDT
JUDITH
THOMPSON
ATTORNEY
DALE COOPER: COMMITTED EXTORTION AND MAKING FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS TO THE
COURTS.
ATTORNEY
RICHARD COLIN NOW JUDGE FOR WASHTENAW COUNTY COURTS. RESIDING IN CHELSEA
MICHIGAN. COMMITTED EXTORTION.
ATTORNEY
MAX SPICKARD
ATTORNEY
CHARLES WIDMAIER
ATTORNEY
DOUGLAS CAMERON
PROSCUTION
ATTORNEY DAN GERBER
BY EXPOSING THESE PEOPLE. TO THE LICENSE REAL ESTATE AGENTS AND TO LICENSE BUILDERS THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA.
HOPEFULLY THESE ACTIONS OF LYONS WILL PROTECT THEM
BECAUSE THIS COULD HAPPEN TO YOU TO. THIS HAPPEN TO ME. SO PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS. Now why didn’t I come forth about these issues: Ex-wife thinking and fearing these past clients would steal or martial home equity by making fraudulent lawsuits that was acquire with fraudulent judgments from Consumer & Industrial services.
My marital
home appraised for $800,000, 00 in 1997. 1194 Camelot, Pinckney,
Michigan
in 1998 Ex-wife illegally removes George Lyons from the martial homes through the advice of her attorney. So none of these past clients could attach the equity in the home. And when George Lyons went back to retrieve his evidence and property Ex-wife stated to George Lyons that she throughout everything of George Lyons out of the marital home. She and others tried to destroy any and all evidence and personal property? Including time dated audio tapes.
In 2007. I was informed by C & C dumpster company, Howell, Mi. A company that I used in constructing homes. "The worker stated: George who going to pay for this dumpster you or Patti (ex-wife). I informed the person what I was going thru. He stated George I have the largest dumpster here. And everything in the dumpster has your name on it. He then stated the dumpster and the contents in the dumpster becomes his property. Now George what driveway do you what me to drop the dumpster at.
I recovered all evidence. Including time date audio tapes. Evidence that was presented to Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division employees along with time dated audiotapes.
I am presently going to the news media in the very near future: With the following sandwich board signs. Because If I can’t get fair justice or trial in the Livingston County court system because of their and attorney’s criminal acts. 3
in 1998 Ex-wife illegally removes George Lyons from the martial homes through the advice of her attorney. So none of these past clients could attach the equity in the home. And when George Lyons went back to retrieve his evidence and property Ex-wife stated to George Lyons that she throughout everything of George Lyons out of the marital home. She and others tried to destroy any and all evidence and personal property? Including time dated audio tapes.
In 2007. I was informed by C & C dumpster company, Howell, Mi. A company that I used in constructing homes. "The worker stated: George who going to pay for this dumpster you or Patti (ex-wife). I informed the person what I was going thru. He stated George I have the largest dumpster here. And everything in the dumpster has your name on it. He then stated the dumpster and the contents in the dumpster becomes his property. Now George what driveway do you what me to drop the dumpster at.
I recovered all evidence. Including time date audio tapes. Evidence that was presented to Consumer & Industrial services enforcement division employees along with time dated audiotapes.
I am presently going to the news media in the very near future: With the following sandwich board signs. Because If I can’t get fair justice or trial in the Livingston County court system because of their and attorney’s criminal acts. 3
I will try my best to protect both State of Michigan License Real Estate agents and Residential Builders. And Expose these issues. To the public.
I have recently lien 4 properties: For $21,000,000.00
1. 1194 Camelot, Pinckney, Michigan
2. Lot 2 Betty Lyons Lane, Pinckney, Michigan
3. 5640 Shoshoni Pass, Pinckney, Michigan
4. 4849 Gallagher, Whitmore Lake, Michigan.
These register documents can be reviewed through the Livingston County Register of Deeds. 4
SANDWICH
BOARD TO BE WORN TO PICKET THE COURTS AND NEWS STATIONS
ATTENTION
NEWS MEDIA
THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURTS SYSTEM IS CORRUPTED
39 EMERGENCY MOTIONS FOR JUDGE’S DISQUALIFICATION
FOR BIASNESS. PLUS ALL JUDGE’S WERE CALLED AS MATERIAL WITNESSES
ALL REFUSED THESE MOTIONS ILLEGALLY.
THERE IS MUCH MORE CORRUPTION…
I HAVE THE EVIDENCE
LOOKING FOR INTERVIEWS
GEORGE LYONS
734-330-1004
http://findingjusticeforpeople.blogspot.com 5
ATTENTION
NEWS MEDIA
THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURTS SYSTEM IS CORRUPTED
39 EMERGENCY MOTIONS FOR JUDGE’S DISQUALIFICATION
FOR BIASNESS. PLUS ALL JUDGE’S WERE CALLED AS MATERIAL WITNESSES
ALL REFUSED THESE MOTIONS ILLEGALLY.
THERE IS MUCH MORE CORRUPTION…
I HAVE THE EVIDENCE
LOOKING FOR INTERVIEWS
GEORGE LYONS
734-330-1004
http://findingjusticeforpeople.blogspot.com 5
CORRUPTED ATTORNEY’S
CORRUPTED PROSCUTOR ATTORNEY’S
CORRUPTED POLICE AGENCY’S
CORRUPTED STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
CORRUPTED FRIEND OF THE COURTS OF LIVINGSTON COUNTY
THIS IS A GOOD OLD BOY’S CLUB
STARTED WITH A CLIENT WHO WAS WORKING FOR HAMBURG TOWNSHIP POLICE
WHO REFUSED TO HAVE BLACK’S BUILD IN A SUBDIVISION IN BRIGHTON, MICHIGAN
ALL ITEMS ARE ON AUDIO TAPES TIME DATED
I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET A FAIR TRIAL.
I CHALLENGE YOU NEWS MEDIA TRY TO FIND ME IN MAKING FALSE STATEMENTS…
IF THIS CAN HAPPEN TO ME THIS COULD HAPPEN TO YOU… OR ONE OF FAMILY MEMBERS OR FRIENDS.
NOW STOP AND EXPOSE THE CORRUPTION
THIS 2 PAGE DOCUMENT IS GOING ON A
SANDWICH BOARD 6
NOW
THESE PEOPLE TRIED TO USE THIS STATEMENTS THAT THE CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL
SERVICES ENFORCEMENT AND USED THIS FALSE STATEMENTS TO DE-FAME ME. By
definition of harm somebody's reputation: to attack somebody or somebody's
reputation, character, or good name by making slanderous or libelous
statements.
THE
COST OF THE COVER-UP OF THE FALSE STATEMENTS OF CONSUMER & INDUSTRY
SERVICES ENFORCEMENT DIVISION ENFORCEMENT DIVISION. JUST ONE THING IS $
21,000,000.00+ (Twenty One Million plus) BETWEEN 1998 TO 2014 LOST OF INCOME.
THERE IS A LOT MORE. THIS IS JUST INCOME BECAUSE THESE CRIMINAL ACTS OF THESE
PEOPLE.
AGAIN CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES ENFORECEMENT DIVISION HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE THAT GEORGE LYONS WAS TOTALLY INOCENCE OF ANY CHARGES PER CONSUMER & INDUSTRY SERVICES ENFORCEMENT DIVISION. PRIOR TO ANY JUDGMENTS FROM CONSUMER & INDUSTRIAL SERVICES.
Respectfully submitted
George Lyons
6180 Academy Drive Suite 4
Brighton, Michigan 48116
734-330-1004
[x] I certify that the information in these documents is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge.
[x]I consent to releasing to the Michigan Attorney General any information or documents relative to the investigation of this complaint. 7

Prior to the
Emergency Motions of the Judge’s being disqualified for biasness
All judges were
also were call as material witnesses.



RECOVERED EVIDENCE THAT WAS HIDDEN FROM GEORGE LYONS
THERE ARE MORE PICTURES.
Prior to the Emergency Motions of the Judge’s being disqualified for biasness
all judges were also were call as material witnesses. 8 9 10
RECOVERED EVIDENCE THAT WAS HIDDEN FROM GEORGE LYONS BY EX-WIFE AND KARL AND MARIAN KOPP
THERE ARE MORE PICTURES. 11
The following Emergency Motion of Disqualification of Judge’s for Biasness document is a copy that I could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 39 more Emergency Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as Material Witnesses? And more.
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if
there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)]
imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit
is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.
Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.
None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.
Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.
None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any
order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied
of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the
Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". H R 420
|
The following document is a copy that I could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 38 more Emergency Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as Material Witnesses? And more.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no. 06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no. 06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
NEAL D.
NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
Curt
Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane
3100 Crystal Springs Lane
Aka
3100 Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-878-2278
Attorney for the Defendant’s
Lalonde’s and attorney Charles Widmaier
Attorney Kenneth V. Zich
515 E.
Grand River Avenue,
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139
810-231-3286
Attorney for the Defendants Kopp’s
Douglas
Cameron
DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,
DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,
Aka
Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier attorney for the
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier attorney for the
Defendant’s
Marcich’s
734-878-1874 822 E. Grand River
Brighton, M 48116
734-878-1874 822 E. Grand River
Brighton, M 48116
FOLLOWING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES.
AND ATTORNEYS FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL ALL CLAIMS, AND ALL CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION AND OTHER INVESTIGATOR’S
NOW
COMES PLAINTIFF GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, States that Honorable Judge Stanley
Latreille did not follow court procedures or guidelines of the MCR. 2.003.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.
As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.
As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
Plaintiff
George E. Lyons made this motion and says:
1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:
3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.
4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.
a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);
b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).
1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.
2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.
5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS
6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116
9. All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live
58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live
59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live
60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live
61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live
62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live
63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live
all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.
1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:
3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.
4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.
a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);
b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).
1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.
2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.
5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS
6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116
9. All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live
58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live
59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live
60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live
61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live
62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live
63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live
all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.
FOOTNOTE:
THE ABOVE WERE ALSO CALL AS MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 38 EMERGENCEY MOTIONS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE’S FOR BIASNESS.
64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live
And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live
And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully request:
A. that this motion be granted; and,
B. that this matter be thereafter transferred to the State Court Administrator’s office for reassignment to wherefore another circuit as required by MCR 2.003 et seq.
RELIEF
ALTERNATIVE, THIS WAS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:
MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a hearing and decides the motion.
The motion was denied, and then the plaintiff is NOW referring the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion or submit this to the State of Michigan administrator Office for a de novo on the record 32/33.
This motion is being request by the Plaintiff and per MCR 2.003 be followed. And placed before the Chief Judge and “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:
Respectfully submitted this January 31st, 2007
By: __________________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679
STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE Latreille
P.O.BOX 226 Case no.06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka 3100 Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants Attorney Charles Widmaier
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Attorney Kenneth V. Zichi
734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS 515 E. Grand River Avenue,
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl
Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no.
04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER Attorney for Defendants
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139 Douglas Cameron
810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier
734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS 822 E. Grand River,
Brighton, Mi.48116
4849 GALLAGHER Attorney for Defendants
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139 Douglas Cameron
810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier
734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS 822 E. Grand River,
Brighton, Mi.48116
AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE
AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S, AND PLACING THESE CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION.
Plaintiff George E. Lyons, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that the following facts are true to the best of his personal knowledge; or are based on information and belief, and as to those he believes them to be true; and if sworn as a witness in this matter he would competently testify and produce other evidence to conclusively prove as follows:
1. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, and on information and belief, has numerous personal contacts and acquaintances among all of Livingston County judges, court clerks, other court employees and personnel.
2. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, these allegations beginning many years ago, became directly, indirectly, regularly and routinely involved and enmeshed with all Livingston County and Washtenaw judges and other court personnel in numerous legal, political, fraternal and social organizations. Structures and activities; all of which on information and belief, has provided and continues to provide numerous opportunities for judicial and extra-judicial ex-parte contacts with Livingston County and Washtenaw judicial officers and other court personnel.
3. Plaintiff believes that the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and
other legal representatives, acting herein, has and will actively use his/ and their long-time positions, influence, access to judges and access to court records: to make ex-parte contacts with members of the Livingston County bench and /or their employees in attempts to create bias in defendant’s favor; to surreptitiously remove materials from court records to which Plaintiff is a party; and to otherwise deprive Plaintiff of his rights to due process in this case in any manner possible.
4. On information and belief, HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and
Other legal representatives, for past clients has already used his status and connections to misinform and intimidate potential attorneys for defendants in this case and thereby effectively deprived Plaintiff of legal representation herein.
5. Plaintiff believes that, from its inception, Defendant’s and other past clients has been given special considerations in the handling and treatment of the instant case by 44th Livingston county Circuit court and personnel, due to bias in favor of Defendant’s and their attorney.
6. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE, and other legal representatives, herein is inextricably involved and enmeshed in numerous judicial and extra-judicial matters which include, in general, all Livingston County judicial and circuit officers and other court personnel.
7. All members of the Livingston Judicial and Circuit County bench would have a natural inclination or tendency, if sitting in judgment, to be biased in favor of Defendant’s and/or against Plaintiff due to the status and judicial connections of Defendant’s counsel and past attorney’s.
8. HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, has too many opportunities, and is of a mind, and has already undertaken, to improperly engage in ex-parte communications with Livingston County Judicial and Circuit court judges relative to this case; And the has repeatedly representation of Due to the circumstances and relationship existing between the HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE and other legal representatives, and all judicial and Circuit court officers in Livingston County; Plaintiff believes he cannot get a fair trial or hearing in this county.
9. Plaintiff has presented to this court, and other courts evidence to support the removal of this Case No’s. 06-021758-CZ, STORZBACH'S,FRIBERG'S,LALONDE’S AND FEEBACK’S 04-020652 KOPP’S AND 04-021106-CK Marcich’s to a de nova hearing to the State of Michigan Administration Hearing to be transfer to another circuit court.
10. Defendant George E. Lyons hereby swears under penalty of perjury that all facts stated in the forgoing Affidavit In Support of Emergency Motion for Disqualification and Denying Summary Disposition and court rulings of the Honorable Judge Stanley
Latreille of the Defendants are true to the best of his personal knowledge or stated on information and belief, and as to those facts he believes them to be true.
By: _____________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me
This_______day of ___________. 2007
Notary Public: ____________________________
STATE
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no.06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no 020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no.04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no.06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no 020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no.04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 NEAL D. NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
Curt Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane aka
3100
Betty Lyons Lane Attorney
for Defendants Attorney Charles Widmaier
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Kenneth V. Zichi
734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS 515 E. Grand River Avenue,
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Kenneth V. Zichi
734-878-2278 DEFENDANTS 515 E. Grand River Avenue,
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER Attorney for Defendants
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139 Douglas Cameron
810-231-3286 DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane, aka Betty Lyons Lane Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier
734-878-1874 DEFENDANTS 822 E. Grand River,
Brighton, MI 48116
BRIEF MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE.
DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY DISPOSITION JUDGMENT AND 7 DAY NOTICE. AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL OF ALL CLAIMS OF THE DEFENDANT’S. AND PLACING ALL CASES ON STAY UNTIL AFTER INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION OR OTHER INVESTGATOR’S FROM THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS ATTORNEYS FOR FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITIONS.
DISQUALIFICATION LAW AND ARGUMENT
these underlying principles of disqualification law are well settled. What the Michigan Supreme Court said almost 125 years ago in Stockton v Township Board is and Peninsular Railway v Howard, it remains valid and binding today:
“It Is among the First objects of civil government, to deprive persons of the power in adjudge finally for themselves, and conclusively assert their own causes; and so fundamental is this rule of justice, so essential to the order, peace, and even stability of government, that however broad the terms of a grant of judicial power may be, this principle remains operative, and gives rise to a tacit exception from the general words of the grant’s…The principle … asserts itself wherever judicial powers are employed by a body appointed by law…the rule is not confined to cases where the person is both judge and party.
The
principle… applies to the elements and substance of the controversy, and in
general, where the case is of such a nature as to make it necessary, in its
course or final issue for the Trier to pass upon his own implicated rights or
interest, the rule attaches and unseats him. Subtle
…
…
The
court ought not to be astute to discover refined subtle distinctions to save a
case from the operation of the maxim, when the principle it embodies bespeaks
the propriety of its application. The immediate rights of the litigants are not
the only object of the rule. A sound public policy, which is interested in
preserving every tribunal appointed by law from discredit, imperiously demands
its observance. “10
exactly what are the: implicated rights or interests”10 which will disqualify a judge? As was held in Stockton, supra, the can be found in the “elements and substance of the controversy:” what the Supreme Court almost a century later referred to as the “circumstances and relationships” of a case when it decided Glass v State Highway Commission, 23 citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Murchison.
“A fair trial is fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationship must be considered. This court has said, however, that every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge…not to hold the balance site, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law, ’23 Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform it high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 24
The Glass court said, “Such reasoning applies equally to Michigan’s assurance of due process.” Therefore, virtually any “circumstances or relationship existing between a judge and a party litigant which would offer “ possible temptation to an average” person “ not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” between contending litigants denies due process of law and is interest enough to provide grounds for disqualification. ”23”
exactly what are the: implicated rights or interests”10 which will disqualify a judge? As was held in Stockton, supra, the can be found in the “elements and substance of the controversy:” what the Supreme Court almost a century later referred to as the “circumstances and relationships” of a case when it decided Glass v State Highway Commission, 23 citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Murchison.
“A fair trial is fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationship must be considered. This court has said, however, that every procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge…not to hold the balance site, clear and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law, ’23 Such a stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform it high function in the best way justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 24
The Glass court said, “Such reasoning applies equally to Michigan’s assurance of due process.” Therefore, virtually any “circumstances or relationship existing between a judge and a party litigant which would offer “ possible temptation to an average” person “ not to hold the balance nice, clear and true” between contending litigants denies due process of law and is interest enough to provide grounds for disqualification. ”23”
We expect our judges to be human beings with normal human faults and shortcomings like the rest of us, not angles in robes. We realize there are some situations where it would be extremely difficult for any judge to remain neutral and impartial, the often-quoted opinion in Wayne County Prosecutor v. Doerfler 24
“Justice Cardozo has stated.
“ Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions which make the man, be he litigant or judge. “27
A judges are not expected to bring with him to the bench a blank mind and personality. As he becomes, by necessity, a composition of the general experiences of his life, refined and honed by his legal training and legal experience so that the desired judicial temperament will hopefully emerge. “28
to require a blank mind is unreasonable, but to demand an impartial and clear appraisal of each new case is not. A judge may well be subconsciously prejudiced in one way towards the evidence or the parties in a case before him. It is his duty not to permit these prejudices to override his responsibilities in providing a fair forum for the determination of controversy. This duty should ideally motivate the judge to request reassignment of the case if he is aware of any prejudices which he holds which would interfere with his impartiality “29
Modern disqualification rules, grounded in public policy, exist as much for the good of the court as for the good of any litigant; and every judge has a duty to avoid even the appearance of bias, prejudice or partiality. Freely granting disqualification when justified and necessary to achieve that end. As was said in Warren Schools v. MERC: 2
“The object of this rule…is more than guaranties that a legal dispute will be resolved objectively by unbiased and impartial persons. It is also a shield against any suspicion on the part of the litigants and the public that any subjectivity, bias and partiality contributed to the outcome of the dispute. The though behind such was best expressed by Justice Frankfurther in Baker v Carr 22:
The Court’s authority – possessed of neither the purse nor the sword – ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance…” 22
The Michigan Supreme Court has adopted a rule stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Withrow:”4 judges and decision-makers should be disqualified without a showing of actual bias where “experience teaches that probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable, “4
Throughout the last century. Courts have slowly but surely broadened the measure by which a disqualification “threshold” can be reached, steadily relaxing the standards for it employment. While early decisions tended more toward requiring concrete evidence of bias such as direct financial or personal interest, there was a gradual movement toward requiring only an appearance of bias, now well-established; and, more recently, the trend is allowing a petitioner’s reasonable belief that bias exists to establish the appearance of bias, to wit: In a 1981 decision, Pitoniak v Borman’s, 5 the court held:
“A basic requirement of the constitutional right is due process is a hearing before a fair, unbiased and impartial decision-maker. 1/2/3/4/5 A party who challenges the impartiality of a judge need not show actual prejudice; it is one in which: experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. “4/5/6
then in 1982, the Michigan Court of Appeals held, in People v Lowenstein: 14“… (Some disqualification cases)… deal with how much of an allowance our courts will make for a judge’s inherent human failings. No human being (even a judge) is completely prejudice-free. But our judicial system requires judges. Therefore we make allowances. Under normal circumstances, we will assume (absent evidence to the contrary) that the judge is free enough from bias to make a tolerably non-partisan Decision. For example, a judge will occasionally preside over a case involving a defendant who had earlier pleaded guilty to the offense.
Because
this situation often enough arises and because the appearance of impropriety is
not that high, we allow the trial judge to remain in charge of the case absent
a showing of actual bias…A C However, we realize that some situations are just
too dangerous.
Judges
normally are not subjected to such special pressures and “under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies in human weaknesses, we find that the
appearance of justice requires the judge to disqualify himself.
The
test is not (just) whether or not actual bias or an appearance of bias that the
judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the
court and the interests of the accused. “17 In fact, even though a judge
personally believes himself to be unprejudiced, unbiased and impartial, he
should nevertheless certify disqualification where there are circumstances of
such a nature to cause doubt as to his partiality, bias or prejudice. “18/6/2
(emphasis added)
And circumstances of such a nature as to cause doubt can arise from the mind of a petitioner, as was held in1986 by the Florida Supreme Court, which arrived at the Michigan result by applying the same analysis from a different perspective, making several important points along the way as emphasized below:
“ … The facts alleged in a motion to disqualify need only show that the party making it has a well-grounded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge.
And circumstances of such a nature as to cause doubt can arise from the mind of a petitioner, as was held in1986 by the Florida Supreme Court, which arrived at the Michigan result by applying the same analysis from a different perspective, making several important points along the way as emphasized below:
“ … The facts alleged in a motion to disqualify need only show that the party making it has a well-grounded fear that he or she will not receive a fair trial at the hands of the judge. Judicial inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the judge.
Judicial
inquiry should focus on the reasonableness of the affiant’s belief that the
judge may be biased, and not the judge’s own perception of his or her ability
to act fairly. … The sufficiency of the allegations depends upon whether he or
she has successfully established the actual existence of prejudice.
The
letter standard would render the motion for disqualification virtually futile
and result in the sort of adversary proceeding between judge and petitioner
that create bias or the appearance thereof even where none had existed before.
“33 (emphasis added)
And further to that:
“Generally, disqualification of a judge from action in a proceeding in which he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent is intended not merely for the benefit of the parties to the suit, who are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, but for the general interests of justice, by preserving the purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions.
And further to that:
“Generally, disqualification of a judge from action in a proceeding in which he is not wholly free, disinterested and independent is intended not merely for the benefit of the parties to the suit, who are entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, but for the general interests of justice, by preserving the purity and impartiality of the courts, and the respect and confidence of the people for their decisions.
Moreover,
judicial tribunals must not only be, but appear to be impartial, so that where
circumstances are such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man a suspicion
of bias, disqualification may be warranted although there is no proof of actual
bias. “36 (emphasis added)
No matter where the evolution of disqualification theory may lead, the eternal catch -22 of disqualification law will always follow: upon any request for disqualification, if there exists even a reasonable suspicion of the presence of bias, prejudice or partiality
any failure to grant the request tends to beg the question, lead to more suspicion and possibly create the evil otherwise truthfully denied and sought is be avoided.
A truly independent non-biased judge considering such a situation should not care about retaining jurisdiction of any particular case; but instead rise above one’s self, respect a petitioner’s well-plead request and promptly proceed to remove all grounds for any suspicion of doubt, by granting
No matter where the evolution of disqualification theory may lead, the eternal catch -22 of disqualification law will always follow: upon any request for disqualification, if there exists even a reasonable suspicion of the presence of bias, prejudice or partiality
any failure to grant the request tends to beg the question, lead to more suspicion and possibly create the evil otherwise truthfully denied and sought is be avoided.
A truly independent non-biased judge considering such a situation should not care about retaining jurisdiction of any particular case; but instead rise above one’s self, respect a petitioner’s well-plead request and promptly proceed to remove all grounds for any suspicion of doubt, by granting
Disqualification.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.
: MCR
2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a
written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know
grounds for disqualification.
The
Judge complained of then holds a holds a hearing and decides the motion. If the
motion is denied, then the party or attorney may refer the motion to the chief
judge who must decide the motion de novo on the record 32/33.
Respectfully
submitted this January 31, 2007
By ______________________________________
George Edward Lyons
P.O.Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679
TABLE OF CITATIONS AND AUTHORITIES
1. US Const, Am XIV; Mich Const 1963,art 1,set 17;
2. In Re Murchison, 349 US 133, 136; 75 S Ct 623( 1955)
3. Gibson v Berryhill, 411 US 564, 579; 93 S Ct 1689 ( 1973)
4. Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351 ( 1975 )
5. Pitoniak v Borman’s, Inc. 104 Mich App 718, 722-723(1981)
6. Withrow v Larkin, 421, US 35, 47; 95 S Ct 1455( 1975)
7. Mathews v Eldridge,424, US 319, 335; 96 S Ct 893 ( 1976 )
8. Goldberg v Kelly, 397 US 254, 263-271; 90 S Ct 1011 (1970)
9. Wayne Circuit Judges v Wayne County, 386 Mich 1 ( 1971)
10. Stockwell v Township Board, 22 Mich 341 ( 1871)
11. Peninsular Railway Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich 18 ( 1870)
12. People v Houston, 179 Mich app 753, 756 ( 1983 )
13. Clemens v Bruce, 122 Mich App 35, 37-38 (1982)
14. People v Lowenstein, 118 Mich App 475, 481-432 (1982)
15. United State v Grinnell, 384 US 563; 86 S C: 1698 (1966)
16. People v Rider, 93 Mich App 383 ( 1979 )
17. Ungar v Sarafite. 376 US 573, 588: 84 S Ct 841 (1964)
18. Merritt v Munster, 575 P2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1978)
19. Strong v Pontiac General. 117 Mich App 143, 148 (1982)
20. Wayne County v Recorder’s Court, 81 Mich App 143, 148 (1982)
21. Warren Schools v MERC. 67 Mich App 58 (1976)
22. Baker v Carr. 369 US 186, 267; 82 S Ct 691. 737 – 738 (1962)
23. Tumey v Ohio 273 US 510; 47 S Ct 437 (1927)
24. Offutt v United States, 348 US 11, 14; 75 S Ct 11 (1955)
25. Glass v State Hwy Const. 370 Mich 482 ( 1963 )
26. Wayne County Prosecutor v Doerfler, 14 Mich App 428( 1968 )
27. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 167.
28. Utilities Com v Pollak, 343 US 451, 466; 72 S Ct 813 ( 1952 )
29. Mirych v State Fair Commission, 376 Mich 384( 1965 )
30. Consumer Power v Iosco Circuit Judge, 210Mich 572 (1920)
31. Hayes-Albion v Kuberski, 108Mich App 642, 657-658 (1981)
32. Gruprynski v Bay Judge, 166 Mich 118, 123-124 (1988)
33. People v Gauntlett, 134 Mich 737, 757-761 (1984)
34. MCR 2.003 et seq.
35. Caleffe v Vitale, 65 ALR 4th 67, 71-72 (1986)
36. See 46 Am Jur 2d, Judges ss. 86; see also ss. C (1) (a. b) of Canon 3 of the Code 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (Am Jur 2d Desk book)
"Fraud on the
Court by an Officer of the Court"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A
judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge
is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully.
A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government
to act impartially and lawfully.
State and federal attorneys fall into the same
general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the
court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
Whenever
any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she
is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States,
763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated
"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is
directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties
or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court
or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the
judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial
functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the
court proceeding?
"Fraud
upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is
also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud
upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of
Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The
maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to
judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F.
Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim
that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re
Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that
fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894),
affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338
Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home
Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
4. What
causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
Federal
law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain
circumstances.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")
("Section 455(a)
of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants
from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judicial process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.
None
of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear
to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of
no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".
To amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to improve attorney accountability, and for other
purposes.
|
The judge
has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial
capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more
lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a
judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he/she has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.
Since both treason and the interference
with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in
such acts.
Michigan Court Rules
Rule
2.003 Disqualification of Judge
(A)
[Unchanged.]
(B)
Grounds. A judge is disqualified when
the judge cannot
Impartially hear
a case, including but not limited to
Instances in
which:
(1) The judge is personally biased or prejudiced
for
Or against a party or attorney.
(2) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
(3) The judge has been consulted or employed as
an
Attorney in the matter in controversy.
(4) The judge was a partner of a party, attorney
for
A party, or a member of a law firm representing a
Party within the preceding two years.
(5) The judge knows that he or she, individually
or
As a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or
Child
wherever residing, or any other member of
The judge's family residing in the judge's
Household, has an economic interest in the
Subject matter in controversy or in a party to
The proceeding or has any other more
than de
Minimis interest that could be substantially
Affected by the proceeding;
(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person
Within the third degree of relationship to either
Of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(a) Is a party to the proceeding, or an
Officer, director or trustee of a party;
(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding?
(c) Is known by the judge to have a more than
De minimis interest that could be
Substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be
A material witness in the proceeding.
A judge is not disqualified merely because the
Judge’s former law clerk is an attorney of record
For a party in an action that is before the judge
Or is associated with a law firm representing a
Party in an action that is before the judge.
(C)
[Unchanged.]
(D)
Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may
Be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the
Parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence
Of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If,
Following disclosure of any basis for disqualification
Other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
The parties without participation by the judge, all agree
That the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge
Is then willing to participate, the judge may participate
In the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or
Placed on the record.
Rule 2.003 Disqualification of Judge
PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES
(A)
Who May Raise. A party may raise the issue of a judge's
disqualification by motion, or the judge may raise it.
(B)
Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot
impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which:
(D) That the
judge has knowledge he/she may be called as a material witness.
(1)
The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against
a party or attorney.
(2) The judge has personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
(3) The judge has been consulted or
employed as an attorney in the matter in controversy.
(4) The judge was a partner of a party,
attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm representing a party within the
preceding two years.
(5) The judge knows that he or she,
individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever
residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's
household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in
a party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that
could be substantially affected by the proceeding.
(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or
a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(A) Is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party;
(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding;
(c) Is known by the judge to have a
more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding;
(d) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceedings.
Footnote: Again Plaintiff/Defendant George Lyons
filed 39+ Emergency Motions to Disqualify Livingston County Judge’s for
Biasness.
Which The Livingston County Judges refused to acknowledge.
PLUS THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURT JUDGES REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EVIDENCE
THAT WAS PRESENT TO THE JUDGE PER LAWSUITS. In Summary’s that was given
to the court prior to any hearings before any judges.
Per MICHIGAN COURT RULES:
A judge is not disqualified merely
because the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of record for a party in an
action that is before the judge or is associated with a law firm representing a
party in an action that is before the judge.
(C) Procedure.
(1)
Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial and inconveniencing
the witnesses, a motion to disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the
moving party discovers the ground for disqualification. If the discovery is
made within 14 days of the trial date, the motion must be made forthwith. If a
motion is not timely filed, untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury
trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion should be granted.
(2)
All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit. In any motion under
this rule, the moving party must include all grounds for disqualification that
are known at the time the motion is filed. An affidavit must accompany the
motion.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall
decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a)
In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a
party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo;
(b)
In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the
chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the
motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo.
(4) Motion Granted. When a judge is
disqualified, the action must be assigned to another judge of the same court,
or, if one is not available, the state court administrator shall assign another
judge.
(E) Remittal of
Disqualification. If it appears that there may be grounds for disqualification,
the judge may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the
presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification.
If, following disclosure of any basis
for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
the parties without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should
not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge
may participate in the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or placed
on the record.
Disqualification
of Judges
Federal
law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain
circumstances.
In 1994,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if
an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's
impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer
to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be
disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct.
1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts
have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a
requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not
the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v.
Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is
directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is
actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge
but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
process.").
That Court
also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any
proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor
v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord,
456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that
the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he
has received justice.”
Our
Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an
interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of
justice.
One of our
members not only did not receive justice from a prejudiced judge, but he does
not believe that he received justice from the judge, as required by law.
"Recusal
under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in
support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte
under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further,
the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion
asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further
stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the
judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri,
at 1202.
Judges do
not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound
to follow the law. Does your judge follow the law?
Should a
judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given
another example of his "appearance of partiality" which further
disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the
disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an
"appearance of partiality" and has disqualified
himself/herself. None of the orders issued any judge who has been
disqualified by law are valid, they are void as a matter of law, and are
of no legal force or effect.
However,
as we know, many judges ignore the law, but by doing so, they not only attempt
to harm you, the public, but they have made a mockery of the law, and have
evidenced a disdain for Justices of higher courts, such as the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeal. If judges do not have respect for other judges,
why should judges expect the respect of the public?
Should a
judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842,
845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice
is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a
judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party
has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge may have been
engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate
commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and
not in the judge's judicial capacity. The judge has no more lawful
authority than your next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge).
However since some judges believe that they are the Lord, they may not follow
the law. (Judge Rosen entered his courtroom each day, stood before the
court audience, raised his hand, and stated that he was the Lord. The
night before he was to be indicted, he took a gun and blew his brains
out. So much for a judge being the Lord.)
If you
were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to
non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of
partiality" and, under the law, has disqualified him/herself.
However,
since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges
follow the law, it is possible that your judge may not know the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states
"disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be
disqualified" under certain circumstances.
One of our
members has filed several motions for disqualification, only to have the judge
ignore the motions. The member will post on this web-site several of the
motions filed, to give the public a taste of the law and how judges ignore the
Supreme Law of the Land. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars
against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason
to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically
disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and we suggest
that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference
with interstate commerce.
Courts
have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.
Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal
acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
This
member will post some of his motions here for educational purposes, and links
to these motions will be found on this page.
We will
also inform you on what you can do to assist others in disqualifying judges.
Please assist when requested.
The above citations are only
the tip of the iceberg in the disqualification of judges. Citizens
would appreciate your informing us of any additional citations, whether Federal
or State, that concern the disqualification of a judge. Help complete
this page of information.
Criminal
Penalties
Section 324.XXXXX Criminal
Penalties; fraud
(1) Beginning on [the effective date of the act], a person,
who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or
indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation,
certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or
required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this
part, knowing that the statement, report, confirmation, certification,
proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be
maintained is false or misleading, is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $50,000.00,
or both. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by
any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.
(2) A person who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted,
either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report,
confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document
filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under
this part, knowing that the statement, representation, plan, report,
confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other document
filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is subject to a
civil fine of $50,000.00 for each submission. For purposes of this subsection,
a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such transmittal
constitutes a separate submission.
(3) A person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony
and shall be fined not less than $2,500.00 or more than $50,000.00 for each
violation:
(a) Knowingly releases a hazardous substance or causes a release
contrary to applicable federal, state, or local requirements or contrary to any
permit or license held by that person, if that person knew or should have known
that the release could cause personal injury or property damage.
(b) Intentionally damages or renders inaccurate any monitoring
device or permanent marker required to be maintained under this part or a rule
promulgated under this part.
(c) Intentionally destroys any record required to be maintained
under this part or rule promulgated under this part.
(d) Knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of an
environmental covenant existing at a facility when obligated to do so, and that
failure results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under
the conditions that pose an acute risk.
(e) Intentionally alters, removes or damages an exposure barrier
designed to prevent exposures to hazardous substances, including, but not
limited to, a physical barrier or written instrument and that action results in
exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions
that pose an acute risk.
(f) Intentionally fails to disclose to a purchaser, lessee,
easement holder or vendee that real property is a facility subject to due care
provisions [at the point of sale, lease, easement grant, or vendee contract] in
accordance with section [Disclosure and Notice Requirements] and that
failure to disclose results in exposure to a hazardous substance at
concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.
(4) In addition to a fine imposed under subsection (1) or (3), the
court may impose an additional fine of not more than $25,000.00 for each day
during which the release or
DEQ Proposal Page 1
of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009
I.
History of Judicial Disqualification
Disqualification
standards in the United States have been a work in
progress,
gaining in complexity and strength over time. Under English
common law,
the only accepted basis for judicial disqualification was
financial
interest—disqualification for bias was not recognized. In
1792, the U.S.
Congress enacted legislation that was the precursor to 28
U.S.C. § 455.
This legislation codified the common law by calling for
disqualification
of a district judge who was “concerned in interest,” but
added that a
judge could also be disqualified if he “has been of counsel
for either
party.”10 The statute was expanded in 1821 to
require disqualification
when relatives
of the judge appeared as parties.11
In 1891, Congress enacted legislation, later
codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 47, forbidding a judge from hearing the appeal of a case that
the
judge tried.12 In
1911, the precursor to § 455
was further amended to
require disqualification when the judge was a material witness
in the
case.13 That same year, Congress enacted new
legislation (later codified
as 28 U.S.C. §
144) entitling a party to secure the disqualification of a
judge by
submitting an affidavit that the judge has “a personal bias or
prejudice”
against the affiant or for the opposing party. A decade later,
in Berger
v. United States,14
the Supreme Court interpreted this statute to
prohibit a
judge from ruling on the truth of matters asserted in such an
affidavit, and
to require automatic disqualification if the affidavit was
facially
sufficient.
In 1927, the
Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to
the law of
disqualification. In Tumey v. Ohio,15 the Court invalidated,
on due process
grounds, an Ohio statute that authorized a judge to
preside over
cases in which the judge would receive court costs assessed
against
convicted (but not acquitted) defendants.
By the
mid-twentieth century, common-law aversion to judicial
bias as
grounds for disqualification continued to exert considerable
10.
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 178–79 (1792).
11.
Act of Mar. 3, 1821, ch. 51, 3 Stat. 643 (1821).
12.
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 23, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (1891).
13.
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 20, 36 Stat. 1090 (1911).
14.
255 U.S. 22 (1921).
15.
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
6
II.
Disqualification Under
28
U.S.C. § 455
A. Overview
1.
The text of § 455
The primary
source of disqualification law in the federal judicial system
is 28 U.S.C. §
455. It provides, in its entirety, as follows:
§
455. Disqualification of justice, judge or magistrate judge
(a)
Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be
questioned.
(b)
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1)
Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2)
Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in
controversy,
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during
such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or
such
lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(3)
Where he has served in governmental employment and in such
capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning
the
proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular
case
in controversy;
(4)
He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or
minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject
matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest
that
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5)
He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship
to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i)
Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee
of
a party;
(ii)
Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii)
Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected
by the outcome of the proceeding;
.
(iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely
to be a material witness in
the proceeding
(c)
A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial
interests,
and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the
personal
financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in
his household.
III.
Disqualification Under
28
U.S.C. § 144
A. Overview
Section 144 of
Title 28 states in its entirety:
Whenever
a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files
a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter
is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or
in
favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein,
but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The
affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias
or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before
the
beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
good
cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party
may
file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a
certificate
of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith.419
By its terms,
§ 144 applies only to district judges, as compared to
§ 455, which
applies to any “justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States.”
A literal reading of § 144 suggests that a party can force
disqualification
automatically, simply by filing an affidavit alleging that
the judge is
biased against the affiant or in favor of the affiant’s opponent.
Such an
interpretation would render § 144 akin to peremptory
disqualification
procedures adopted by judicial systems in a number of
western states—and
the legislative history of § 144 lends some support
for this interpretation.420
The federal
courts have indeed held that under § 144 a judge must
step aside
upon the filing of a facially sufficient affidavit; but they have
been exacting
in their interpretations of what a facially sufficient affidavit
requires and
of the procedural prerequisites to application of the
statute. Thus,
motions have been dismissed for untimeliness; because
the movant
failed to submit an affidavit or submitted more than one
affidavit;
because the attorney rather than a party submitted the affida-
419.
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949). Originally enacted as § 21 of the Judicial Code of
1911,
the statute was recodified as § 144 in 1948 without significant change.
420.
46 Cong. Rec. 2627 (1911) (remarks of Representative Cullop).
84
IV.
Disqualification Under
28
U.S.C. § 47
A little-used
disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 47, provides that “no
judge shall
hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or
issue tried by
him.”476 One reason the statute has barely surfaced
in the
case law is
that its applicability is limited to cases in which a trial judge
subsequently
serves as an appellate judge in the same matter, which
may occur when
a district judge is appointed to the circuit court or sits
on the circuit
court by designation. A second reason it is so rarely employed
is that on
those occasions where it suggests a basis of disqualification,
the same
result would also be reached by reference to § 455(a).
As an
historical aside, however, it may be noted that this was not always
so. When
members of the Supreme Court “rode circuit” in the
eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, it was not uncommon for
them to hear
appeals as Supreme Court justices from cases they decided
as circuit
court judges.
In Russell
v. Lane,477
the trial judge in a habeas case reviewed a decision
of a state
appellate court in which the judge had been a member
of the panel.
The Seventh Circuit found that this created an appearance
of impropriety
in violation of § 455(a). In reaching that decision, however,
the court
cited the relevance of § 47, noting that it “is an express
ground for
recusal . . . in modern American law for a judge to sit on
the appeal
from his own case.”478
A somewhat
more extended discussion of § 47 is found in an opinion
by Judge James
Craven, Jr., of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth
Circuit, explaining his disqualification from a school desegregation
case.479 As a district judge years earlier, he
heard and decided a
case involving
the same parties. Although the instant case was a separate
lawsuit, it
raised the identical “ultimate question.” Citing the Supreme
Court’s
treatment of the predecessor statute to § 47, Judge Craven
held that the
statute must be “strictly construed” to prevent judges
476.
28 U.S.C. § 47 (1994).
477.
890 F.2d 947 (7th Cir. 1989).
478.
Id. at
948.
479. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 135
(4th Cir.
Violation
continues. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of the person under this subsection, the court shall impose a fine
of not less than $25,000.00 and not more than $50,000.00 per day of violation.
Upon conviction under subsection (3), in addition to a fine, the court in its
discretion, may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for not more than 2
years or impose probation upon a person for a violation of this part. With the
exception of the issuance of criminal complaints, issuance of warrants, and the
holding of an arraignment, the circuit court for the county in which the
violation occurred has exclusive jurisdiction.
(5)
Upon a finding by the court that the action of a criminal defendant prosecuted
under this section poses or posed a substantial endangerment to public health,
safety, or welfare, the court shall impose, in addition to the penalties set
forth in subsections (3) and (4), a fine of not less than $1,000,000.00; and,
in addition to a fine, a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.
(6)
To find a defendant criminally liable for substantial endangerment under
subsection (5), the court shall determine that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly acted in such a manner as to cause a danger of death or serious
bodily injury, and that either of the following has occurred:
(a)
The defendant had an actual awareness, belief, or understanding that his or her
conduct would cause a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(b)
The defendant acted in gross disregard of the standard of care that any
reasonable person would observe in similar circumstances.
(7)
As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury
that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical
pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
(8)
Knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant under subsection (5)
may be attributed to the defendant if the defendant took affirmative steps to
shield himself or herself from the relevant information.
(9)
The attorney general or county prosecutor may conduct an investigation of an
alleged violation of this section and bring an action for a violation of this
section.
(10)
If the attorney general or county prosecutor has reasonable cause to believe
that a person has information or is in possession, custody, or control of any
documents or records, however stored or embodied, or tangible object relevant
to an investigation for violation of this part, the attorney general or county
prosecutor may, before bringing any action, make an ex parte request to
a magistrate for issuance of a subpoena requiring that person to appear and be
examined under oath or to produce the documents, records, or objects for
inspection and copying, or both. Service may be accomplished by any means
described in the Michigan court rules. Requests made by the attorney general
may be brought in Ingham County.
(11)
If a person objects to or otherwise fails to comply with a subpoena served
under subsection (10), an action may be brought in district court to enforce
the demand. Actions filed by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham
County.
MDEQ Proposal Page 2
of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009
Mr. Jones this is
only the tip of the ice berg: I have so much evidence that it’s overwhelming.
Including brief cases of audio tapes. Last Court date was and the end of 2013.
Respectfully submitted
George Edward Lyons
6180 Academy Drive
Suite 4
Brighton, Michigan 48116
734-330-1004
October 17, 2014
"Fraud
on the Court by an Officer of the Court" And "Disqualification of
Judges, State and Federal"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"? 2. What is "fraud on the court"? 3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding? 4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully.
State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
1. Who is an "officer of the court"? 2. What is "fraud on the court"? 3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding? 4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully.
State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated
"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the 29
Entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
Federal law requires the automatic
disqualification of a judge under certain circumstances. In 1994, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective
observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality.
If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude
that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified."
[Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")
("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
The
Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,
80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct.
11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he
is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice. 30
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge.
Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.
None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order
after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of
any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the
Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". H R 420
|
The following document is a copy that I
could not scan the original because having no scanner. I have 38 more Emergency
Motions for Disqualification of Judges for biasness. Who were also called as
Material Witnesses? And more.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no. 06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
IN THE 44th JUDICAL CIRCUIT COURT OF (LIVINGSTON COUNTY)
210 S. HIGHLANDER WAY, HOWELL, MICHIGAN, 48843 (517-546-9816)
State of Michigan court administrator
For assignment of case to another judge
GEORGE EDWARD LYONS HONORABLE CHIEF JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE
P.O.BOX 226 Case no. 06-021758-CZ
PINCKNEY, MICHIGAN 48169 Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
734-657-1679 Case no. 04-20684-CK
PLAINTIFF
-V-
RONALD STORZBACH AND VIRGINIA STORZBACH H/W
7709 PARTRIDGE HILL,
Brighton, Michigan 48116
Moved to: 912 Sand wedge Court
Bowling Green, KY 42103-2508
UNKNOWN
DEFENDANTS
Richard Friberg and Ann Friberg H/W
5640 Shoshoni Pass
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
540-823-3271
Moved to: 19385 Briar Patch Drive
Gordonville, Va. 22942-7564
DEFENDANTS
David Feeback and Carrie Feeback H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
10932 Whitewood Attorney for Defendants
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
NEAL D.
NIELSEN
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
DEFENDANTS 2000 Grand River
Suite 200
Brighton, Michigan 48114
Curt
Lalonde and Mary Ann Lalonde H/W Case no. 06-021758-CZ
3100 Crystal Springs Lane
3100 Crystal Springs Lane
Aka
3100 Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-878-2278
Attorney for the Defendant’s
Lalonde’s and
attorney Charles Widmaier
Attorney
Kenneth V. Zich
515 E. Grand
River Avenue,
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139
Howell, Michigan. 48543
Karl Kopp and Marian Kopp H/W Case no. 04-020652-CF-B
4849 GALLAGHER
WHITMORE LAKE, MI. 48139
810-231-3286
Attorney for the Defendants Kopp’s
Douglas
Cameron
DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,
DEFENDANTS 317 W. MAIN Street
Brighton, Michigan 48116
IVO AND HEATHER MARCICH H/W Case no. 04-20684-CK
3155 Crystal Spring Lane,
Aka
Betty Lyons Lane
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier attorney for the
Pinckney, Michigan 48169 Charles Widmaier attorney for the
Defendant’s
Marcich’s
734-878-1874 822 E. Grand River
Brighton, M 48116
734-878-1874 822 E. Grand River
Brighton, M 48116
FOLLOWING EMERGENCY MOTION FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF HONORABLE JUDGE STANLEY LATREILLE PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES.
AND ATTORNEYS FILING FALSE SUMMARY DISPOSITION OF DEFENDANT’S AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO REMOVAL ALL CLAIMS, AND ALL CASES ON STAY UNDER INVESTIGATION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN JUDICIAL TENURE INVESTIGATION AND OTHER INVESTIGATOR’S
NOW
COMES PLAINTIFF GEORGE EDWARD LYONS, States that Honorable Judge Stanley
Latreille did not follow court procedures or guidelines of the MCR. 2.003.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.
As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
A. That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge and if there is not a Chief Judge these cases be re-open and all judgments be removed and Sent to the State of Michigan Administer office for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
B. That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
C. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
D. Honorable Judge Stanley Latreille did not follow these procedures. Plaintiff demands that these procedures be followed per the MCR. 2.003 And must be followed.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.
As per and if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
ALTERNATIVE, IF THIS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
1.That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq
2.That this Honorable Court Chief judge to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
3. That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
Plaintiff
George E. Lyons made this motion and says:
1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:
3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.
4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.
a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);
b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).
1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.
2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.
5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS
6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116
9. All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live
58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live
59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live
60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live
61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live
62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live
63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live
all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.
1. Within the past (14) days, Plaintiff has become aware of facts giving Rise to disqualification in all lawsuits and therefore this motion has been brought in a proper, timely manner under MCR 2.003 et seq.
2. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives cannot impartially hear any matter involving this case because:
3. that his Honor Stanley Latreille is being called as a witness in this case.
4. Also being called as witness is Attorney Charles Widmaier, Neil Neilson, Douglas Cameron, and there companies.
a. This Court and other legal representatives is biased or prejudiced for or against either or both of the parties to this action, and biased in favor of past/present Defendant’s. Defendant’s attorney, which is disqualifying under MCR 2.003(B) (2);
b. This Honorable Court and other legal representatives are disqualified by law for numerous other reasons under the provisions of MCR 2.003(B) (7).
1. That this Honorable Court and other legal representatives and all other Livingston County judicial or Circuit officers and court personnel should be disqualified from acting upon, hearing, deciding or otherwise participating in any further disposition of this case in any manner, except to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003(B) (2) and to disqualify as requested; as required by MCR 2.003 (B) (2) and or MCR 2.003 (B) (7), the grounds for which are stated herein are stated herein and in the attached affidavit.
2. That per Plaintiff Witness List the following is included.
5. Charles Widmaier (P-38376) Material Witness Live
Attorney for the Defendants confirm audio
822 E. Grand River Avenue
Brighton, Michigan
(810-229-9340)
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS
6. Employees of Harris & Literski Material Witness Live
317 E. Grand River confirm audio
Brighton, Michigan 48116
9. All Judges’ of Livingston County are called as Material Witness Live
Court system District / Circuit confirm audios
and all employees’ Honorable Judge Burress Material witness Live
58. Honorable Judge Hegarty Material witness Live
59. Honorable Judge Latreille Material witness Live
60. Honorable Judge Reader Material witness Live
61. Honorable Judge Delvero Material witness Live
62. Honorable Judge Reck Material witness Live
63. Honorable Judge Pickeranin Material witnesses live
all employees of Livingston Material witness Live
County.
FOOTNOTE:
THE ABOVE WERE ALSO CALL AS MATERIAL WITNESS IN THE 38 EMERGENCEY MOTIONS FOR
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE’S FOR BIASNESS.
64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live
And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
64. Magistrate Brown Material witness Live
And if the above would follow under conflict of Interest, and are not used as witnesses in this case and others cases that are being filed in the near future.
The July 10, 1995 amendments of MCR 2.003, and Rules 3A, 3D, 6C, and 7B of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, and new MCR 9.227 and Rule 7D of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct, are based on the proposed revision of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct submitted by the State Bar Representative Assembly. See 442 Mich 1216 (1993). They are effective September 1, 1995.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a) In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who shall decide the motion de novo;
(b) In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who shall decide the motion de novo.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully request:
A. that this motion be granted; and,
B. that this matter be thereafter transferred to the State Court Administrator’s office for reassignment to wherefore another circuit as required by MCR 2.003 et seq.
RELIEF
ALTERNATIVE, THIS WAS MOTION IS DENIED, Plaintiff respectfully demands;
That this motion be referred and transferred the 44th Circuit Court Chief Judge for a de nova hearing and /or other or further proceedings MCR. 2003 et seq.,
That this Honorable Court to set aside any and all judgments and refrain from taking any further actions on this case during the pendency of said disqualification proceedings, as required under MCR 2.003 et seq., and
That this Court refrain from taking any further action on this case during the tendency of said disqualification proceedings, except those ministerial action necessary to comply with applicable statutes, court rules and case law.
Procedure:
Proper procedure for handling a motion to disqualify is well established and was recently summarized in Czuprynski v Bay 1 2 follows:
“The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:
MCR 2.003 provides that a party or attorney seeking disqualification must file a written motion supported by an affidavit of facts and including all know grounds for disqualification. The Judge complained of then holds a hearing and decides the motion.
The motion was denied, and then the plaintiff is NOW referring the motion to the chief judge who must decide the motion or submit this to the State of Michigan administrator Office for a de novo on the record 32/33.
This motion is being request by the Plaintiff and per MCR 2.003 be followed. And placed before the Chief Judge and “The procedure for disqualification of a trial judge . . . which was formerly provided by statute is now provided by court rule. MCR 2.003 generally, that procedure is exclusive and must be followed. “10/31.:
Respectfully submitted this January 31st, 2007
By: __________________________________
George E. Lyons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box 226
Pinckney, Michigan 48169
734-657-1679
"Fraud on the
Court by an Officer of the Court"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"
And "Disqualification of Judges, State and Federal"
1. Who is an "officer of the court"?
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
2. What is "fraud on the court"?
3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?
4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"
A
judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge
is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully.
A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government
to act impartially and lawfully.
State and federal attorneys fall into the same
general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the
court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
Whenever
any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she
is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States,
763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated
"Fraud upon the court is fraud which is
directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties
or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court
or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the
judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly
corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."
"Fraud
upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. It is
also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud
upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of
Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The
maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to
judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F.
Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim
that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re
Village of Willow brook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that
fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed
162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App.
79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security
Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Under Michigan and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.
Federal
law requires the automatic disqualification of a judge under certain
circumstances.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.")
("Section 455(a)
of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants
from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judicial process.").
That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice.
"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202.
Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself.
None
of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear
to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of
no legal force or effect.
Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce".
To amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to improve attorney accountability, and for other
purposes.
|
The judge
has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial
capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more
lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a
judge). However some judges may not follow the law.
If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.
However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances.
The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he/she has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.
Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.
Since both treason and the interference
with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in
such acts.
Michigan Court Rules
Rule
2.003 Disqualification of Judge
(A)
[Unchanged.]
(B)
Grounds. A judge is disqualified when
the judge cannot
Impartially hear
a case, including but not limited to
Instances in
which:
(1) The judge is personally biased or prejudiced
for
Or against a party or attorney.
(2) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
(3) The judge has been consulted or employed as
an
Attorney in the matter in controversy.
(4) The judge was a partner of a party, attorney
for
A party, or a member of a law firm representing a
Party within the preceding two years.
(5) The judge knows that he or she, individually
or
As a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or
Child
wherever residing, or any other member of
The judge's family residing in the judge's
Household, has an economic interest in the
Subject matter in controversy or in a party to
The proceeding or has any other more
than de
Minimis interest that could be substantially
Affected by the proceeding;
(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or a person
Within the third degree of relationship to either
Of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(a) Is a party to the proceeding, or an
Officer, director or trustee of a party;
(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding?
(c) Is known by the judge to have a more than
De minimis interest that could be
Substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) Is to the judge's
knowledge likely to be
A material witness in the proceeding.
A judge is not disqualified merely because the
Judge’s former law clerk is an attorney of record
For a party in an action that is before the judge
Or is associated with a law firm representing a
Party in an action that is before the judge.
(C)
[Unchanged.]
(D)
Remittal of Disqualification. If it appears that there may
Be grounds for disqualification, the judge may ask the
Parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence
Of the judge, whether to waive disqualification. If,
Following disclosure of any basis for disqualification
Other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
The parties without participation by the judge, all agree
That the judge should not be disqualified, and the judge
Is then willing to participate, the judge may participate
In the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or
Placed on the record.
Rule 2.003 Disqualification of Judge
PER MICHIGAN COURT RULES
(A)
Who May Raise. A party may raise the issue of a judge's
disqualification by motion, or the judge may raise it.
(B)
Grounds. A judge is disqualified when the judge cannot
impartially hear a case, including but not limited to instances in which:
(D)
That
the judge has knowledge he/she may be called as a material witness.
(1)
The judge is personally biased or prejudiced for or against
a party or attorney.
(2) The judge has personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
(3) The judge has been consulted or
employed as an attorney in the matter in controversy.
(4) The judge was a partner of a party,
attorney for a party, or a member of a law firm representing a party within the
preceding two years.
(5) The judge knows that he or she, individually
or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or
any other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has
an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding.
(6) The judge or the judge's spouse, or
a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse of such a person:
(A) Is a party to the proceeding, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party;
(b) Is acting as a lawyer in the
proceeding;
(c) Is known by the judge to have a
more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding;
(d) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceedings.
Footnote: Again Plaintiff/Defendant George Lyons
filed 39+ Emergency Motions to Disqualify Livingston County Judge’s
for Biasness.
Which The Livingston County Judges refused to acknowledge.
PLUS THE LIVINGSTON COUNTY COURT JUDGES REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE EVIDENCE
THAT WAS PRESENT TO THE JUDGE PER LAWSUITS. In Summary’s that was given
to the court prior to any hearings before any judges.
Per MICHIGAN COURT RULES:
A judge is not disqualified merely
because the judge's former law clerk is an attorney of record for a party in an
action that is before the judge or is associated with a law firm representing a
party in an action that is before the judge.
(C) Procedure.
(1)
Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial and inconveniencing
the witnesses, a motion to disqualify must be filed within 14 days after the
moving party discovers the ground for disqualification. If the discovery is
made within 14 days of the trial date, the motion must be made forthwith. If a
motion is not timely filed, untimeliness, including delay in waiving jury
trial, is a factor in deciding whether the motion should be granted.
(2)
All Grounds to be Included; Affidavit. In any motion under
this rule, the moving party must include all grounds for disqualification that
are known at the time the motion is filed. An affidavit must accompany the
motion.
(3) Ruling. The challenged judge shall
decide the motion. If the challenged judge denies the motion,
(a)
In a court having two or more judges, on the request of a
party, the challenged judge shall refer the motion to the chief judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo;
(b)
In a single-judge court, or if the challenged judge is the
chief judge, on the request of a party, the challenged judge shall refer the
motion to the state court administrator for assignment to another judge, who
shall decide the motion de novo.
(4) Motion Granted. When a judge is
disqualified, the action must be assigned to another judge of the same court,
or, if one is not available, the state court administrator shall assign another
judge.
(E) Remittal of
Disqualification. If it appears that there may be grounds for disqualification,
the judge may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the
presence of the judge, whether to waive disqualification.
If, following disclosure of any basis
for disqualification other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
the parties without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge should
not be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge
may participate in the proceedings. The agreement shall be in writing or placed
on the record.
Disqualification
of Judges
Federal
law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain
circumstances.
In 1994,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if
an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's
impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer
to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be
disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct.
1147, 1162 (1994).
Courts
have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a
requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not
the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v.
Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is
directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is
actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
§455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge
but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial
process.").
That Court
also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any
proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor
v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord,
456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that
the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he
has received justice.”
Our
Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States,
362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348
U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an
interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of
justice.
One of our
members not only did not receive justice from a prejudiced judge, but he does
not believe that he received justice from the judge, as required by law.
"Recusal
under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in
support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte
under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d
1189 (7th Cir. 1989).
Further,
the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion
asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further
stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the
judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri,
at 1202.
Judges do
not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound
to follow the law. Does your judge follow the law?
Should a
judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given
another example of his "appearance of partiality" which further
disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the
disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an
"appearance of partiality" and has disqualified
himself/herself. None of the orders issued any judge who has been
disqualified by law are valid, they are void as a matter of law, and are
of no legal force or effect.
However,
as we know, many judges ignore the law, but by doing so, they not only attempt
to harm you, the public, but they have made a mockery of the law, and have
evidenced a disdain for Justices of higher courts, such as the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeal. If judges do not have respect for other judges,
why should judges expect the respect of the public?
Should a
judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842,
845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice
is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause.").
Should a
judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party
has been denied of any of his/her property, then the judge may have been
engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate
commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and
not in the judge's judicial capacity. The judge has no more lawful
authority than your next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge).
However since some judges believe that they are the Lord, they may not follow
the law. (Judge Rosen entered his courtroom each day, stood before the
court audience, raised his hand, and stated that he was the Lord. The
night before he was to be indicted, he took a gun and blew his brains
out. So much for a judge being the Lord.)
If you
were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to
non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of
partiality" and, under the law, has disqualified him/herself.
However,
since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges
follow the law, it is possible that your judge may not know the ruling of the
U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states
"disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be
disqualified" under certain circumstances.
One of our
members has filed several motions for disqualification, only to have the judge
ignore the motions. The member will post on this web-site several of the
motions filed, to give the public a taste of the law and how judges ignore the
Supreme Law of the Land. The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars
against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason
to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically
disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and we suggest
that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference
with interstate commerce.
Courts
have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts.
Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal
acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.
This
member will post some of his motions here for educational purposes, and links
to these motions will be found on this page.
We will
also inform you on what you can do to assist others in disqualifying judges.
Please assist when requested.
The above citations are only
the tip of the iceberg in the disqualification of judges. Citizens
would appreciate your informing us of any additional citations, whether Federal
or State, that concern the disqualification of a judge. Help complete
this page of information.
Criminal
Penalties
Section 324.XXXXX Criminal
Penalties; fraud
(1) Beginning on [the effective date of the act], a person,
who makes or submits or causes to be made or submitted, either directly or
indirectly, a statement, representation, plan, report, confirmation,
certification, proposal, or other information or other document filed or
required to be maintained under this part and rules promulgated under this
part, knowing that the statement, report, confirmation, certification,
proposal, or other information or other document filed or required to be
maintained is false or misleading, is guilty of a felony punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $50,000.00,
or both. For purposes of this subsection, a submission includes transmittal by
any means and each such transmittal constitutes a separate submission.
(2) A person who makes or submits or causes to be made or
submitted, either directly or indirectly, a statement, representation, plan,
report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other
document filed or required to be maintained under this part and rules
promulgated under this part, knowing that the statement, representation, plan,
report, confirmation, certification, proposal, or other information or other
document filed or required to be maintained is false or misleading, is subject
to a civil fine of $50,000.00 for each submission. For purposes of this
subsection, a submission includes transmittal by any means and each such
transmittal constitutes a separate submission.
(3) A person who does any of the following is guilty of a felony
and shall be fined not less than $2,500.00 or more than $50,000.00 for each
violation:
(a) Knowingly releases a hazardous substance or causes a release
contrary to applicable federal, state, or local requirements or contrary to any
permit or license held by that person, if that person knew or should have known
that the release could cause personal injury or property damage.
(b) Intentionally damages or renders inaccurate any monitoring
device or permanent marker required to be maintained under this part or a rule
promulgated under this part.
(c) Intentionally destroys any record required to be maintained
under this part or rule promulgated under this part.
(d) Knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of an
environmental covenant existing at a facility when obligated to do so, and that
failure results in exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under
the conditions that pose an acute risk.
(e) Intentionally alters, removes or damages an exposure barrier
designed to prevent exposures to hazardous substances, including, but not
limited to, a physical barrier or written instrument and that action results in
exposure to a hazardous substance at concentrations or under the conditions
that pose an acute risk.
(f) Intentionally fails to disclose to a purchaser, lessee,
easement holder or vendee that real property is a facility subject to due care
provisions [at the point of sale, lease, easement grant, or vendee contract] in
accordance with section [Disclosure and Notice Requirements] and that
failure to disclose results in exposure to a hazardous substance at
concentrations or under the conditions that pose an acute risk.
(4) In addition to a fine imposed under subsection (1) or (3), the
court may impose an additional fine of not more than $25,000.00 for each day
during which the release or
DEQ Proposal Page 1
of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009
Violation
continues. If the conviction is for a violation committed after a first
conviction of the person under this subsection, the court shall impose a fine
of not less than $25,000.00 and not more than $50,000.00 per day of violation.
Upon conviction under subsection (3), in addition to a fine, the court in its
discretion, may sentence the defendant to imprisonment for not more than 2
years or impose probation upon a person for a violation of this part. With the
exception of the issuance of criminal complaints, issuance of warrants, and the
holding of an arraignment, the circuit court for the county in which the
violation occurred has exclusive jurisdiction.
(5)
Upon a finding by the court that the action of a criminal defendant prosecuted
under this section poses or posed a substantial endangerment to public health,
safety, or welfare, the court shall impose, in addition to the penalties set
forth in subsections (3) and (4), a fine of not less than $1,000,000.00; and,
in addition to a fine, a sentence of 5 years imprisonment.
(6)
To find a defendant criminally liable for substantial endangerment under
subsection (5), the court shall determine that the defendant knowingly or
recklessly acted in such a manner as to cause a danger of death or serious bodily
injury, and that either of the following has occurred:
(a)
The defendant had an actual awareness, belief, or understanding that his or her
conduct would cause a substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury.
(b)
The defendant acted in gross disregard of the standard of care that any
reasonable person would observe in similar circumstances.
(7)
As used in this section, "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury
that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme physical
pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.
(8)
Knowledge possessed by a person other than the defendant under subsection (5)
may be attributed to the defendant if the defendant took affirmative steps to
shield himself or herself from the relevant information.
(9)
The attorney general or county prosecutor may conduct an investigation of an
alleged violation of this section and bring an action for a violation of this
section.
(10)
If the attorney general or county prosecutor has reasonable cause to believe
that a person has information or is in possession, custody, or control of any
documents or records, however stored or embodied, or tangible object relevant
to an investigation for violation of this part, the attorney general or county
prosecutor may, before bringing any action, make an ex parte request to
a magistrate for issuance of a subpoena requiring that person to appear and be
examined under oath or to produce the documents, records, or objects for
inspection and copying, or both. Service may be accomplished by any means
described in the Michigan court rules. Requests made by the attorney general
may be brought in Ingham County.
(11)
If a person objects to or otherwise fails to comply with a subpoena served
under subsection (10), an action may be brought in district court to enforce
the demand. Actions filed by the attorney general may be brought in Ingham
County.
MDEQ Proposal Page 2
of 3 Criminal Penalties August 24, 2009
Mr. Jones this is
only the tip of the ice berg: I have so much evidence that it’s overwhelming.
Including brief cases of audio tapes. Last Court date was and the end of 2013.
Respectfully
submitted
George Edward Lyons
6180 Academy Drive
Suite 4
Brighton, Michigan 48116
734-330-1004
October 17, 2014